SOPhiA

12th Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy

2022

Programme and Abstracts

Location:	Department of Philosophy (Humanities)
	University of Salzburg
Date:	September 7–9, 2022
Language:	English
Website:	http://www.sophia-conference.org/

Contents

Preface

I n recent years the opportunities for keeping track of science-business for students of philosophy has increased. The raising number of essay competitions and graduate conferences support this claim.

❧

In 2022, the Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy is, once again, joining the midst of these events. The title of the conference already reveals some details about the organizers, the contributors and the conference's guiding principles. To avoid missunderstandings we want to add the following remarks: (i) Because of the high number of international participants, Salzburg stands for the location of the conference only, not for the nationality of its participants. (ii) One of the conference's distinctive feature compared to similar events is that we do not make any constraints regarding the topic of presentations. (iii) On the contrary, every philosophical discipline – as long as it is carried out in an analytic way – has its place at SOPhiA.

❧

By combining (ii) and (iii) we want to demonstrate, in contrast to some voices which claim that Analytic Philosophy constrains our intellectual life, that all traditional topics can be advantageously examined in the framework of Analytic Philosophy. It is our utmost concern to unite analytic philosophers from all around the world (cf. (i)). This is also in the sense of Carnap, who claims in his early work *The Logical Structure of the World*:

> "*The new type of philosophy has arisen in close contact with the work of the special sciences, especially mathematics and physics. Consequently they have taken the strict and responsible orientation of the scientific investigator as their guidline for philosophical work, while the attitude of the traditional philosopher is more like that of a poet. This new attitude not only changes the style of thinking but also the type of problem that is posed. The individual no longer undertakes to erect in one bold stroke an entire system of philosophy. Rather, each works at his special place within the one unified science.*"

In spirit of this motto, we wish you an interessting conference, fruitfull discussions and stimulating thoughts.

The Organization Committee

Figures and Facts

Timeframe and general information. From September 7th-9th 2022 the twelfth Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy (SOPhiA 2022) will be held at the University of Salzburg's Department of Philosophy (Humanities). The conference is public and attending it is free of charge. The official language of the conference is English. Contributed talks will be given by philosophy students (pre-doc). The conference is hosted by members of the University of Salzburg's Department of Philosophy (Humanities) and former affiliates. The organizers can be contacted via organization@sophia-conference.org.

❧

Mission statement. Within the conference, problems of all areas of philosophy should be discussed. A thematical focus is not intended. The conference therefore has no specific theme. The presentations should rather set themselves apart by a methodological limitation to the tradition of Analytic Philosophy by usage of clear language and comprehensible arguments. The conference is meant to be a common effort to clearly formulate some of the problems of philosophy and to provide critical assessments of them. No individual is expected to construct "a whole building of philosophy" all by himself; rather, the conference hosts expect everyone, as Carnap proposes, to bring the undertaking forward "at his specific place within" philosophy.

❧

Procedure. SOPhiA 2022 will be a hybrid event with presentations by speakers who will be in person in Salzburg (offline) and speakers who will present online. As of now, about two third of our speakers intend to present in person. In order to guarantee a maximum degree of accessibility and flexibility, we will assign to each offline conference room of our venue at the University of Salzburg an online room. All presentations will be held/broadcasted in both types of rooms in parallel. This way all forms of combination of offline/online presentation and offline/online audience will be possible. In toto, about 150 participants are expected. There will be 105 contributed talks, 5 workshops, and 4 plenary talks.

Legend of Programmes

Time	HS E.002	SR 1.003	SR 1.004	SR 1.005	SR 1.006	SR 1.007
09:45–10:00	Opening & SOPhiA Best Paper Award					
10:00–11:30	Plenary Lecture — Bas van Fraassen — *Scientific Theories and Their Empirical Support* — Chair: Raimund Pils — (English, Location HS E.002)					
11:30–11:45	Coffeebreak					
11:45–12:30	Synthese Session: Publishing Workshop with the Synthese Editor in Chief (Otávio Bueno) — (English, Location HS E.002, Online Talk)					
12:30–14:00	Lunch Break					
14:00–14:30	Philosophy of Mind — Aisha Qadoos — *The possibility of a one-many body-person relation* — Chair: Martin Niederl — (English)	Epistemology — Krzysztof Sękowski — *Expertise and Concept Revision through the Method of Cases* — Chair: Niklas Gärtner — (English) (Online Talk)	Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics — Janu Paul Engler — *Variations of Intuitionistic Revisionism* — Chair: Maren Bräutigam — (English)	Ethics — Lia Nordmann — *The Role of Minds and Mites in Korsgaard's Account of Duties to Animals* — Chair: Stephen Müller — (English)	Metaphysics/Ontology — Yohan Molina — *The Metaphysic of Constitutive Standards* — Chair: Youssef Agaioul — (English)	Political Philosophy — Nicole Maria Prosser — *Justifying Claims for Justice: Identity and Epistemic Power* — Chair: Giada Coleschi — (English)
14:40–15:10	Philosophy of Mind — Elisa Bezençon — *Understanding the essence of a property in several ways: on the plausibility of the "dual-config thesis" and its importance in philosophy of mind* — Chair: Martin Niederl — (English) CHANGE: The talk is cancelled!	Epistemology — Bin Zhao — *On Relativizing the Sensitivity Condition to Belief Formation Methods* — Chair: Niklas Gärtner — (English) (Online Talk)	Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics — Diego Campos Sasdelli — *Impredicativity and the Paradoxes of Deontic Logic* — Chair: Maren Bräutigam — (English)	Ethics — Levin Güver — *Intention, Closeness, and Double Effect* — Chair: Stephen Müller — (English)	Metaphysics/Ontology — Markel Kortabarria — *Grounding and metaphysical explanation: Is it really that complicated?* — Chair: Youssef Agaioul — (English)	Political Philosophy — Heye Munakжan — *Charles Mills' misinterpretations and insurmountable difficulty regarding John Rawls's ideal theory* — Chair: Giada Coleschi — (English) (Online Talk)
15:20–15:50	Philosophy of Mind — Palша Yaroshik — *Do we need a care for gender-biased AI?* — Chair: Martin Niederl — (English) (Online Talk)	Epistemology — Filippo Riscica Lizzio — *Pluralistic Ignorance and Group Belief* — Chair: Niklas Gärtner — (English) (Online Talk)	Philosophy of Science — Martin Voggenauer — *Productive Higher-Level Causation Without Mechanisms* — Chair: Maren Bräutigam — (English)	Ethics — Karl Reimer — *Motivating AI-Legal Personhood an Agency Account* — Chair: Stephen Müller — (English) (Online Talk)	Metaphysics/Ontology — Emanuele Tullio — *Inheritance Temporalism: Sketching a Novel Temporalist Approach* — Chair: Youssef Agaioul — (English)	Political Philosophy — Martina Valkonic — *Norm externalisation and the evolution of cooperation* — Chair: Giada Coleschi — (English) CHANGE: The talk is cancelled!
16:00–16:30	Philosophy of Mind — Camden McKenna — *Analyzing Time-Consciousness: A Pluralistic Proposal* — Chair: Martin Niederl — (English) (Online Talk)	Epistemology — Simon Graf — *Uniqueness, Permissivism, and Self-fulfilling Beliefs* — Chair: Niklas Gärtner — (English)	Philosophy of Science — Luca Gasparinetti — *"Wittgensteinian Quietism": A Quietist Cure for Philosophers of Time* — Chair: Maren Bräutigam — (English) (Online Talk)	Ethics — Leonard Dung — *The symbolic objection to sentience as criterion for moral status* — Chair: Stephen Müller — (English)	Metaphysics/Ontology — Szymon Sapalski — *Inferentialist Framing of Metaontological Expressivism* — Chair: Youssef Agaioul — (English)	Political Philosophy — Blaž Huzjak — *Freedom Without Ability* — Chair: Giada Coleschi — (English) (Online Talk)
16:30–16:50	Coffee Break					
16:50–17:20	Philosophy of Mind — Jakob Roloff — *Actions Deviating from Selection History: A Teleofunctionalist Solution to the Problem of Deviant Causal Chains of Actions* — Chair: Martin Niederl — (English)	Epistemology — Daniela Schuster — *The epistemic-alaethic uncertainty distinction for formal epistemology and suspension of judgement* — Chair: Niklas Gärtner — (English) CHANGE: The talk is cancelled!	Philosophy of Science — Ina Jäntgen — *How to measure effect sizes for rational decision-making* — Chair: Maren Bräutigam — (English)	Ethics — Konstantin Eckl — *The amoral Common Ground of Subjectivist Metaethics* — Chair: Gregor Greslehner — (English) (Online Talk)	Metaphysics/Ontology — Violeta Conde — *Necessitism and Unrestricted Quantification* — Chair: Youssef Agaioul — (English) (Online Talk)	Political Philosophy — Marlene Maidinger — *Understanding Voluntariness* — Chair: Giada Coleschi — (English)
17:30–18:00	Philosophy of Mind — Jan Rostek — *Reconciling group mind hypothesis with inherently phenomenal mentality* — Chair: Martin Niederl — (English)	Epistemology — Nikolaj Sharakov — *Invariantist Account of Epistemic Gaslighting* — Chair: Niklas Gärtner — (English)	Philosophy of Science — Jan Bomer — *Causal Power Quantified - A Generalization and Defense of Cheng's Causal Power Measure* — Chair: Maren Bräutigam — (English)	Ethics — Nolan Cannon — *Knocking Normative Necessity* — Chair: Gregor Greslehner — (English) (Online Talk)	Metaphysics/Ontology — Bogdan Dumitrescu — *Freedom to branch otherwise: The compatibility between freedom and an A-theoretic branching theory of time* — Chair: Youssef Agaioul — (English) (Online Talk)	
18:00–18:15	Break					
18:15–19:45	Plenary Lecture — Leonhard Menges — *A Moral Problem For Free Will* — Chair: Stephen Müller — (English, Location HS E.002)					
19:45–21:30	Warm Evening Buffet					

Time	HS E.002	SR 1.003	SR 1.004	SR 1.005	SR 1.006	SR 1.007
			Location			
10:00-10:30	**Philosophy of Mind** Martin Niederl *Animal Reasoning via Conative Salience* Chair: Jakob Roloff (English)	**Epistemology** Leon Schöppl *Modeling epistemic violence: How testimonial quieting and smothering undermine collective inquiry* Chair: Nikolai Shurakov (English)	**Philosophy of Science** Martina Calderisi *Probability confirmation, and the base-rate fallacy* Chair: Ina Jäntgen (English) *(Online Talk)*	**Ethics** Cécile Rosat *Actional Theory of Adam Smith Sympathy* Chair: Silvana Pani *CHANGE: The talk is cancelled!*	**Metaphysics/Ontology** Pelin Kasar *Social Construction as Grounding: Demarcating the Important/Covert Cases* Chair: Alejandro Gracia di Renzo (English) *(Online Talk)*	**Philosophy of Language** Gabriel Levc *Plausible Deniability and Epistemic Authority* Chair: Teresa Flera (English)
10:40-11:10	**Philosophy of Mind** Robin Timothee Bianchi *Agency and Causation* Chair: Jakob Roloff (English) *(Online Talk)*	**Epistemology** Shimpei Endo *Truthmakers for Epistemicism* Chair: Nikolai Shurakov (English)	**Philosophy of Science** Maren Bräutigam *On similar fermions: what's heterodox about heterodoxy?* Chair: Ina Jäntgen (English)		**Metaphysics/Ontology** Youssef Aguisoul *Substrata and Incoherence* Chair: Alejandro Gracia di Renzo (English)	**Philosophy of Language** Ayoob Shahmoradi *Thinking Without Discriminating* Chair: Teresa Flera (English)
11:20-11:50	**Philosophy of Mind** Valentina Martinis *Cognitive Phenomenal Presence* Chair: Jakob Roloff (English) *(Online Talk)*	**Epistemology** Niklas Gärtner *The irrationality of conspiracy theories: Why the way we acquire evidence should affect our credence* Chair: Nikolai Shurakov (English)	**Philosophy of Science** Jakob Lissy *The Price of Deception: Thinking of Greenwashing in Terms of its Economic Preconditions* Chair: Ina Jäntgen (English)	**Ethics** Shmuel Gomes *Properties and the Value of Persons* Chair: Silvana Pani (English) *(Online Talk)*	**Metaphysics/Ontology** Alfonso Romero Zuniga *A neo-aristotelian approach to the ontology of events* Chair: Alejandro Gracia di Renzo (English)	**Philosophy of Language** Giada Coleschi *The Logicality of Language Hypothesis: New Evidence in Favour of the Rescale Approach* Chair: Teresa Flera (English)
12:00-12:30	**Philosophy of Mind** Daniel Weger *Internalist Representationalism and the Predictive Mind* Chair: Jakob Roloff (English)	**Epistemology** Leonardo Flamini *Are we always neutral or undecided when we inquire?* Chair: Nikolai Shurakov (English) *CHANGE: The talk is cancelled!*	**Philosophy of Science** Oykü Ulusoy *Behaviourism vs. Mentalism: Two Approaches to Decision Theory and the Normative Implications of Modelling Practice* Chair: Ina Jäntgen (English)		**Metaphysics/Ontology** Minseok Kim *Predication, Ways of being and Properties* Chair: Alejandro Gracia di Renzo (English) *(Online Talk)*	**Philosophy of Language** Sara Papic *Linguistic Correctness as a Response to the Normativity Argument* Chair: Teresa Flera (English)
12:30-14:00	De Gruyter Session and De Gruyter Reception with subsequent lunch break (English, Location: HS E.002)					
14:00-15:30	**Plenary Lecture** Vera Hoffmann-Kolss *What Can You Do with Causal Models? Grounding, Levels, Individuation of Properties* Chair: Alexander Gebharter (English, Location: HS E.002)					
15:30-16:00	Break					
16:00-19:30	**Workshop 1** Ina Jäntgen & Charlotte Zemmel & Ahmad Elabbar *Conventions in Science: conceptual, epistemic and ethical* (English)	**Workshop 2 (Hybrid)** Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla & Alexander Gebharter & Maria Sekatskaya *(Non-)Reductionism in the Metaphysics of Mind* (English)	**Workshop 3 (Hybrid)** Niel Linnemann & Thorben Petersen *Affiliated Workshop on the Metaphysics of Space-Time: The End of Time?* (English)	**Workshop 4** Matteo de Ceglie *Reflecting on 10 years in the set theoretic multiverse* (English)	**Workshop 5** Peter Brössel & Eline Kuipers *Novel Approaches to Knowledge-How and Skilled Action* (English)	

Time	Location					
	HS E.002	**SR 1.003**	**SR 1.004**	**SR 1.005**	**SR 1.006**	**SR 1.007**
10:00–10:30	Philosophy of Mind Eduardu Vascargu *Decoding unitovian the metacommunicative file* Chair: Daniel Weger (English) *(Online Talk)*	Epistemology Leon Assaad *Ideology-Based Trust in Information Sources: A Bayesian Analysis* Chair: Cristian Valpe (English)	Philosophy of Science Vera Shumilina *The Use of Works on Scientific Explanation for Explainable Artificial Intelligence* Chair: Wojciech Grabon (English) *(Online Talk)*	Ethics Felix Danowski *Reliability for the Quasi-Realist* Chair: Sibiana Pani (English)	Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics Maciej Głowacki *Formalism, Incompleteness, and the Implicit Commitment Thesis* Chair: Leon Commandeur (English) *(Online Talk)*	Philosophy of Language Teresa Plera *Indexicals in literary fiction* Chair: Hugo Ribeiro Mota (English)
10:40–11:10	Philosophy of Mind Michael Hegarty *Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness and Origins of Agency* Chair: Daniel Weger (English) *(Online Talk)*	Epistemology Ignacio Federico Madroñal *Recognition and parity: A consequence of deep disagreement between epistemic peers* Chair: Cristian Valpe (English) *(Online Talk)*	Philosophy of Science Dalila Serebrinsky *Epistemic Stances, Argumentation and Simulation.* Chair: Wojciech Grabon (English)	Ethics Michael Vollmer *Moral Worth and the Two Kinds of Reasons Challenge* Chair: Sibiana Pani (English)	Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics Jared Illand *Realism on Thin Ice: An Argument from Mathematical Practice* Chair: Leon Commandeur (English) *(Online Talk)*	Philosophy of Language Marlene Valek *Silencing as Resistance* Chair: Hugo Ribeiro Mota (English)
11:20–11:50	Philosophy of Mind Abhishek Vadav *Mary meets Mike: In defense of the Knowledge Argument* Chair: Daniel Weger (English) *(Online Talk)*	Epistemology Maciej Tarnowski *Comparing pragmatic and introspection-based explanations of Moore's Paradox* Chair: Cristian Valpe (English)	Philosophy of Science Nina Nicolin *Trope-Ontological Interpretation of Quantum Field Theory - A Case Study of Inductive Metaphysics* Chair: Oykü Ulusoy (English)	Ethics Lorenzo Testa *Justified Non-moral Blame* Chair: Sibiana Pani *(Online Talk)*	Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics Katia Parshina *Philosophical Assumptions Behind the Rejection of Computer-Based Proofs* Chair: Leon Commandeur (English)	Philosophy of Language Sutanupa Chakraborty *Are Realism and Truth Enigmas? : A Dammedian Response* Chair: Hugo Ribeiro Mota (English) *(Online Talk)*
12:00–12:30	Philosophy of Mind Bruno Cortesi *Some remarks on the correct interpretation of the thesis of Revolution in the philosophy of mind* Chair: Daniel Weger (English)	Epistemology Paige Massey *Extraordinary Permission* Chair: Christian Valpe (English)	Philosophy of Science Marin Naegard *How Do Quantum Systems Persist?* Chair: Wojciech Grabon (English) *(Online Talk)*	Ethics Martin Sijberg *On Scanlon's Individualist Restriction* Chair: Sibiana Pani (English)	Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics Alejandro Gracia Di Rinzo *A Vindication of the Universal Set* Chair: Leon Commandeur (English)	Philosophy of Language Margit Witte *Concept Use and Hermeneutical Justice* Chair: Hugo Ribeiro Mota (English) *(Online Talk)*
12:30–14:00	Lunch Break					
14:00–14:30	Philosophy of Mind Alexander Hollen *Embodied skills and knowledge-how as the basis for concept possession* Chair: Bruno Cortesi (English)	Epistemology Cristian Valpe *A Dispositional Theory of Practical Basing* Chair: Leon Assaad (English)	Philosophy of Science Wojciech Grabon *Models and Their Normativity* Chair: Oykü Ulusoy (English)	Ethics Krzysztof Głowacki *Peter Singer. Ethical Significance of the Community, and Bottom-Up Ethics* Chair: Felix Danowski (English) *Online Talk*	Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics Oguz Akcelik *Bolzano and Quine on Nomic Truths* Chair: Katia Parshina (English) *CHANGE: The talk is cancelled!*	Philosophy of Language Antonina Jamrozik & Zuzanna Jusinska *Gendered Personal Pronouns as Presupposition Triggers* Chair: Marlene Valek (English) *Online Talk*
14:40–15:10	Philosophy of Mind Maja Griem *"Active attention guidance" as a basic scaffold for (social) cognition* Chair: Bruno Cortesi (English) *(Online Talk)*	Epistemology Ilia Patronnikov *Is transfer of epistemic warrant the mark of inferential transitions?* Chair: Leon Assaad (English) *(Online Talk)*	Philosophy of Science Marcin Wozny *On the role of idealisations in high interpretation* Chair: Oykü Ulusoy (English) *CHANGE: The talk is cancelled!*	Ethics Ida Mizcke *Integrity or partiality? On Bernard Williams and consequentialism* Chair: Felix Danowski (English) *(Online Talk)*	Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics Ismael Ordoñez Miguens *Mathematical Objectivity: Truth and Independence* Chair: Katia Parshina (English)	Philosophy of Language Arnold Grigorian *Non-realistic model theory for a realistic modal language: the case of contingentism* Chair: Marlene Valek (English) *Online Talk*
15:20–15:50	Philosophy of Mind Daniel Kim *Naive Realism and Temporal Expectations* Chair: Bruno Cortesi (English) *(Online Talk)*	Epistemology Mels Han Gencer *On the Belief Condition in Thomas Bick's Theory of Action* Chair: Leon Assaad (English) *(Online Talk)*	Philosophy of Science Ußım Bica *What is like to be a perspectival model. The spectrum analogy* Chair: Oykü Ulusoy (English) *(Online Talk)*	Ethics Linda Priano *Hate speech: between regulation and counterspeech* Chair: Felix Danowski (English)	Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics Gareth Rhys Pearce *Epistemic Normativity for Non-Classical Truth* Chair: Katia Parshina (English) *(Online Talk)*	Philosophy of Language Hugo Ribeiro Mota *Resolving social deep disagreements: argumentation and change of perspective* Chair: Marlene Valek (English)
16:00–16:30	Philosophy of Mind Dmitry Tourko *Selfhood as an Emergent Property* Chair: Bruno Cortesi (English) *(Online Talk)*	Epistemology Valentin Teillet *Knowledge-First Psychology* Chair: Leon Assaad (English) *CHANGE: The talk is cancelled!*	Philosophy of Science Hamid Mirhosseini *What and how do we represent in science and art?* Chair: Oykü Ulusoy (English)	Ethics Ni Zhang *Are Reasons of Partiality Deontic?* Chair: Sibiana Pani (English) *(Online Talk)*	Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics Leon Commandeur *Logical Instrumentalism for Anti-Exceptionalists* Chair: Katia Parshina (English)	Philosophy of Language Ella Valerie Berger *Identifying medical gaslighting: A subjective, outcome-based approach* Chair: Marlene Valek (English) *Online Talk*
16:30–16:45	Coffee Break					
16:45–18:15	Plenary Lecture Otavio Bueno *Models and Modal Knowledge* Chair: Christian J Feldbacher (English, Location: HS E.002) *(Online Talk)*					
18:15–20:00	Closing Dinner (Restaurant)					

Plenary Talks

Scientific Theories and Their Empirical Support

Bas van Fraassen

As traditionally conceived, experimental support for a theory is a form of evidential support, and evidential support is a form of confirmation. Disentangling this concept cluster, in part through a new appreciation of Newton's methodology and the development of post-Newtonian theories, was a developing story during the last fifty years. I will argue for a clear separation between empirical support of theories and confirmation.

Section:	Plenary Talk: Opening
Language:	English
Chair:	Raimund Pils
Date:	10:00-11:30, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location:	HS E.002

A Moral Problem For Free Will

Leonhard Menges

The aim of this talks is to raise a new challenge for free will. The starting point is the observation that a certain kind of free will plays a specific and under-examined role in our everyday and philosophical thinking: it makes certain responses that are typically morally unacceptable acceptable or at least less unacceptable. The question I will pose is this: what is the thing that could play that role? I will discuss several possible answers and I will show that they are not convincing. I will argue that this discussion has an interesting upshot for how we should approach free will. To anticipate: our metaphysical thinking should be guided by our moral thinking.

Section:	Plenary Talk
Language:	English
Chair:	Stephen Müller
Date:	18:15-19:45, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location:	HS E.002

What Can You Do with Causal Models? Grounding, Levels, Individuation of Properties

Vera Hoffmann-Kolss

Causal models have become one of the most popular tools for analyzing the concept of causation. Moreover, several authors have recently pointed out that the formal framework of causal models can be used to analyze other metaphysically relevant notions. In this paper, I will explore the advantages and the limitations of this approach. In particular, I will consider the notions of grounding, levels and the problem of property individuation and investigate to what extent we can use causal models to gain metaphysical insights about them.

Section:	Plenary Talk
Language:	English
Chair:	Alexander Gebharter
Date:	14:00-15:30, 08 September 2022 (Thursday)
Location:	HS E.002

Models and Modal Knowledge

Otavio Bueno

Are models a source of modal knowledge? Or do they only encode information that is relevant to obtain and establish such knowledge? In this paper, I examine this issue by considering some approaches to the epistemology of modality and the epistemology of models in science. I focus on views that defend that there is a very close connection between scientific models and modal knowledge and justification (Fischer [2017]) and views that emphasize that modality are features of models (van Fraassen [1980] and [1989]), with the resulting conclusion that modal knowledge (assuming that there is any) should emerge from model knowledge (that is, knowledge of the models). In contrast with these views, I argue that models convey relevant information about the modal, but they themselves are not the source of modal knowledge. Rather, modal knowledge results from knowledge of the relevant properties of the objects under consideration, and models typically have an auxiliary role of encoding some of the relevant information. In this respect, the epistemology of modality

is not significantly different from the epistemology of scientific models in that it uses models as a useful device to infer information about the relevant objects, but it is ultimately one's access to the objects and their properties that provides the proper grounds for modal knowledge. Modality is then understood as an objective feature of the objects under consideration (in contrast with van Fraassen's proposal) and modal knowledge and justification depends neither on inference to the best explanation nor on theoretical virtues more generally (in contrast with Fischer's view). A form of empiricist modalism is then recommended (Bueno and Shalkowski [2015] and [2020]).

References:
Bueno, O., and Shalkowski, S. [2015]: "Modalism and Theoretical Virtues: Toward an Epistemology of Modality", Philosophical Studies 172, pp. 671-689.
Bueno, O., and Shalkowski, S. [2020]: "Troubles with Theoretical Virtues: Resisting Theoretical Utility Arguments in Metaphysics", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101, pp. 456-469.
Fischer, B. [2017]: Modal Justification via Theories. Cham: Springer.
van Fraassen, B.C. [1980]: The Scientific Image. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
van Fraassen, B.C. [1989]: Laws and Symmetry. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Section:	Plenary Talk: Closing
Language:	English
Chair:	Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla
Date:	16:45-18:15, 09 September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	HS E.002

Workshops

Workshop: Conventions in Science: conceptual, epistemic and ethical

Organisation: Ina Jängten & Charlotte Zemmel & Ahmad Elabbar

This workshop addresses the nature and roles of conventions in science. As a form of collective inquiry, scientists are frequently bound by communal rules and standards - what we might call ?conventions? - that prescribe how to conduct research: from the choice of p-values in statistical hypothesis testing to the proper storage of lab samples and the visualization of data. Despite the ubiquity and centrality of conventions in science, we thus far lack a thorough understanding of them. What exactly are conventions in science? What epistemic function do they serve? What gives conventions their normative force? And, under what conditions, if any, may researchers properly violate conventions? This workshop aims to explore such questions from a range of philosophical perspectives.

Keynote Speaker:
- Professor Quill R Kukla: Maps and the Epistemic Risks of Visual Representations

Graduate student speakers:
- Shivani Aggarwal (University of Cambridge): "Epistemic Protectionism and Conventions in the Pharmaceutical Sciences"
- Gerald Teng (Tufts University): "Transcendental realism and the new metaphysics of physical quantities"
- Miguel Ohnesorge (University of Cambridge): "The Limits of Conventional Justification: Inductive Risk and Industry Bias Beyond Conventionalism"
- Ilvie Prince (Leibniz Universität Hannover): "Contraception: a non-health-related medical task?"

Abstracts:

Maps and the Epistemic Risks of Visual Representations

Prof. Quill R Kukla

I argue that maps, taken as epistemic tools, present a number of dis-

tinctive epistemic risks, and that no set of representational conventions or epistemic standards can eliminate these risks. There is no such thing as an objective or value-free map; rather, the production of any map is governed by a variety of value-driven choices. While the value-ladenness of scientific reasoning is familiar to philosophers of science from the literature on inductive risk, visual representations of data such as maps pose epistemic risks that are distinct from (but just as ineliminable as) inductive risks. Three of these are aesthetic risk, categorization risk, and simplification risk. With respect to each, maps that are accurate according to recognizable representational conventions not only fail to avoid these risks but may even present heightened risk. Unconventional maps that make their distinctive, value- laden perspective clear may offer special epistemic benefits.

Epistemic Protectionism and Conventions in the Pharmaceutical Sciences

Shivani Aggarwal

The science of pharmacology has a telos tied to public health: the discovery and development of medicinally-useful drugs. The epistemic inquiry of those engaged in pharmacology, be it an individual scientist working at a government-funded university laboratory or a team of researchers for a large corporation is constrained by communal rules and standards - "conventions" - in countless nations. For instance, it is frequently held that in order to demonstrate that a drug is safe and effective for a given therapeutic condition, scientists must collect evidence by means of randomized control trials (RCTs). National regulatory bodies such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the United States or the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) hold political authority to prevent the output of the pharmaceutical sciences from reaching doctors and patients unless the rules and standards set by convention are met. Indeed, historians such as Carpenter (2014) have noted the unique power of an agency such as the FDA to not only regulate the market, but to exercise conceptual influence over the "parameters" of experimentation and production. I raise the question as to whether such conventions are in tension with progress in the pharmaceutical sciences. Answering this question necessitates an analysis of the function of conventions in this scientific domain. I argue that these conventions serve both an epistemic and a

pragmatic function that generally justifies their maintenance through state power.

Regarding the epistemic dimension of conventions in the pharmaceutical sciences, Ahlstrom-Vij (2013) identifies the RCT constraint as one of his three central examples of 'epistemic paternalism' ? external constraints upon the inquiry of others done for the epistemic good of those being interfered with. I suggest that the setting and maintaining of conventions in the pharmaceutical sciences not only prevents common sources of bias from occurring in the scientific process, but also provides valuable epistemic good for the public which would not be generated otherwise. Then, drawing on John (2011)'s discussion of fixed versus floating epistemic standards from the context of scientific communication, I argue that these conventions have a criticial pragmatic function in that they enable downstream decision-makers such as doctors and patients to make informed decisions by serving as reliable signals of expertise. Non-experts make the assumption that experts are only endorsing drugs if they meet certain consistent thresholds ? violating convention can therefore disrupt trust in the medical system.

The implications of this suggest that attempts to liberalize institutions such as the FDA and remove requirements for allowing pharmaceuticals on the market should be approached with caution. This diverges from the views expressed by individuals such as Epstein (2005) and Salbu (1994) but is in alignment with Navarro and Teira (2021) who argue that despite often originating from a "patient advocacy" position, such reforms are often counterproductive to patient aims. Conventions should be rigorously maintained and rarely violated; further concerns about off-label prescription practices and compassionate use programs can be raised.

Transcendental realism and the new metaphysics of physical quantities

Gerald Teng

There is a recent surge of interest in the nature of physical quantities in analytic metaphysics (see Arntzenius and Dorr 2012; Dasgupta 2013; Eddon 2013; Peacocke 2015; Perry 2015; Kim 2016; Sider 2020; Baker 2020; Wolff 2020). These discussions are motivated by what I call transcendental realism about physical quantities? the stance that we can speak of physical quantities in-themselves a priori, as abstracted from "epistemic" talk about the role of physical quantities in scientific

practice. However, transcendental realism about physical quantities is controversial. Historically, anti-realists such as Bridgman (1927) and van Fraassen (1980) have argued that physical quantities are nothing over and above heuristics in our theory-mediated measurement conventions and operations.

Anti-realism has a prima facie flaw. The transcendental realists are right to insist that there must be something "out there" that ensures the quantitativeness and the convergence of our measurements. Nevertheless, the transcendental realists fail to appreciate the anti-realist insight that we cannot intelligibly separate? even by stipulation? ?epistemic? from "metaphysical" talk about physical quantities. In this paper, I will devise an improved argument against transcendental realism about physical quantities, and I will show that all attempts to defend the stance fail. I then sketch a positive proposal for a "minimal" realist approach towards physical quantities. The strategy is as follows. In §1 and §2, I explain transcendental realism about physical quantities. In §3, I argue that all analytic metaphysicians working on the subject presume transcendental realism. In §4 I gloss the contemporary debate between absolutism and structuralism about physical quantities. I will show that that the debate ends at an unproductive impasse. I then argue, in §5, that the limitations of both absolutism and structuralism may be traced back to the shared assumption of transcendental realism. Next, in §6, I consider and reject three ?meta-metaphysical? reasons to retain transcendental realism: that physical quantities in-themselves are necessary truthmakers for our true representations; that they are essential grounds for our metaphysical explanations; and that they are productive "naïve" models of the world in-itself. Lastly, in §7, I provide a brief sketch of a "minimal realist" approach towards research into physical quantities. I propose that the minimal realist ought to "bracket" all talk about the reality or unreality of physical quantities and instead talk about physical quantities as they are (re)presented to us in our experience and scientific conventions.

Minimal realism about physical quantities has two key advantages. Primarily, minimal realism accounts for all the "meta-metaphysical" evidence adduced in favor of both transcendental realism and anti-realism. Minimal realism also enables us to adduce a greater variety of (historical and sociological) evidence for or against our specific theories about physical quantities. Secondarily, minimal realism affords greater insight into the constitution and objectivity of our scientific measurements of physical quantities. I will argue that our scientific conventions and op-

erations ought to be seen as constitutive of physical quantities, and that we ought to think of the objectivity of physical quantities as nothing over and above the convergence of our theory-mediated measurements.

The Limits of Conventional Justification: Inductive Risk and Industry Bias Beyond Conventinalism

Miguel Ohnesorge

This article develops a constructive criticism of methodological conventionalism. Methodological conventionalism asserts that standards of inductive risk ought to be justified in virtue of their ability to facilitate coordination in a research community. On that view, industry bias occurs when conventional methodological standards are violated to foster industry preferences. The underlying account of scientific conventionality, however, is insufficient for theoretical and practical reasons. Conventions may be justified in virtue of theor coordinative functions, but often qualitfy for posterior empirical criticism as research advances. Accordingly, industry bias does not only threaten existing conventions but may impede their empirically warranted improvement if they align with industry preferences. My empiricist account of standards of inductive risk avoids such a problem by asserting that conventional justification can be pragmatically warranted but has, in principle, only a provisional status. Methodological conventions, therefore, should not only be defended from preference-based infringements of their coordinative function but ought to be subjected to empirical criticism.

Contraception: a non-health-related medical task?

Ilvie Prince

It is not controversial that prescribing contraception is, in fact, an activity provided by the medical community. More controversial is the question of what makes this activity medical. Philosophers have been thinking about what is at the core of the medical activity and the role of a physician for a long time. This debate is no longer very lively, but it is also not settled. There is a wide range of positions, from singularist accounts that define he cure of disease as the primary goal to pluralist accounts that present a whole range of equally important goals. What seems to be settled for most philosophers of medicine is, that activi-

ties such as prescribing contraception are not an activity in line with the health-related main aim(s) of medicine. They present other mostly pragmatic reasons for locating this activity in the medical field.

This classification contrasts with scientific considerations when assessing the risks of contraceptive side effects. Contraceptive pills and long-acting reversible contraceptives are assessed under the conventional framework for pharmaceutical medical interventions. Thus, when balancing the acceptability of side effects, the risk associated with side effects are weighed against the efficacy, benefits, and necessity of the intervention. In particular, the necessity of intervention is often justified by the importance of avoiding a major health risk that is already present. The extent to which such a framework can capture the non-health-related dimensions of an intervention, or even conflicts with the non-health-relatedness of contraception, is open to question.

In my talk I will offer some thoughts on why I think it is fruitful to engage with the conception of birth control as a medical task for ethical and epistemological reasons. I also attempt to sketch a conceptualization of medical tasks on the borderlines of health and social needs. The latter are often masked as the former when operating under the scientific conventions of medicine which translates into epistemic gaps as well as encroaching behaviors in care. When going beyond the scope of what is conventionally understood as medicine, research and evaluation methods need to be adjusted. Otherwise, our scientific conventions might keep us blind to relevant facts.

Section:	Workshop
Language:	English
Date:	16:00-19:30, 08 September 2022 (Thursday)
Location:	hybrid

Workshop: (Non-)Reductionism in the Metaphysics of Mind

Organisation: Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla & Alexander Gebharter & Maria Sekatskaya

Many theories in the social sciences and humanities use concepts referring to mental properties. These concepts are currently not replaceable by concepts from more fundamental scientific theories. Irreducibility of mental concepts and the explanatory role they play in scientific explanations of higher-level sciences led to the conclusion that mental properties are real, causally efficacious, and non-identical to physical properties. This gives us a reason to reject reductive physicalism. However, there are metaphysical reasons to accept it. One of the most famous is the causal exclusion argument, which claims that physicalist ontology and the thesis of the causal closure of the physical, together with the idea that mental properties are not identical to physical properties, entail the causal inefficacy of the mental.

This workshop addresses different aspects of reductive and non-reductive accounts in the metaphysics of mind. Contributions discuss the history of reductionism and its connection to logical positivism, the emergence of non-reductive physicalism, and the contemporary state of the art in the debate between reductive and non-reductive physicalist accounts of the mental. The causal exclusion argument and the different non-reductive strategies to counter it will be of particular interest.

Schedule: September 8, 2022 (CET)

16:00 — 16:10   *Workshop Introduction*

16:10 — 16:50   Alexander Gebharter: *Causal Exclusion and Causal Bayes Nets*

16:50 — 17:30   Thomas Blanchard & Andreas Hüttemann: *Causal Modeling, Causal Exclusion and Mutual Dependence*

17:30 — 17:50   *Break*

17:50 — 18:30   Vera Hoffmann-Kolss: *Interventionism, Monotonicity Principles, and Causal Exclusion*

18:30 — 19:10   Raphael van Riel: *Reductionism and Representationalism about the Mental/Non-Mental Distinction*

19:10 — 19:50   Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla & Maria Sekatskaya: *(Non-)Reductionism in Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Mind*

19:50 — 20:00   *Workshop Closing*

Abstracts

**Thomas Blanchard (University of Cologne) &
Andreas Hüttemann (University of Cologne):**
Causal Modeling, Causal Exclusion and Mutual Dependence

An important question for the causal modeling approach is how to
integrate non-causal dependence relations such as asymmetric superve-
nience into the approach. Strikingly, the most prominent proposal to
that effect (due to Gebharter) entails that multiply realizable proper-
ties are causally powerless. If correct, this result is a striking vindica-
tion of Kim's causal exclusion objection against nonreductive physical-
ism. This paper argues, however, that Gebharter's framework should
be rejected, and proposes a significantly different way of integrating
non-causal dependencies within the causal modeling framework that
dissolves exclusion worries. Gebharter's framework, we argue, leads to
serious problems when applied to part-whole relationships: in partic-
ular, it entails (implausibly) that composite entities are causally in-
efficacious. In our view, the key mistake in the framework is the as-
sumption that in causal modeling, non-causal dependencies should be
treated as akin to causal relationships. We argue that this assumption
is poorly motivated, and neglects certain crucial differences between
causal and non-causal dependencies, notably the fact that non-causally
related variables are mutually manipulable. This in turn suggests that
in causal modeling, non-causal dependence relationships are best rep-
resented as mutual dependence relationships. We develop a new kind
of causal model based on this suggestion which we call 'hybrid models'.
Hybrid models differ from causal Bayes nets (the most familiar type of
model in the causal modeling approach) in that they contain both ar-
rows (representing direct causal dependence) and bidirected edges (rep-
resenting direct mutual dependence). Another difference is that hybrid
models contain information about levels of reality at which variables
are located. We formulate plausible Markov and minimality conditions
for hybrid models, and show that the resulting framework fully vindi-
cates the causal efficacy of multiply realizable properties and composite
entities.

**Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla (University of Cologne) &
Maria Sekatskaya (University of Duesseldorf):**
*(Non-)Reductionism in Philosophy of Science and Philosophy
of Mind*

Reduction in philosophy of mind is usually understood in a very strong
sense: as a complete reduction of all mental predicates to physical pred-
icates. In the early stages of logical empiricism, this type of reduction
was considered to be about explicit definability/translatability of the-
oretical predicates with the help of empirical predicates. In philosophy
of mind, non-reducibility of mental predicates is often used to postulate
ontological distinctness of mental properties. However, the step from
the failure of explicit definability of mental concepts in terms of phys-
ical concepts to proclaiming that mental phenomena are ontologically
non-identical to anything physical does not appreciate the complexity of
different forms of scientific reduction. As we will outline, the discussions
of reduction and reductionism in philosophy of mind and philosophy of
science diverged quite a lot. Whereas in philosophy of mind any form
of linking mental to physical concepts that is not based on identifica-
tion or explicit definability is labelled as "non-reductive", in philosophy
of science, explicit definability is considered the strongest, but not the
only possible, form of reduction. A weaker form of reduction is that of
employing bilateral reduction sentences for theoretical predicates such
as dispositional terms. But even this approach was quickly found to be
untenable, for which reason a weaker constraint of reduction in terms
of empirical confirmability of propositions with theoretical predicates
was put forward in the classical empiricist programme. In this talk, we
are going to compare the usage of this concept in these different strands
of debate, and outline a new, and potentially fruitful classification that
integrates philosophy of science and philosophy of mind debates better
with each other.

Alexander Gebharter (UNIVPM, Ancona):
Causal Exclusion and Causal Bayes Nets

In this paper I reconstruct and evaluate the validity of two versions of causal exclusion arguments within the theory of causal Bayes nets. I argue that supervenience relations formally behave like causal relations. If this is correct, then it turns out that both versions of the exclusion argument are valid when assuming the causal Markov condition and the causal minimality condition. I also investigate some consequences for the recent discussion of causal exclusion arguments in the light of an interventionist theory of causation such as Woodward's (2003).

Vera Hoffmann-Kolss (University of Bern):
Interventionism, Monotonicity Principles, and Causal Exclusion

One crucial challenge for interventionist theories of causation is to develop criteria for variable choice. What variables should an apt causal model contain? This question arises especially in causal exclusion contexts, where the question is whether an apt model can contain variables standing in supervenience relations (or other metaphysical dependence relations) to each other.

In this paper, I argue that the set of variables constituting a model should satisfy the following monotonicity requirement: the causal relations occurring in the model would not disappear if further variables were added that do not lead to a violation of Woodward's Independent Fixability constraint. This precludes causal exclusion scenarios that contain variables standing in supervenience relations to each other from being considered apt models.

I furthermore argue that the variables hypothetically added to a model must not only be in accordance with the Independent Fixability constraint, but must also be at least as natural as the variables already included in the model. A general implication of this is that the adequacy of causal models depends on stronger metaphysical assumptions than proponents of interventionism typically assume.

Raphael van Riel (University of Duisburg-Essen):
Reductionism and Representationalism about the Mental/Non-Mental Distinction

In this talk, I discuss a view proposed by Carl Hempel in his paper 'Reduction: Ontological and Linguistic Facets', published in 1969. Hempel suggested that questions regarding the relation between mental states and physiological states should be given what he calls a 'linguistic' (and what I call a 'representationalist') interpretation. I will explicate Hempel's suggestion and sketch one argument in favor of this view.

Section:	Workshop
Language:	English
Date:	16:00-20:00, 08 September 2022 (Thursday)
Location:	SR 1.003

Workshop: The Metaphysics of Space-Time: The End of Time?

Organisation: Niels Linnemann & Thorben Petersen

The major traditions in metaphysics -the analytic and the naturalistic- seriously discuss the possibility that time does not exist, at least not fundamentally so.
Analytic philosophy of time has its roots in McTaggart?s seminal paper 'The Unreality of Time', which gave rise to two influential views of time, namely the A-theory and the B-theory. Whereas A-theorists conceive of time as passing, and B-theorists at least allow that time is intrinsically directed, the grandfather of analytic philosophy of time himself argued that time is merely an illusion.

- Current naturalistic philosophy of time dares to look at speculative theories of quantum gravity, many of which are taken to suggest that time is not part of the fundamental ontology either.

In our symposium, we would like to bring representatives of both of these traditions into a fruitful exchange. The main aim of the session is to provide an introduction to the philosophy of time at the frontier of its debates. Also, we want to give participants a sense of how metaphysics could, and maybe even should operate (nowadays).

Participants:
- Natalja Deng (Yonsei)
- Lucy James (Bristol)
- Niels Linnemann (Bremen)
- Joshua Mozersky (Queen's)
- Thorben Petersen (Bremen)
- Kian Salimkhani (Cologne)

Schedule (3.5 hours, minimum)
16:00 Thorben Petersen (Bremen): Welcome
16:05 Natalja Deng (Yonsei): Tenseless Passage and the limits of theorizing about time
16:35 Joshua Mozersky (Queen's): McTaggart, Quantum Gravity and the Emergence of Time
17:05 Lucy James (Bristol): tba
17:35 25 Minute Break
18:00 Thorben Petersen (Bremen): Why time remains

18:30 Kian Salimkhani (Cologne): The many problems of spacetime emergence in QG (w/ RJ)
19:00 Niels Linnemann (Bremen): On recovering spacetime through spacetime functionalism
19:30 Panel discussion

Section:	Workshop
Language:	English
Date:	16:00-20:00, 08 September 2022 (Thursday)
Location:	SR 1.004

Workshop: Reflecting on 10 years in the set theoretic multiverse

Organisation: Matteo de Ceglie

n 2012, Hamkins published his seminal paper "The set-theoretic multiverse". In this paper, he presented a novel conception that tried to clarify some ambiguous notion in current set theoretic practice. In particular, he provided a revolutionary interpretation for the practice of set-generic forcing: a multiverse of different set theoretic universes. Such an idea immediately sparked an intense debate in the philosophy of set theory and the foundations of mathematics. In the following years, several crucial contributions were made by Antos, Bagaria, Friedman, Gitman, Koellner, Maddy, Meadows, Martin, Steel, Ternullo, Väänänem, Venturi, and Woodin, just to name a few. After 10 years, it's a good moment to take stock, and reflect on the development of the philosophical ideas behind the set theoretic multiverse and its various mathematical characterisations.

Speakers:
- Carolin Antos
- Michal Tomasz Godziszewski
- Joel Hamkins
- Claudio Ternullo

Section:	Workshop
Language:	English
Date:	16:00-19:30, 08 September 2022 (Thursday)
Location:	SR 1.005

Workshop: Novel Approaches to Knowledge-How and Skilled Action

Organisation: Peter Brössel & Eline Kuipers

The philosophical debate concerning knowledge-how is often framed as a divide between intellectualists, who argue that knowledge-how can be reduced to knowledge-that, and anti-intellectualists, who deny this. However, newly emerging positions at the intersection of philosophy of mind and cognitive science are hard to place on either side of this debate because they combine aspects of both camps. With intellectualists, they focus on the internal mental states of agents to whom we want to ascribe knowledge-how. Knowledge-how and skilled action should qualify in certain respects as intelligent achievements. With anti-intellectualists, they argue that these states do not need to be belief-like. Important subjects of discussion within the contemporary debate are the nature, content, and functional role of the representations involved in acquiring and possessing knowledge-how and the relation between knowledge-how and performing skilled bodily action. This workshop aims to address these and other subjects related to the nature of knowledge-how.

Speakers:
- Chiara Brozzo (University of Barcelona): On an Analogy Between Intention and Perceptual Belief
- Eline Kuipers (Ruhr University Bochum): Knowledge-How and the Interface Problem
- Joshua Shepherd (Carleton University and University of Barcelona): Practical Reasoning and Epistemic Feelings

Section:	Workshop
Language:	English
Date:	16:00-19:30, 08 September 2022 (Thursday)
Location:	SR 1.006

Contributed Talks

Substrata and Incoherence

Youssef Aguisoul

ubstrata or propertyless particulars, according to the substratum theorist, exemplify properties. This account is accused of incoherence; indeed, the proposition "propertyless particulars have properties" is contradictory. There are at least three options to escape the accusation. There is one option which qualifies the sense of "propertyless particulars"; another option which eliminates "propertyless particulars"; and another option which neither qualifies the sense nor eliminates the subject matter, but eliminates the predicate "have properties". I show that neither of these options meet the accusation. The substratum theorist should therefore devise other options.

Section:	Metaphysics/Ontology
Language:	English
Chair:	Alejandro Gracia di Rienzo
Date:	10:40-11:10, 08 September 2022 (Thursday)
Location:	SR 1.006

Youssef Aguisoul (University of Lisbon , Portugal)

Bolzano and Quine on Nomic Truths

Oguz Akcelik

n this study, I will analyze and compare Bolzano's and Quine's conceptions of nomic truths. In the first part, I will focus on Bolzano's definition of universal validity as a form of nomic truth in his Theory of Science (1837/2014 II.sec.147). This definition is paraphrased by Bar-Hillel (1950, p.95) in a modernized and rigorized form as follows: "The proposition p is called universally valid with respect to the class of concepts A if and only if the propositions which may be developed from p by varying at will every occurrence of the elements in A " are all true. In the second part, I will focus on Quine's notion of essential vs. vacuous occurrence of a word for the purpose of defining logical truth Quine (1940). Subsequently

Quine (1935/1976) notes that his definition of logical truth as pointed out by Bar-Hillel has been anticipated, in essence, by Bolzano. Quine distinguishes between logical, geological, economic, etc. vocabularies, characterizing the science into question. Accordingly, he defines the characteristic vocabularies in terms of nomic truths, provided they are lawlike. In the third part, I will compare Quine's discussion of logical truth with Bolzano's theory of logical analyticity, and I will conclude the following two points:

(1) The class of concepts A mentioned in Bolzano's definition of the universal validity of proposition p corresponds, in Quine's framework, to the set of constants occurring vacuously in the sentence expressing proposition p.

(2) The complement of the class of concepts A relatively to the total class of concepts constituting the proposition p corresponds to the set of constants occurring essentially in the sentence expressing proposition p.

Bar-Hillel, Y. 1950 "Bolzano's Definition of Analytic Propositions" Theoria 16 (2):91-117.
Bolzano, Bernard. 1837/2014. Theory of Science, Translated by Paul Rusnock and Rolf George, 4 vols., Oxford University Press.
Quine, W.V., 1935/1976 "Truth by Convention" in Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, enlarged ed. Harvard University Press.
Quine, W.V., 1940 Mathematical Logic, Harvard University Press.

Section:	Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Language:	English
Chair:	Katia Parshina
Date:	14:00-14:30, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.006

❧

Oguz Akcelik (Middle East Technical University, Turkei)

A Vindication of the Universal Set

Alejandro Gracia Di Rienzo

The universal set is the set of absolutely everything. It serves as a domain for absolutely unrestricted quantification and as the extension of the most general concepts, like OBJECT. This notion is metaphysically appealing and useful, but is beset by paradoxes. Quine's "New Foundations" (NF) system is the most well-known set theory which admits a universal set as a bona fide and (apparently) paradox-free object. I will defend NF from the common charge that it is unmotivated and artificial. To do this I advance two arguments. First, that NF can be regarded as a development of the "logical" conception of sets, as opposed to the "iterative" conception embodied by Zermelo-Fraenkel and related systems. Second, that NF inherits (and actually surpasses) the intuitive motivation of type theory. Both the iterative and the logical conceptions of set, I will maintain, are equally valid notions of set and can coexist peacefully on a pluralist (or more precisely dualist) approach to the philosophy of sets. If this is a cogent view, then the notion of a universal set should not be said to be intrinsically incoherent, and is thereby vindicated as suitable for the aforementioned theoretical roles.

Section:	Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Language:	English
Chair:	Leon Commandeur
Date:	12:00-12:30, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.006

Alejandro Gracia Di Rienzo (University of Santiago de Compostela , Spain)

Ideology-Based Trust in Information Sources A Bayesian Analysis

Leon Assaad

Why/How does ideological misalignment create disagreement on factual issues?

It seems that people who are on opposite sides of an ideological spectrum disagree not only on ideological issues, but also on a. which sources of information are trustworthy and b. on factualissues. For instance, in the US, 75 percent of Republicans trust Fox News, while 77 percent of Democratsdistrust them (Gentzkow, Wong, and Zhang 2018, p. 2). On a factual matter, 85 percent of conservative Republicans do not believe that humans are responsible for climate change, while 79 percent of liberal Democrats do. (Kaplan, K. (2016, October 4). When it comes to views on climate change, liberals and Conservatives Are Still Worlds Apart. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved May 2, 2022).

What to make of this phenomenon? Much has been written in the literature on political episte-mology about so-called "deep disagreement" and the (arguably) resulting polarization.

In my thesis, I build and analyze a Bayesian model to make sense of it (specifically, I draw on Bovens and Hartmann 2004 and Duijf 2021). I find that trust in an information source can be influenced by ideological alignment. I refer to this effect as ideological (dis-)trust, in which trust in an information source is "piggybacked" by ideological (mis-)alignment. For the Bayesian agent, ideological trust erodes and emerges from the reception of testimony in a way that is strongly reminiscent of the confirmation bias. However, my model does not presuppose overtly irrational biases. Hence, my simple model can be interpreted as a rational reconstruction of the phenomenon: Ideologically misaligned people disagree about facts because they trust different sources. And this (ideologically based) trust can arise through rational belief updating.

References:
– Bovens, Luc, and Stephan Hartmann. 2004.Bayesian epistemology. OUP Oxford.
– Duijf, Hein. 2021. "Should one trust experts?" Synthese,1-24.
– Gentzkow, Matthew, Michael B Wong, and Allen T Zhang. 2018. "Ideological bias and trust ininformation sources." Unpublished manuscript.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Cristian Vulpe
Date:	10:00-10:30, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.003

❧

Leon Assaad (LMU Munich, Germany)

Identifying medical gaslighting. A subjective, outcome-based approach

Ella Valerie Berger

As a colloquialism, the term "medical gaslighting" (MG) has become prevalent in the disabled and chronically ill community to refer to experiences in which patients are made to question their bodily perceptions and their ability to make judgments about them (e.g. Sebring, 2021). I will argue that we need a philosophical approach to gaslighting that accounts for a particular detriment of MG, namely that victims are hindered in their capacity to judge who did them wrong, even after they realize that they have experienced MG.

In the recent philosophical literature, there has been an increasing demand to move beyond strictly interpersonal approaches to gaslighting and to turn towards structural concepts. The structural approaches emphasize the subliminal ways in which epistemic institutions and practices shape ignorance and thus unfairly disadvantage certain knowers (Ruiz, 2020; Pohlhaus, 2020).

These accounts, often implicitly, hint at issues of willful ignorance, culpability, and blameworthiness. But I argue that they don't give enough consideration to how these issues emerge on the interpersonal level where, ultimately, victims confront them. The difficulty of localizing culpability is not only what makes gaslighting so pernicious, but also further harms victims who, after painfully realizing they were being gaslit, might not be able to figure out by whom.

Therefore, I argue that we need an extension to such structural and objective accounts which captures even subtle instances of interpersonal MG and thereby helps victims make sense of the injustice that was done to them. I thus propose a subjective approach to MG which takes seriously the structural nature of gaslighting but starts from the victim's harm.

In a first step, I will elaborate on the current literature on structural accounts of MG. Secondly, I will show how these accounts indi-

cate issues of culpability and blameworthiness which emerge, yet might be extremely difficult to recognize, in interpersonal instances of MG. Thirdly, I will propose a subjective, outcome-based account of MG which allows even for untypical occurrences of MG to be discerned as such ex post. More precisely, I will show how even occurrences that are indistinguishable from epistemic bad luck (and often they are!) can be part of the cumulative experience that amounts to MG.

References:
– Pohlhaus, G. (2020). Gaslighting and Echoing, or Why Collective Epistemic Resistance is not a Witch Hunt. Hypatia, 35(4), 674-686.
– Ruiz, E. (2020). Cultural Gaslighting. Hypatia, 35(4), 687-713.
– Sebring, J. C. H. (2021). Towards a sociological understanding of medical gaslighting in western health care. Sociology of Health and Illness, 43(9), 1951-1964.

Section:	Philosophy of Language
Language:	English
Chair:	Marlene Valek
Date:	16:00-16:30, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.007

✂️

Ella Valerie Berger (University of Vienna, Austria)

Understanding the essence of a property in several ways: on the plausibility of the "dual-carving thesis" and its importance in philosophy of mind

Elisa Bezencon

n this presentation, I will address the question of whether we can understand the essence of a property in two or more distinct ways and show the importance of this question in philosophy of mind. At the center of my presentation will be the "dual-carving thesis" (Goff, 2017) which states that it is possible to have two transparent but inferentially isolated concepts of a property, where a transparent concept is a concept that gives its possessor an a

priori access to the essence of its referent. After a brief clarification of this thesis and some underlying concepts, I will show that determining the truth of this thesis is crucial for the debate about a posteriori physicalism. Given a certain conception of phenomenal concepts, the truth-value of the dual-caving thesis will be decisive for choosing between physicalism and its negation (e.g. Nida-Rümelin, 2007). Next, I will consider pro- and contra-arguments for this thesis and evaluate them. Finally, I want to raise some points that must be clarified to assess the plausibility of this thesis. I thus hope to indicate some of the philosophical work that remains to be done in order to make progress with the question of the metaphysical status of consciousness.

Section:	Philosophy of Mind
Language:	English
Chair:	Martin Niederl
Date:	14:40-15:10, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location:	HS E.002

❧

Elisa Bezencon (University of Fribourg, Switzerland, Switzerland)

Agency and Causation

Robin Timothee Bianchi

Broadly construed, agency is a power to bring about change, to make things happen, to make a difference, or more simply to act. Bringing about a change is to cause an event or change, and in turn, this is to manifest a causal power. One of the main points of contention in the metaphysics of agency between event-causal reductionists and agent-causal antireductionists concerns what this "bringing about" consists in. While antireductionists maintain that agents' actions can be analyzed as bringing about of changes by agents which constitute fundamental instances of agent causation, reductionists attempt to reduce this relation of "bringing about" to a causal relation between events.

Admittedly, the project of giving an account of how relations of agent causation are ontologically realized in an event-causal order is puzzling. For its prime motivation derives from a sort of naturalism on

the account of which the "natural causal order" is purely event causal (see Velleman 2015; Bratman 2001; Schlosser 2010; Bishop 1989). However, it is unclear why we should consider the thesis that causal connections only obtain between events as a scientific rather than a philosophical view (Alvarez and Hyman 1998, 227-228). So, if it has to be more than a mere article of faith, it better be supported by further considerations. One such consideration, which appears to be implicit in reductionist accounts, to support the project of ontological reduction would ensue from reflection on the way we typically experience causation and establish causal connections. However, as I shall briefly argue in this talk, the reductionist project turns out to be rather unmotivated upon considering both the way we typically observe and establish causal connections in everyday life and how we report them. In short, the main claim of this piece is that, since causal connections between events enjoy neither a conceptual nor a semantical priority nor an epistemic priority over causal relations between agents and patients, the project of showing that event causation has ontological priority over agent causation remains poorly motivated. This is not to argue that the reductionist thesis is false, but rather to question the grounds on which the project of reduction relies.

Section:	Philosophy of Mind
Language:	English
Chair:	Jakob Roloff
Date:	10:40-11:10, 08 September 2022 (Thursday)
Location:	HS E.002

✂️

Robin Timothee Bianchi (University of Neuchatel, Switzerland)

What is like to be a perspectival realist. The spectrum analogy

Daian Bica

erspectival realism (PR) claims that scientific knowledge is historically and culturally situated, and, thus, relative to a particular scientific community from a given historical episode (cf. Massimi 2022). From PR, it follows that there is a

plethora of scientific perspectives across the history of science. Now, although there is a historical commitment to epistemic pluralism, defenders of PR try to formulate also a commitment to scientific realism, i.e., that there is, besides the historical situatedness of scientific knowledge, a perspective-independent world (e.g., entities, laws, properties) (cf. Massimi 2018). The issue of integrating the two claims is referred to as "the commitment problem" (CTP) of PR (cf. Credu 2020).

One central question of the proposal is "Which is the proper realist commitment PR should take for solving the CTP?" The diagnosis I furnish is that PR is not a single, unique philosophical position; rather, behind PR lurks a spectrum of possible interpretations (many ways of resolving/answers to the CTP) with epistemic pluralism on the left extreme side and traditional scientific realism on the right extreme side of the spectrum. Accordingly, I bring forward four formulations of PR (PR1 – PR4) in order to solve the challenge of CTP.

I provide a thorough cost-benefit analysis of PR1 - PR4, and I end the presentation with the belief in a positive resolution of the CTP. I shall argue that PR1 (left/pluralist side of the spectrum) seems, at the first glance, to be akin to a form of nominalism, while PR4 (right/ realist side) seems to collapse in a form of traditional scientific realism. Similarly, while PR3 (center of the spectrum, leaning to the right side of the spectrum) seems to generate a friction with the commitment to epistemic pluralism, PR2 (center, leaning to the left) seems to not be realist enough for solving CTP.

Key-words: perspectival realism, epistemic pluralism, scientific realism, the commitment problem

– Credu, Ana-Maria (2020), "Natural Kinds as Real Patterns: Or How to Solve the Commitment Problem for Perspectival Realism"
– Massimi, Michela (2018), "A Perspectivist Better Best System Account of Lawhood"
– Massimi, Michela (2022), "Perspectival ontology: between situated knowledge and multiculturalism"

Section:	Philosophy of Science
Language:	English
Chair:	Oyku Ulusoy
Date:	15:20-15:50, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.004

✂

Daian Bica (Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Romania/Germany)

Causal Power Quantified - A Generalization and Defense of Cheng's Causal Power Measure

Jan Borner

As part of her power PC theory, Patricia Cheng (1997) has introduced a measure of probabilistic causal power, which is supposed to quantify the capacity of a cause to produce its effect. Cheng's measure is not the only measure of probabilistic causal strength out there. But while there is variety of different proposals in the literature (Eells (1991), Suppes (1970), Lewis (1986)), Fitelson and Hitchcock (2011) have convincingly argued that Cheng's measure is the most suitable explication of intrinsic causal power, a concept that is highly valuable when it comes to predictions and decision making, since the intrinsic causal power of a cause is supposed to remain stable over different contexts. Additionally, Cheng and her colleagues have shown in several experiments that her measure is an accurate description of how humans actually reason about causal relationships (see, for example, Liljeholm and Cheng (2007)).

Despite all that, several arguments have recently emerged that challenge the adequacy and viability of Cheng's measure. Most notably, Sprenger (2018) argues that any measure that is not ordinally equivalent to Eells' measure of causal strength is deficient in the sense that it does not satisfy some basic and highly intuitive adequacy constraints. I want to defend Cheng's measure from Sprenger's arguments. But to do so, Cheng's power PC theory has to be generalized to make her measure of causal power applicable to more complex situations than those that it was originally designed for. I will argue that this can be done in a straightforward way.

Section:	Philosophy of Science
Language:	English
Chair:	Maren Bräutigam
Date:	17:30-18:00, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location:	SR 1.004

❦

Jan Borner (MCMP, LMU Munich, Germany)

On similar fermions: what's heterodox about heterodoxy?

Maren Bräutigam

There are largely three views on the question of whether or not Leibniz's principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) is violated by states of similar fermions: firstly, the (earliest) view that similar fermions are always qualitatively identical, so that PII is always violated; call this the no discernibility view (see French and Redhead (1988). Secondly, the (more recent) view that similar fermions are discernible in a weak sense - the so called weak discernibility view (see Saunders (2003), (2006); Muller and Saunders (2008); Muller and Seevinck (2009)). Thirdly, the (most recent) view that similar fermions are (at least sometimes) discernible in a strong sense; call this the new discernibility view. The new discernibility view is currently advocated by, e.g., Bigaj (2015); Caulton (2014); Dieks and Lubberdink (2011), (2020); Friebe (2014), (2016); Leegwater and Muller (2020). Bigaj (2022) has recently categorized the no discernibility and the weak discernibility view as orthodox, and the new discernibility view as heterodox, thereby indicating that the latter view has something new and original about it. In this talk, I deal with the question of whether and how this categorization is justified.

As is now known, the no discernibility view relies on the semantical standard interpretation that the indices of the Hilbertspace formalism (typically 1 and 2) refer to physical entities (i.e. particles); more specifically, that they do refer so directly (i.e. independently from properties). This semantical view has been called direct factorism. Proponents of the weak discernibility view stick to the standard semantics (i.e. direct factorism), but save PII only in a weak sense by doing so. Proponents of the new discernibility view, by contrast, reject direct factorism in one of the two following ways: Descriptive anti-factorists (Dieks and Lubberdink, Friebe) deny that the formalism's indices have physical meaning (anti-factorism). Instead, they suppose that descriptively referring particle names can be introduced from outside the formal-

ism (descriptive anti-factorism). Descriptive factorists (Leegwater and Muller) stick to the supposition that the formalism's indices refer to particles (factorism), but substitute the supposition that they do refer so directly with the supposition that they do refer so descriptively (descriptive factorism). Now, it looks as if the new discernibility view, by deviating from the standard semantics, is heterodox in that it defends PII in more than just a weak sense (like proponents of the orthodox weak discernibility view do).

In this talk, I introduce two distinctions - one concerning ontology, the other concerning semantics - which show that the heterodox new discernibility view might not be as heterodox as it seems. The first distinction concerns two different interpretations of PII and, correspondingly, two different understandings of qualitative distinctness. In one interpretation, PII is supposed to work as a principle of individuation, saying that whenever two objects are numerically distinct, their numerical distinctness is grounded in their being qualitatively distinct. Correspondingly, I call it the grounding interpretation of PII. In another interpretation, PII is not supposed to work as a principle of individuation itself (i.e. objects are individuated independently from qualitative distinctness). Instead, PII is understood as an auxiliary principle which supports a principle of individuation other than PII by ensuring that a situation with two numerically distinct but qualitatively identical objects actually never occurs. Read this way, PII states that whenever two objects are numerically distinct for whatever reason (other than being qualitatively distinct), their numerical distinctness is nevertheless accompanied by qualitative distinctness. Correspondingly, I call this reading the accompanying interpretation of PII.

The two interpretations of PII differ with respect to their ontological commitments. The proponent of the accompanying interpretation is committed to an ontology which, in principle, allows for the possibility of numerically distinct but qualitatively identical objects. The reason is this: according to the accompanying interpretation, qualitative distinctness has nothing to do with individuation, so objects are individuated differently (e.g., by bare particularity). However, as soon as individuation is independent from qualitative distinctness, the possibility of numerically distinct but qualitatively identical objects immediately follows - and must therefore be prevented by adding an auxiliary principle, such as PII in the accompanying interpretation, to one's ontology. The proponent of PII in the grounding interpretation, by contrast, is committed to an ontology which forbids the possibility

of numerically distinct but qualitatively identical objects right from the start. The reason is that as soon as individuation is tied to qualitative distinctness, the possibility of numerically distinct but qualitatively identical objects is immediately excluded - there cannot be two objects which are qualitatively identical. Thus, investigating with which kind of ontology a view is compatible is a way of figuring out to which interpretation of PII it is committed. The results allow to determine how exactly the heterodox new discernibility view differs from the orthodox no and weak discernibility views ontologically, and thereby to determine what exactly is heterodox about the new discernibility view, ontologically speaking.

The second distinction which I wish to introduce is the distinction between semantics and metasemantics. The semantics of proper names answers the question in which way a name refers, or what the meaning of a name consists in. The metasemantics of proper names answers the question of how it comes about that a given name refers to the object it refers to, or, put differently, how the reference of a name gets fixed. Now, the following argument - which I call the argument from metasemantics - shows that the semantical views which are united under the heading new discernibility (i.e. descriptive anti-factorism and descriptive factorism) display some ambiguity. In a first step, it can be shown that both descriptive anti-factorists and descriptive factorists are not concerned with descriptive reference, but with descriptive reference fixing. In a second step, it can be shown that descriptive reference fixing is not sufficient for descriptive reference. This is witnessed by the so called causal theory of reference, according to which a name's reference can get fixed either by ostension or with the help of a (definite) description, but names function as directly referring rigid designators (i.e. names which refer to the same object in every possible world) from then on. As a consequence, both descriptive anti-factorists and descriptive factorists have to prove that their proposed names do indeed refer descriptively. The argument from metasemantics shows that it is not clear whether the new discernibility view differs from the no and weak discerniblity views semantically (by deviating from the standard semantics), or metasemantically (by complementing the standard semantics with a metasemantical story). Therefore, it is not yet clear what exactly is heterodox about the heterodox new discernibility view, semantically speaking.

References:

– Bigaj, T. (2015). Dissecting weak discernibility of quanta, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 50, 43-53.

– (2022). Identity and Indiscernibility in Quantum Mechanics, Palgrave Macmillan.

– Caulton, A. (2014).Qualitative Individuation in Permutation-Invariant Quantum Mechanics, arXiv:1409.0247v1 quant-ph.

– Dieks, D. and Lubberdink, A. (2011). How Classical Particles Emerge from the Quantum World, Foundations of Physics 41(6), 1051–1064.

– (2020). Identical Particles as Distinghuishable Objects, General Journal of Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-020-09510-w.

– French, S. and Redhead, M. (1988). Quantum Physics and the Identity of Indiscernibles, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (2), 233-246.

– Friebe, C. (2014). Individuality, distinguishability, and (non-)entanglement: A defense of Leibniz's principle, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 48 (A), 89-98.

– (2016). Leibniz's principle, (non-)entanglement, and Pauli exclusion, DOI:10.13140/RG.2.2.20612.42883.

– Leegwater, G. and Muller, F.A. (2020). The Case Against Factorism. On the Labels of Factor 8855; Hilbert-Spaces of Similar Particles in Quantum Mechanics, Journal for General Philosophy of Sciene, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-020-09514-6.

– Muller, F.A. and Saunders, S. (2008). Discerning Fermions, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59, 499-548.

– Muller, F. and Seevinck, M. (2009). Discerning Elementary Particles, Philosophy of Science, 76: 179–200.

– Saunders, S. (2003). Physics and Leibniz's Principles, in K. Brading and E. Castellani (eds.), Symmetries in Physics: Philosophical Reflections, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

– (2006). Are Quantum Particles Objects, Analysis, 66: 52–63.

Section:	Philosophy of Science
Language:	English
Chair:	Ina Jängten
Date:	10:40-11:10, 08 September 2022 (Thursday)
Location:	SR 1.004

☙❧

Maren Bräutigam (Cologne University, Germany)

Probability, confirmation, and the base-rate fallacy

Martina Calderisi

ase-rate neglect is the tendency to ignore (or at least underweight) base rates when updating one's credence in a certain hypothesis in light of new evidence. It has been observed experimentally in a variety of domains, ranging from social psychology to medicine, since the 1970s. However, despite extensive discussion, neither the normative question: "Is the neglect of base rates a real fallacy?", nor the descriptive question: "Why are base rates (mistakenly) neglected?" have been settled. In this paper, we will focus on the latter. In particular, in section 1, we will present in some detail two possible determinants of this phenomenon: representativeness, as suggested by Kahneman & Tversky (1973), and linear integration, as suggested by Juslin, Nilsson, & Winman (2009). We will also put forward an alternative proposal, according to which humans' appreciation of confirmation relations would account for the base-rate fallacy, much as it can for the conjunction fallacy, as shown by Crupi, Fitelson, & Tentori (2008) and Tentori, Crupi, & Russo (2013). Moreover, in section 2, we will

test this explanatory hypothesis against data recently collected by Pighin & Tentori (2021) and we will discuss the results of this analysis as well as its strenghts and limitations, pointing to open issues for future research. As argued in section 3, our results provide support to a confirmation-theoretic view of reasoning under uncertainty, including well-known tendencies to biased judgment of probability.

Section:	Philosophy of Science
Language:	English
Chair:	Ina Jängten
Date:	10:00-10:30, 08 September 2022 (Thursday)
Location:	SR 1.004

Martina Calderisi (University of Turin (FINO Consortium), Italy)

Knocking Normative Necessity

Nolan Cannon

Robust realism in metaethics holds two theses: ethical properties are stance independent (they do not constitutively depend on human-like attitudes) and irreducibly normative (they are or imply reasons). One objection is that sui generis ethical properties make strong supervenience (SS) a mystery:

(SS) Nonethical properties metaphysically necessitate ethical properties.

(MH) Commitment to brute necessary connections between discontinuous properties counts significantly against a view.

If ethical properties are sui generis with respect to nonethical properties, then it is a mystery how they could be metaphysically necessarily connected. But, by (MH), such mysteries are suspect; so, robust realism incurs a significant cost.

Some have argued the connection between the ethical and nonethical is only normatively necessary, which is weaker than metaphysical necessity. If the connection is only normatively necessary, then there is no problem for robust realism. I aim to call into question the viability of normative necessity. I first argue (SS) does not entail, contra Rosen (2020), reductive naturalism since holism in essence is neither uncommon nor mysterious. The arguments are too complex for detail here, but to show this I draw on holism in theory of reasons and on holism in quantum mechanics. Holism in these domains is enough to vindicate holism in general. I then respond to a normative necessarian error theory of why we think metaphysical necessity is true. That argument relies on a same-explanation analysis of the closeness of worlds: all the closest possible worlds are worlds with the same explanation of the distribution of ethical properties, whatever that may be. My objection is that normative necessitarians are vulnerable to the Benacerraf-Field problem in a way the metaphysical necessitarians are not. The conclusion: the error theory offered is unfounded and metaphysical necessity is more plausible.

Section:	Ethics
Language:	English
Chair:	Gregor Greslehner
Date:	17:30-18:00, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location:	SR 1.005

❧

Nolan Cannon (Florida State University, United States of America)

Are Realism and Truth Enigmas?: A Dummetian Response

Satarupa Chakraborty

The debate between Donald Davidson and Michael Dummett with regard to the notion of meaning have important and interesting bearings upon the discussions in theory of meaning and related issues in philosophy of language. While Davison took a strong realist position, preferring the classical theory of truth, Dummett's take came as a profound challenge to this position of the realist account of meaning, as advocated by Davidson. Dummett's challenge to the realist notion of meaning and the classical idea of truth forms the backbone of his anti-realistic account of meaning.

If we take the classical realist's account of meaning as a comprehensive theory of meaning, a large number of sentences remain outside the explanation of a theory of meaning as those lack any reference. Thus, "what constitutes the meaning of a sentence" itself comes under a review under such a discourse of meaning.

Dummett, challenged the position of the realists which used the classical notion of truth as one coming into play in determining meaning of a sentence and held a strong anti-realist position. He argued that the concern here does not lie in asking the question whether or not the entities of a particular type- universals, or material objects exist, but whether they are among the ultimate constituents of reality (Truth and Other Enigmas, 1978). If one can successfully raise the question whether we can at all claim that the entities like universals, material objects are among the ultimate constituents of reality, the realists' position can be majorly challenged.

This paper will analyse the classical theory of truth and meaning, and build a Dummetian case to argue as to why the realist account of meaning suffers a great deal in offering a "full-blooded theory of meaning". Since Donald Davidson is taken to be a strong defender of realism and truth, an important question of investigation is: can Davidson save his theory from Dummett's attack on realism and truth? If Dummett

differs from Davidson in holding the correspondence version of truth and considers such a theory as un-preferable, why is the correspondence theory of truth not preferable for Dummett? What account of truth does Dummett propose which fits into his anti-realistic account of meaning, and thereby, offers a comprehensive theory of meaning?

Section:	Philosophy of Language
Language:	English
Chair:	Hugo Ribeiro Mota
Date:	11:20-11:50, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.007

༠༜

Satarupa Chakraborty (Jawaharlal Nehru University, India)

The Logicality of Language Hypothesis: New Evidence in Favour of the Rescale Approach

Giada Coleschi

In the generative tradition syntax is assumed to be autonomous and independent from logic (Chomsky 1955, 1957). The autonomy of syntax, if interpreted in terms of irrelevance of logical considerations for syntactic formation, seems to make the generative approach compatible with a consolidated tradition in philosophy (e.g. Husserl 1901; Croce 1905; Carnap 1934; the discussion in Pistoia-Reda 2021), which focuses on the syntactic acceptability of analytic constructions such as 1)-3).

   1) It did and did not rain at the same time and place (Mill 1878)

   2) "Questa tavola rotonda" quadrata (Croce 1905)

   3) All quadrilaterals have 5 vertices (Bar-Hillel 1957)

In the logicality of language hypothesis (Gajewski 2002, 2009; Fox, Hackl 2006; Chierchia 2013; Abrusan 2014; Del Pinal 2019), the grammaticality of analytic propositions such as 1)-3) is acknowledged, but the conclusion about the irrelevance of logical considerations for syntactic formation is rejected to account for ungrammaticalities such as 4)-5).

   4) *Someone but John smokes (Von Fintel 1993)

   5) *There are any cookies left (Chierchia 2013)

How can we account for the asymmetry between the ungrammaticality of 4)-5), due to their analytic status, and the grammaticality of 1)-3), notwithstanding their analytic status? According to a standard articulation of the logicality of language hypothesis (Gajewski 2002, 2009; Fox, Hackl 2006; Chierchia 2013), linguistic constructions are associated with austere representations, different from classical logical forms, which reveal truly analytic contents only in the ungrammatical cases. According to an alternative articulation, the ungrammaticality of 4)-5) derives from the impossibility of transforming them into informatively adequate contributions, by modulating the lexical content (Del Pinal 2019, 2021; Sauerland 2014; Pistoia-Reda, Sauerland 2021; Pistoia-Reda, San Mauro 2021).

The talk intends to offer a brief reconstruction of the logicality of language hypothesis and its two articulations, and to present new evidence that seems to support the alternative one. If this evidence is solid, then it is possible to accept the said hypothesis without necessarily having to assume a purely linguistic logic, and then the said hypothesis may be invoked with less trepidation.

Section:	Philosophy of Language
Language:	English
Chair:	Teresa Flera
Date:	11:20-11:50, 08 September 2022 (Thursday)
Location:	SR 1.007

Giada Coleschi (University of Siena, Italy)

Logical Instrumentalism for Anti-Exceptionalists

Leon Commandeur

Anti-exceptionalism about logic is the thesis that logical theories are significantly similar to scientific theories, for example with respect to their epistemic status or methodology (Hjortland 2017, Martin and Hjortland 2021). Within that debate, some authors have proposed various versions of what can be labelled logical instrumentalism, being the idea that logic should essentially be understood as a tool or instrument to achieve particular purposes

(Arenhart 2020, Dos Santos 2021, Peregrin and Svoboda 2021). This position, however, has been poorly articulated. First, the current proposals can easily be reduced to a trivial claim about the instrumental value of logical systems. Second, while these proposals have been put forth as anti-exceptionalist positions, a comparison with scientific instrumentalism will show that these proposals are significantly different than instrumentalism as it has been understood in (the philosophy of) science. Thus, if one wishes to uphold the claim that logic is significantly similar to science, logical instrumentalism cannot be what previous authors have taken it to be. Therefore, I will propose a different version of logical instrumentalism that is more aligned with, and informed by, scientific instrumentalism. The most significant difference between the instrumentalist view that I present and the one that has so far been is on the point of non-representationalism about logic, being the idea that logic does not represent any extra-systemic phenomenon. While current instrumentalist proposals endorse non-representationalism, I will argue that if we are to be anti-exceptionalists about logic, then we ought to reject it.

Section:	Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Language:	English
Chair:	Katia Parshina
Date:	16:00-16:30, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.006

<div align="center">❧</div>

Leon Commandeur (University of Bergen, Norway)

Necessitism and Unrestricted Quantification

Violeta Conde

As Williamson (2013) puts it "necessitism" is the metaphysical view that states the truth of the following principle: (N). Quantifiers in (N) are understood as quantifying over everything whatsoever populates the modal universe, so whoever argues for necessitism should accept (modal) unrestricted quantification as a part of an intelligible discourse. I'll first present three of the

main arguments that have been displayed to cast doubt on the intelligibility of unrestricted quantification, for they can be retrieved in the context of necessitism; namely:

1. Absolutely unrestricted quantification isn't genuinely absolute, since it depends on the conceptual schema adopted (Hellman, 2006).

2. Our use of first-order quantifiers is unavoidably ambiguous, as the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem shows (Putnam, 1983).

3. Considering the All-in-One-Principle (Rayo & Uzquiano, 2006) together with a plausible principle of recombination (Nolan, 1996) makes modal unrestricted quantification prone to paradox (Sider, 2009).

Then, I'll suggest some lines of argumentation the necessitist can follow to shield her use of unrestricted quantification for those objections. Regarding 1., I'll argue that the necessitist can stand for her conceptual schema to be more fundamental than others to characterize the Modal Universe. The key point of my argumentation will be the logical sense of existence held by the necessitist (see Williamson, 2000) since any other schema must start from it by the mere fact that pretends to speak about the world. With respect to 2. the necessitist can proceed by adopting second-order quantification, for that would block the application of the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem. Another option would be trying to defend modal first-order unrestricted quantification even though the ambiguity of our use of quantifiers. That's because the so-mentioned theorem doesn't refuse by itself the intelligibility of unrestricted quantification, for it only shows the possibility of having two different models for a first-order language. Concerning 3., I'll propose different ways to avoid paradoxes: to adopt a plural-talk, to consider an alternative set theory, or to claim that set theory is unable to deal with problems of the metaphysical magnitude like the one presented by a generalist discourse as the necessitist one.

KEYWORDS: necessitism; unrestricted quantification; All-in-One Principle; modality; set-theory

REFERENCES:
– Hellman, G. (2006). "Against 'Absolute Everything'!". In Rayo, A. & Uzquiano, G. (Eds.), Absolute Generality, 75-97. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
– Nolan, D. (1996). "Recombination Unbound", Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 83

(2/3): 239-262. doi: 10.1007/bf00354489

– Putnam, H. (1987). The Many Faces of Realism. La Salle, IL: Open Court.

– Rayo, A. & Uzquiano, G. (Eds.) (2006). Absolute Generality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

– Sider, T. (2009). "Williamson's Many Necessary Existents", Analysis, 69 (2): 250-258. doi: 10.1093/analys/anp010

– Williamson, T. (2000). "Existence and Contingency", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 100 (1): 117-139. doi: 10.1111/1467-9264.00069

– Williamson, T. (2013). Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Section:	Metaphysics/Ontology
Language:	English
Chair:	Youssef Aguisoul
Date:	16:50-17:20, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location:	SR 1.006

❧

Violeta Conde (Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, Spain)

Some remarks on the correct interpretation of the thesis of Revelation in the philosophy of mind

Bruno Cortesi

The so called thesis of revelation has come in the philosophical literature on the mental in a number of slightly divergent formulations. As I understand it, in its core revelation is the claim that phenomenal mental events have the potential to reveal (part of) their nature to a subject entertaining them just of virtue of their being entertained by that subject and of an act of introspection by her directed at them. In short: to have an experience " i.e., to be acquainted with it " is to know its nature. It is widely agreed that although some versions of revelation might strike us as prima facie plausible and perhaps even appealing, at least up to a certain extent, most of them are nonetheless inconsistent with almost any coherent form of physicalism about phenomenal properties. Thus

far, the issue of the alleged tension between revelation and physicalism has mostly been put in terms of phenomenal concepts and/or some kind of "special feature" they would allegedly possess. On a similar vein, the kind of knowledge one would allegedly achieve via introspecting her own conscious states if revelation turned out to be true has mostly been construed as a kind of propositional knowledge or knowledge-that. This emerges clearly in recent attempts to undermine the cogency of revelation against physicalism, e.g., those put forth in Damjanovic (2012) and Trogdon (2016). Analogous assumptions, though, can also be found in authors who endorse revelation, e.g., Nida-Rumelin (2006), Chalmers (2006), Goff (2017). What my paper will be aimed at arguing is that contra this approach, the kind of knowledge one is put in a position to achieve via having and introspecting her own experiences is to be understood as a kind of sui generis non-conceptual -or at least pre-conceptual- and non-propositional knowledge of things a la Russell (1910; 1912). I argue that this kind of grasping may be understood either as an instance of what David Pitt (2011), drawing by analogy on Levine's (2010) distinction between implicit and explicit self-knowledge of thought, labels acquaintance-as-knowledge to be distinguished from (propositional) knowledge by acquaintance, or as an instance of what Giustina and Kriegel (e.g. 2017; 2018; 2019; 2020; 2021; 2022) call primitive introspection, to be distinguished from (recognitional, thus conceptual) reflective introspection. Arguments for the existence of a kind of non-propositional knowledge of things of this sort can also be found in Duncan (2018; 2020; 2022), Conee (1994) and Coleman (2019), among others.

Section:	Philosophy of Mind
Language:	English
Chair:	Daniel Weger
Date:	12:00-12:30, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	HS E.002

<div align="center">⁂</div>

Bruno Cortesi (University School for Advanced Studies of Pavia, Italy, Italy)

Reliability for the Quasi-Realist

Felix Danowski

I n this talk, I'll discuss the way in which Moral Quasi-Realists can understand how we evaluate each other as reliable moral judges. Since the notion of reliability is often thought to be an indispensable building-block of our best theories of knowledge (see e.g. Goldman 2012), this talk also goes some way to address the way in which Moral

Quasi-Realists should conceptualize moral knowledge.

Quasi-Realism, as it is coined by Blackburn (1984, 1993, 1998), is a bundle of theories claiming that moral judgments are conative mental states, according to which we can understand talk of moral facts, truths, beliefs, and so on, in "deflated" terms. Morality is ultimately a "projection" (Blackburn, 1984, p. 180) of our moral beliefs, which play a constitutive role in their etiology.

The reliability of some believer S is quite often (see e.g. Beebe 2006) characterized by a conditional probability of some form, e.g.:

* $pr(S$ believing that p - p)

However:

For this probability to be less than 1, there must be some possible cases where it's the case that p, and S doesn't believes that p. Since, under Quasi-Realism , whether or not p obtains is entirely constituted in virtue of S believing that p, it is far from obvious how Quasi-Realists can accept that this can be the case.

In my talk, I elaborate on this problem, and I'll discuss a novel solution. The solution will revolve around the fact that, if some believer S' disagrees with S on some belief that p, S' can discern a case where it's true that p and S doesn't believe that p. Thus, S' will be justified to ascribe to S a reliability less than 1, given their moral convictions. I will argue that this simple maneuver suffices to get the Quasi-Realist out of trouble, giving them a workable concept of moral reliability. But it will also bring with it some considerable epistemological commitments, which are already familiar from social theories of epistemology (e.g. Craig 1990; Haslanger 1999; Williams 2001). Discussing these implications will conclude my talk.

References:
– James R. Beebe. Reliabilism and deflationism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 84(4):495–510, 2006.

– Simon Blackburn. Spreading the Word. Groundings in the Philosophy of Language. Clarendon Press, 1984.

– Simon Blackburn. How to Be an Ethical Antirealist. In Essays in Quasi-Realism, pages 166–181. Oxford University Press, 1993.

– Simon Blackburn. Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning. Oxford University Press UK, 1998.

– Edward Craig. Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis. Oxford University Press, 1990.

– Alvin I. Goldman. Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology: Essays. Oup Usa, 2012.

– Sally Haslanger. What Knowledge is and What It Ought to Be: Feminist Values and Normative Epistemology. Philosophical Perspectives, 13:459-480, 1999.

– Michael Williams. Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology. Oxford University Press, 2001.

Section:	Ethics
Language:	English
Chair:	Silvana Pani
Date:	10:00-10:30, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.005

Felix Danowski (Universität Wien, Österreich)

Freedom to branch otherwise: The compatibility between freedom and an A-theoretic branching theory of time

Bogdan Dumitrescu

The aim of this paper is to analyze the compatibility between freedom understood as the ability to do otherwise and the metaphysics within an A-theoretic branching theory of time. This is a less popular approach to the problem of free will. It is one that is not concerned with the compatibility between freedom and determinism, but with the compatibility between freedom and various metaphysical theories of time.

Probably the first insight into this new framing of the free will debate was given by Carl Hoefer in his 2002 article, "Freedom from the Inside Out" in which he suggested that the problem of free will is not actually with determinism, but with our intuitive A-series view of time. We commonly think that the past is fixed and beyond our control and that the future is open and partially within our control. Such a view of time assumes an A-series metaphysics that features a closed past, a flowing, objective present and a future that is open to possibilities. The rival of this view is the B-theory of time which assumes that relations between events in time are static and permanent and that there is no ontological distinction between past, present and future. All events in time are equally real.

Although authors like Hoefer claim that such a non-dynamic theory of time is compatible with free will, it would seem that a requirement for freedom understood as the "ability to do otherwise" is that the agent has open alternatives available at the moment of decision. Such a libertarian conception of free will seems to assume an open future, which is a feature of the A-theory. If this is so, then it remains to be seen exactly which A-theory of time best accommodates our intuitions about free will. I will argue that freedom to do otherwise, as presented by libertarian philosophers, requires an ontologically open future and that an A-theoretic branching theory, such as Storrs McCall's model (1994), is compatible with this conception of freedom. I will also maintain that the openness of the future must be conceived as a set of possible states (or branches) from which only one may be actualized (but is undetermined which) and must not be conceived, contra Vincent Grandjean (2019), as the non-existence of states or facts of the matter.

References:
– Grandjean, Vincent (2019). How is the asymmetry between the open future and the fixed past to be characterized? Synthese(3), pp. 1-24.
– Hoefer, Carl (2002). Freedom from the Inside Out. Royal Institute of Philosophy, Supplement, 50, pp 201-222. doi:10.1017/S1358246100010572
– McCall, Storrs (1994). A Model of the Universe: Space-Time, Probability, and Decision. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Section: Metaphysics/Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Youssef Aguisoul
Date: 17:30-18:00, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.006

Bogdan Dumitrescu (University of Bucharest, Faculty of Philosophy, Romania)

The epistemic objection to sentience as criterion for moral status

Leonard Dung

According to the received view, sentience is necessary and sufficient for moral status. In other words, whether a being has intrinsic moral relevance is determined by its capacity for conscious experience, especially valenced experience like pleasure and pain. Based on this assumption, it seems reasonable to use sentience as a criterion to ascribe moral status in practice. According to this method, if we want to know whether we might have ethical obligations to a being, we should consult the best available science to ascertain whether it is sentient. The epistemic objection to this view derives from our profound uncertainty about sentience. According to this objection, we cannot use sentience as a criterion to ascribe moral status in real-world situations. For we cannot know in the foreseeable future which animals and AI systems are sentient while ethical questions regarding the possession of moral status are urgent. Therefore, we need to formulate an alternative criterion.

I reject the epistemic objection. Specifically, I argue that the epistemic objection is dissolved once one clearly distinguishes between the question (a) what determines moral status and (b) what criterion should be employed in practice to ascribe moral status. I will argue that (i) epistemic concerns are irrelevant to what determines moral status and (ii) criteria of moral status have inescapably to be based on sentience, if one concedes that sentience determines moral status. It follows that doubts about our epistemic access to sentience cannot be

used to motivate an alternative criterion of moral status. If sentience determines moral status, then there can be no alternative criterion for ascriptions of moral status. Thus, if proponents of the epistemic objection are correctly skeptical of our attempts to ascertain the distribution of sentience, then the sad truth is that we cannot know the distribution of moral status. However, I briefly argue against such strong pessimism.

Section:	Ethics
Language:	English
Chair:	Stephen Müller
Date:	16:00-16:30, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location:	SR 1.005

❧

Leonard Dung (Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany)

The amoral Common Ground of Subjectivist Metaethics

Konstantin Eckl

The aim of this paper will be to call into question the ability of subjectivism to provide moral common ground across personal and cultural divides. Subjectivism is a metaethical approach which is uniquely suited for the naturalist worldview dominant in the modern age, as it manages to avoid the is/ought gap by equating moral prescription with the description of subjective attitudes agreeing with such prescriptions. Through this move, however, subjectivism sacrifices the ability to endorse one ethical system over another, as long as both systems are internally coherent from the agent's perspective. They sacrifice the possibility of moral common ground.

The paper will be a critique of Sharon Street's attempt to use her "Humean Constitutivism" to find such common ground outlined in her paper "Constructivism in Ethics and the Problem of Attachment and Loss". There, Street illustrates a strategy of how a purely subjectivist view on moral value may nonetheless be able to arrive at a universally shared moral system, by identifying a fundamental problem which affects all moral agents, and finding as its only solution an ethical outlook.

Street thinks she is able to find such a problem in what she calls "the problem of attachment and loss"(AT), which only an ethical standpoint can solve.

In the paper I will show that, while the strategy is functional given the preconceptions of Humean Constitutivism, the "common ground" it brings is not a moral one.

I will defend the notion that a more basic problem than AT is implied by the nature of Street's conception of value systems, namely that of any values going frustrated at all. I will argue that this problem corresponds to a genuine value which is present in all possible value systems, and that when Street's notion of entailment is applied to it, it leads us not to a universal ethical system, but radical value quietism or even antivitalism. Relativism, it seems then, far from being a problem which can be overcome by subjectivism, may be its best option out of a bad bunch.

Section:	Ethics
Language:	English
Chair:	Gregor Greslehner
Date:	16:50-17:20, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location:	SR 1.005

Konstantin Eckl (University of Vienna, Österreich)

Truthmakers for Epistemicism

Shimpei Endo

Roy Sorensen suggested his version of epistemicism in the debate of vagueness and the sorites paradox. According to his truthmaker gap epistemicism, borderline cases are true but ungrounded sentences: They are true but have no truthmaker.

However, this approach has serious drawbacks. Sorensen has no space for higher-order vagueness and margin for error, which are significant merits of epistemicism.

This paper explores a better way of employing truthmaker for epistemicism. My goal is two-fold. The first sub-goal is to suggest a truthmaker semantics for higher-order vagueness. Here come two formal

notions playing important roles: partial truthmakers and abundant truthmakers. A partial truthmaker is a piece of fact that contributes to a truth not solely but with other facts ("not enough" truthmaker). An abundant truthmaker also contributes to a truth but other facts independent of that may do as well ("too much" truthmaker). Given these formal tools, you can analyze the paradox. The sorites arises because we mistake a certain kind of facts (such as the number of hairs) as the necessary and sufficient (i.e. non-partial and non-abundant) factor determining the truth value. You may need extra facts more than the number of hair when evaluating the baldness of the person in question. In other cases, you may determine the truth value with no need of the number of hair. This framework also allows higher-order vagueness. The core idea is this. The excess of facts corresponds to the order of vagueness. The more extra facts needed to determine the truth value, the higher-order its vagueness is. Similarly, the more abundant truthmakers are available, the higher-order its vagueness is.

The second task is to offer a truthmaker reading of the margin for error principle, which is the key of Timothy Williamson's popular version. Such epistemicists ascribe the sorites to our inexact knowledge. I highlight the matching between inexact knowledge and inexact truthmakers.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Nikolai Shurakov
Date:	10:40-11:10, 08 September 2022 (Thursday)
Location:	SR 1.003

<div align="center">❧❦❧</div>

Shimpei Endo (Hitotsubashi University/University of St Andrews, Scotland, UK)

Variations of Intuitionistic Revisionism

Jann Paul Engler

It is well known that intuitionists reject classical reasoning over infinite domains. But their arguments against it are not homogenous throughout different proponents of the issue

and they yield further philosophical and technical differences down the line. In this paper, I will differentiate three types of intuitionistic revisionism, which I attribute to Weyl (with an argument shared with Wittgenstein), Dummett, and Bishop, and compare their relative merits. I will particularly focus on their justification of induction.

The respective arguments against classical reasoning over infinite domains center around the following objections:

1. Classical reasoning is unable to make certain distinctions with respect to infinite domains and thus lacks means of differentiation (Bishop).

2. Classical laws for generalisations over infinite domains lack epistemic warranty (Dummett).

3. There is a complete lack of sense attributed to generalisations over infinite domains in general (Weyl, Wittgenstein).

I will argue that Bishop's proposal turns out to be the one that is the least confrontational towards classical mathematics, but, when put to the test, it does not seem to avoid a possible deadlock scenario with the proponent of classical mathematics. Weyl and Wittgenstein pose the most radical critique towards classical reasoning over the infinite, but they overshoot and thereby cause significant problems for a subsequent justification of induction. Finally, Dummett seems to occupy a middle ground. His argument, if successful, forces the classical mathematician to make substantial epistemic or ontological commitments while also managing to retain and justify induction as a legitimate principle.

Section:	Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Language:	English
Chair:	Maren Bräutigam
Date:	14:00-14:30, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location:	SR 1.004

<div align="center">❧✠❧</div>

Jann Paul Engler (University of St Andrews, United Kingdom)

Are we always neutral or undecided when we inquire?

Leonardo Flamini

Recently, epistemologists have given much attention to suspended judgment, and nearly all of them agree with this minimal account: Suspension of judgment is a form of doxastic neutrality or indecision (Friedman, forthcoming, 2017, 2013; Palmira, 2019; Raleigh, 2021; Sturgeon, 2020, 2010; Wagner, 2022). Namely, when one suspends one's judgment about a given question, one is neutral or undecided about which answer is the correct one. Furthermore, Jane Friedman (2017, forthcoming) closely ties this neutral/undecided doxastic state to inquiry. She argues that any agent inquiring into a given question suspends one's judgment about it. From the conjunction of these perspectives, it follows that if one inquires into a given question, one is neutral or undecided about which answer is the correct one.

In this talk, I argue that if we conceive suspension of judgment as a neutral or undecided state, Friedman's position does not hold. I show that there can exist biased inquiries, in which one inquires into a given question even if one already has a doxastic preference toward one of the possible answers. Moreover, I point out that not always inquirers are in a situation where they are undecided about the answer. Indeed, it can happen that one could not have available a set of possible answers from which to decide the correct one. Given this possibility, one could not be undecided about which answer is correct because one would not have a set of options from which to choose it. However, despite this, I show that there are cases in which one inquires into a given question for which the set of the possible answers is not available or already known by the agent.

Finally, I explore what role suspended judgment could have in an inquiry if it does not have the descriptive role Friedman applies to it, i.e., hallmarking what an inquirer is and when an inquiry is open. I suggest that suspended judgment can have a normative role: It can help us carry out well-conducted inquiries by protecting us from biased doxastic states that could make us collect and evaluate evidence wrongly and end up with a misrepresentation of the world that could even cause consequences that are problematic from an ethical point of view. In other words, suspension of judgment can have the role of helping us issue "right judgments" within and at the end of our inquiries.

Namely, judgments that can correctly represent the thing investigated but also not provoke unethical consequences in our world.

☙❧

Leonardo Flamini (University of Pavia - University of Zurich, Italia)

Indexicals in literary fiction

Teresa Flera

The difference between a factual statement and a fictional statement can be elusive from the perspective of semantics. In philosophical semantics, the status of fictional discourse seems heavily dependent on the ontological status of fictional entities. This is because of the problems connected with determining referents of proper names such as "Sherlock Holmes", which do not exist in the actual world. Realist approaches claim that fictional names do refer to something (not necessarily a person), while anti-realists claim that these names do not refer to anything (they can perhaps pretend-refer)(Searle, 1975; Currie, 1990). I argue that only the realist approach can account for the use of indexicals in fiction. Fictional statements containing indexicals - expressions dependent on the context of utterance, such as "I", "here", or "now" - are more problematic than those with proper names. The word "I" used in first person narration seems to refer to a fictional narrator who is a participant of the events described in the story and that is how it is intuitively interpreted. This interpretation must be accessible in order to differentiate fiction from autobiographies, because indexicals cannot have empty uses - whenever used, they will refer to the appropriate element of the context in which they are used. If the fictional context is unavailable, they will default to the context of the author (Kaplan, 1975). Therefore, a mechanism must exist to determine whether a statement using the indexical "I" is a true factual statement about the author, a false factual statement

about the author, or a fictional statement made by the author about a narrator. In order to model all of these possibilities, we must assume some form of reference to fictional entities that would differentiate them for authors of fictions. I propose a realist approach to the semantics of fiction based on the distinctions between truth-commitment and content-commitment in fiction-making.

Section:	Philosophy of Language
Language:	English
Chair:	Hugo Ribeiro Mota
Date:	10:00-10:30, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.007

Teresa Flera (University of Warsaw, Poland)

The irrationality of conspiracy theories: Why the way we acquire evidence should affect our credence

Niklas Gärtner

In his paper "Epistemic Feedback Loops (Or: How Not to Get Evidence)" Nick Hughes argues that it is an omission of normative epistemology that the way how we acquire evidence is not sufficiently taken into account. As a consequence, common approaches of epistemic normativity classify beliefs that are based on delusive evidence as justified and rational even though, intuitively, we would describe (some of) these cases as irrational, e.g. cases of conspiracists. Based on this realisation, Hughes develops a theoretical framework called "dispositionalism" which enables us to understand why beliefs based on delusive evidence are irrational. Among other simplifications, Hughes focuses only on the coarse-grained attitudes belief, disbelief and suspension of judgment and ignores the more fine-grained attitudes such as credence. This is unfortunate, because if the framework only works if we assume unrealistic oversimplified agents, its' explanatory power is weaker as it could otherwise have been.

Starting from this, in this talk, I want to present an adaption of dispositionalism that is able to handle fine-grained attitudes like credence. For the adaption I will take a closer look at the relationship

between belief and credence by consulting basic principles of Bayesian epistemology. I will compare different options of adaptation and I will argue that an accuracy centric version is the most promising one. On completion I will apply the framework on belief generating cases with delusive evidence, including cases where a person's degree of belief is based on conspiracy theory-influenced evidence. We will see that the framework classifies those cases correctly. This will show that dispositionalism is indeed a very promising alternative to popular approaches to epistemic normativity.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Nikolai Shurakov
Date:	11:20-11:50, 08 September 2022 (Thursday)
Location:	SR 1.003

❧

Niklas Gärtner (Universität of Hamburg, Germany)

"Wittgensteinian Quietism": A Quietist Cure for Philosophers of Time

Luca Gasparinetti

Whether time is tensed or tenseless is a vexed question since McTaggart (1908) has posited his famous distinction between the A(tensed)-theory and the B(tenseless)-theory of time. In light of that and developments in modern physics, philosophers of time have formulated a crucial dichotomy: the scientific and the manifest image of time. The former is tenseless. The latter is tensed. In the literature, philosophers are split into two factions: whereas some seek to recover a typical tensed time in physical theories, others avoid these attempts because physics is not hospitable for tensed theories. The resulting debate is inconclusive: according to tensers, time is tensed in relativity, quantum mechanics (e.g., Lucas 1998), and also, quantum gravity (e.g., Monton 2005). According to anti-tensers, time is tenseless in the same theories (e.g., Callender 2008). Thus, one question arises: who is right?

In this paper, I argue that philosophers suffer from an illness that raises the anxiety of settling this debate. In a quietist spirit, I consider Rovelli (2021)'s insight as a cure for philosophers of time: time is not a monolithic but a multilayered concept. More specifically, the anxiety, and therefore the debate, rests on a wrong assumption: the demand to take one notion of time, appropriate and valid in its context, and state that it represents the ultimate nature of time is a fatal mistake. Once unveiling the confusion, I illustrate that there is no solution to the problem because it must not be raised: since time is a multilayered concept, it makes no sense to force interpretations of physical theories to find a good ground for a tensed theory and to say that tensed theories are false in physics' framework. Time is a concept with different facets that have their meaning within a precise context. Applying a notion of time to different contexts is a conceptual confusion that leads to pseudo-problems.

Section:	Philosophy of Science
Language:	English
Chair:	Maren Bräutigam
Date:	16:00-16:30, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location:	SR 1.004

Luca Gasparinetti (University of Padua, Italy)

On the Belief Condition in Thomas Reid's Theory of Action

Mete Han Gencer

One peculiar implication of Thomas Reid's theory of action is a belief condition: one can only do what one believes one can do. The peculiarity is that while Reid is a staunch defender of common sense, this belief condition runs afoul of common sense. Many seem able to do things even when they are agnostic about whether they can. For instance, in climbing Mount Everest, many who reach the summit start only with the hope of success. This raises an interpretive challenge in the form of two questions. Why does Reid let

his theory of action imply such a belief condition? And does Reid's theory of action need the belief condition?

In this paper, I argue for a novel reading of Reid that answers these two questions. On this reading, Reid's theory of action is an account of causation. Roughly, doing or acting amounts to causing. Reid's analysis of causation in terms of action relies on the concept of an "active power". One's active powers constitute one's ability to do and thereby cause. Active powers are known through their three essential properties: mind-dependence, controllability, and intelligibility. It is their intelligibility that implies the belief condition. After all, if one understands that one can, then one believes that one can. Reid has an epistemic and a moral goal in thinking of active powers as intelligible and hence maintaining the belief condition. The epistemic goal is to render causation qua action intelligible. The moral goal is to enable moral responsibility by rendering unintelligible action impossible. To achieve these goals, Reid needs the belief condition. This answers the first interpretive question. Yet I argue that achieving these goals isn't necessary for Reid's theory of action. Reid would be coherent to defend his theory of action without the belief condition. This answers the second interpretive question.

Key words: Thomas Reid, active powers, causation, beliefs

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Leon Assaad
Date:	15:20-15:50, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.003

Mete Han Gencer (Simon Fraser University, Canada)

Formalism, Incompleteness, and the Implicit Commitment Thesis

Maciej Glowacki

urt Gödel, in his famous article (Gödel 1953/1995), claimed to refute the formalism or at least one of its emanations: the Syntactic Interpretation of Mathematics (SIM). According to

SIM, the sentences of mathematics have no extra-linguistic content and can be justified by means of syntactical rules of the mathematical system alone. Gödel claimed to refute this interpretation of mathematics on the basis of his celebrated Incompleteness Theorem. He argued that SIM entails the consistency of the accepted formal system which, according to his formal result, cannot be justified by formal means.

In my talk I will defend the formalist position against Gödel's argument. I will argue that although the argument is formally valid, its conclusion depends on the assumption that the formalists need to justify the consistency statement within the formal system itself. I will show that this assumption contradicts the Implicit Commitment Thesis (ICT) which is widely discussed in the recent literature on philosophy of mathematics (cf. Dean 2015, Cietski 2017, Nicolai & Piazza 2019, Fischer & Horsten & Nicolai 2019, Fischer 2021, **yk & Nicolai ms). The ICT states that in accepting a formal theory S, one is also committed to some statements that are not provable in S, but whose acceptance is implicit in the acceptance of S. Examples of such commitments include the consistency statement and various reflection principles. Moreover, some authors (e.g. Horsten 2019) claim that these statements need no further justification than the one given for acceptance of the formal theory S.

In the talk, I characterize the formalism as SIM and contrast it with Carnap's formalist position, and discuss Gödel's argument against SIM. I introduce the ICT and show how this thesis can be used to refute Gödel's argumentation. The talk ends with a discussion of some controversies concerning the ICT and arguments for its plausibility.

Section:	Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Language:	English
Chair:	Leon Commandeur
Date:	10:00-10:30, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.006

Maciej Glowacki (University of Warsaw, Poland)

Peter Singer, Ethical Significance of the Community, and Bottom-Up Ethics

Krzysztof Glowacki

Setting out from the utilitarian position and deploying a critical rationalist perspective, I sketch a critique of Peter Singer's reluctance to recognize ethical significance of communities smaller than entire humanity. Using two lines of argumentation: 1) from value-rational gains and 2) from instrumental-rational gains, I first demonstrate that community partiality plays a significant role in the utility-maximizing all-things-considered judgment and thus satisfies the standard of impartial justification of partial preferences proposed by Singer.

After defending psychological and moral ownership gains from community partiality, I use the concept of cultural evolution to argue that the bottom-up emergence of utility-maximizing social norms as outcomes of iterated social game is a necessary condition of social utility. Eventually, I extend this normative exposition to a metaethical level, arguing that the emergence of moral norms is a special case of cultural evolution, and considering their possible convergence to utility-maximizing solutions.

The article contributes by offering a critique of Singer's overreliance on reason and biology to the neglect of relevant cultural factors and by exploring a possible marriage of utilitarianism and moral constructivism, with the community serving as the basic vehicle of the intersubjective cultural - including moral - evolution.

Section:	Ethics
Language:	English
Chair:	Felix Danowski
Date:	14:00-14:30, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.005

Krzysztof Glowacki (University of Warsaw, Poland)

Properties and the Value of Persons

Shmuel Gomes

We, persons, are of value, at least in the sense that we warrant non-instrumental moral concern. Philosophers have attempted to explain this value of persons with accounts of what I'll call "the grounding property": the property of persons that grounds the value of persons. For example, many philosophers have argued that we have value in virtue of certain rational capacities, while others have claimed our value is grounded in the capacity for certain welfare states.

Here, however, I turn to a closely related but largely overlooked question: How do properties ground the value of persons? Specifically, what is the relation between any given person, x, and the grounding property, p, such that x has value in virtue of p? As I show, this is a question that is prior to identifying the grounding property. For one, it is a question that can be settled independently of an account of the grounding property, and moreover, how we conceptualize the grounding relation will limit the properties that could plausibly be identified as the grounding property. Identifying the grounding relation is thus a question that must be settled prior to identifying the grounding property, and which, correspondingly, can be used to critique existent accounts of the grounding property.

Indeed, I argue that most accounts of the value of persons fail precisely because they rest on untenable conceptions of the grounding relation. Most accounts assume what I call "the derivative model" of the grounding relation: that the value of persons is derived from the value of some property. But this is backwards: it is persons that are primarily of value, not properties. Hence, derivative models fail as accounts of the grounding relation, as do the accounts of the grounding property that assume this model.

Consequently, what is needed is an account of the grounding relation that does not sublimate the value of persons to the value of a property. I consider recent proposals made by Christine Korsgaard and Nandi Theunissen, but show that they also fail to avoid this problem. I therefore end by tentatively proposing what I call "the constitutive model": the properties that ground our value must be properties that are constitutive of our very identity. Moreover, this means the problems of personal identity and of the value of persons are intertwined.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Silvana Pani
Date: 11:20-11:50, 08 September 2022 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.005

Shmuel Gomes (University of California, Riverside, United States)

Models and Their Normativity

Wojciech Grabon

Recently, in the discussion of models, especially in the context of the social sciences, the theme of normativity has increasingly come up. While some authors claim that normative models constitute an entirely separate class, distinct from the widely discussed descriptive ones (Beck and Jahn 2021), the problem of normativity of models understood in this way usually boils down to issues related to the success of agent based models in particular social sciences. In my presentation I will therefore consider the question whether this kind of normativity is the only one that can interest us in theoretical reflection on modelling, referring, on the one hand, to one of the key aspects of scientific models, which is that they make inferences possible (see Suarez 2009), and on the other hand to the issue of the so-called directive representations (Millikan 1995). Although it may seem that models constructed for normative guidance appear different from those designed to meet the basic needs of the scientific enterprise, the problems of their efficacy or adequacy related to idealisations are not entirely separate (see Colyvan 2013). Finally, I will also point out that the relationship between descriptive and normative components in the case of models may be analogous to that discussed on the grounds of some theories of legal interpretation (e.g. Sarkowicz 1995), which might shed new light on the issue of normativity in the context of modelling.

Selected bibliography (texts available in English):
– Beck, L., & Jahn, M. (2021). Normative Models and Their Success. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 51(2), 123-150.
– Colyvan, M. (2013). Idealisations in Normative Models. Synthese,

190(8), 1337-1350.

– Millikan, R. G. (1995). Pushmi-Pullyu Representations. Philosophical Perspectives, 9, 185-200.

– Sarkowicz, R. (1995). Levels of Interpretation of a Legal Text. Ratio Juris, 8, 104.

– Suarez, M. (2009), Scientific Fictions as Rules of Inference. In M. Suarez (ed.), Fictions in Science: Philosophical Essays on Modeling and Idealization. London: Routledge, pp. 158-178.

Section:	Philosophy of Science
Language:	English
Chair:	Oyku Ulusoy
Date:	14:00-14:30, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.004

☙❧

Wojciech Grabon (University of Warsaw, Poland)

Uniqueness, Permissivism, and Self-fulfilling Beliefs

Simon Graf

Uniqueness, the thesis that there is just one rationally permissible doxastic attitude given one particular body of evidence has been challenged by various alleged counterexamples. Among the most formidable counterexamples proposed are cases based on self-fulfilling beliefs (Raleigh 2015; Kopec 2015; Kopec and Titlebaum 2016; Drake 2017; Dahlback forthcoming). In these cases, epistemic agents are confronted with a choice between two opposing beliefs whose propositional contents will be true just in case they form the respective belief. Contrary to common reception, I will demonstrate that in a self-fulfilling scenario there is not only a uniquely rational attitude determined by the evidence but also only a uniquely rational attitude to transition into. In so doing, I will show that the respective body of evidence in self-fulfilling belief cases undergoes a mentalist shift in which beliefs about pragmatic considerations become part of the evidential base. Furthermore, if there is practical indifference among the evidentially permitted options and no non-evidential

consideration can serve as tiebreakers the agent is not rationally permitted to pick one of the self-fulfilling attitudes, as often argued in practical equilibria. While in practical equilibria we may pick rather than choose when both outcomes have the same expected utility, picking doxastic attitudes, if possible, is not rational since we know in advance that at most one of them can be true.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Niklas Gärtner
Date:	16:00-16:30, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location:	SR 1.003

❧

Simon Graf (University of Leeds, United Kingdom)

"Active attention guidance" as a basic scaffold for (social) cognition

Maja Griem

The environment shapes our behaviour. This idea has received a comeback during the past decades. However, the focus has mainly been on objects of the world, such as white canes, calculators or notebooks. Since our environment is made up of objects and other agents, I would like to shift the attention towards how other agents might shape our behaviour and facilitate our cognitive capacities.

Take pointing behaviour as an example: By pointing towards a third entity, I can intentionally direct the other's attention towards a common target. This cannot only facilitate or enhance the other's understanding of the content of my talk, but also help to shape the other's attention in various ways, such as showing an interesting object. Furthermore, pointing seems to develop in parallel to the ability to establish joint attention in human infants (Cappuccio & Shepherd, 2013), thereby implying an important role of pointing within socio-cognitive development. Yet, pointing gestures are primarily understood as an extended finger used to point to a specific target (Krause, 2018; Heschl, 2018). This poses a problem if we include other cultures, that show

a variety of different pointing signals, such as pointing with the whole hand, chin, nose, or other body parts (Wilkins, 2003), not to speak of other species that might even be physically unable to show such a gesture.

To account for these differences, we need to extend the notion of pointing by shifting the question from "how does the gesture look?" to "in which way does it facilitate or enhance the other's cognition?" I propose a theory of minimal pointing that focuses on the underlying mechanisms, namely (1) attention gaining, and (2) directing the other's attention towards a specific target. I call this active attention guidance, since it might not be as sophisticated as declarative forms of human pointing, but requires more than passive gaze following: the subject looking at an object first has to actively catch and guide the other's attention towards the target. This can be achieved by various means and cues (visual, auditory, etc.) that gain the other's attention and direct it towards the specific target, requiring a sensitivity for the other's attention without the need for highly sophisticated linguistic abilities. However, for a strategy to count as AAG, the effects must be actively pursued showing goal directed behaviour. Therefore, hardwired rigid patterns have to be ruled out by restricting AAG to behaviours allowing for at least minimal flexibility. Consequently, attention gaining and directing behaviours relying on a sensitivity for others' attentional states and provide minimal flexibility and goal directedness qualify as AAG. I argue that AAG itself is a sophisticated form of joint attention for it includes the active guidance of the other's attention, which is thought of as a major developmental step in human social cognition (Tomasello, 1999). By applying this approach, nonhuman animals can be included without the need to provide evidence for (explicit) general mental state ascription, as has classically been required for more sophisticated forms of joint attention. Instead, a sensitivity for others' attentional states alone (i.e., without second or third order intentionality required) would be sufficient. Such a sensitivity has been shown in various species, such as apes (Dafreville et al., 2021), other primates (Hattori et al., 2010), cats (Ito et al., 2016), dogs (Miklosi et al., 2000; Call et al., 2003), wolves (Range & Virinyi, 2011), horses (Trösch et al., 2019), and corvids (von Bayern et al., 2009).

Further, I argue that active attention guidance can be seen as a basic scaffold for social cognition, underlying flexible coordination, cooperation, and other more sophisticated socio-cognitive abilities. Since our environment consists not only of objects, but also to a huge ex-

tent of other agents, we should put more emphasis on how others can shape our cognition and what we can do to help others. To achieve this, a broader comparative view including different species can be useful to examine more basic underlying mechanisms of highly developed cognitive abilities within an even more complex social environment.

Keywords: pointing, attention, scaffold, comparative cognition, social cognition

Section:	Philosophy of Mind
Language:	English
Chair:	Bruno Cortesi
Date:	14:40-15:10, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	HS E.002

❧

Maja Griem (Ruhr University Bochum, Germany)

Non-realistic model theory for a realistic modal language: the case of contingentism

Arnold Grigorian

In the book "Modal Logic as Metaphysics" Williamson argues that "necessarily everything is necessarily something", and that nothing can exist except actual things. As a result of that view, every object is something and nothing is identical to nothing. From that does not follow that, for example, the notebook I am writing from is always or/and necessary a concrete thing. if it hadn't been produced, it wouldn't exist. It would have been some thing, but it wasn't concrete. It would have been a non-concrete object (not to be confused with abstract objects)

A merely possible object is something that doesn't exist but could have been something. That category can only be described through modal properties. For example, merely possible children of Wittgenstein have the property that they could have been children of Wittgenstein. The question that another kind of actualist, contingentist, can ask: what properties do such merely possible objects have in the actual world? Williamson argues that they don't share any properties

with the actual thing. Non-concrete, merely possible objects can't be described in the same way as concrete objects.

For the contingentist, the problem is not so simple either. He claims that something could have failed to exist and there are things that are nothing. Since he explicitly denies Williamson's main thesis, then some objects are identical to nothing. How can one solve the problem of merely possible individuals without falling into a non-realistic interpretation of modality?

In the presentation, I am going to consider so-called "propositional contingentism" (Stalnaker, Fritz, Goodman) which combines compositional semantics with the set of permutation functions. The aim is to preserve (1) a realistic interpretation of modal language, that doesn't force any controversial metaphysical commitments, and (2) the possibility of contingentist discourse.

Section:	Philosophy of Language
Language:	English
Chair:	Marlene Valek
Date:	14:40-15:10, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.007

Arnold Grigorian (HSE, Russia)

Intention, Closeness, and Double Effect

Levin Güver

We seem to intuitively grasp the difference between the things we intend to do and the merely foreseen consequences - or side-effects - of our conduct. The Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) picks up on this distinction and adds to it a normative dimension, stating that it is all things considered easier to justify foreseen harm than intended harm. It will differentiate the Strategic Bomber – who, to bring an end to the war, bombs an ammunition factory, knowing that it will kill nearby civilians – from the Terror Bomber, who bombs an ammunition factory to kill civilians in order to terrorize the enemy into surrendering the war (Bratman, 1987, pp. 139-140).

Yet we seem to be able to circumvent the DDE by stipulating an agent with very fine-grained intentions. Consider Bennett's Bomber, who bombs the factory with the intention of making nearby civilian bodies "merely seemingly dead for a year or two" without requiring that "the people become downright dead," (Bennett, 1995, pp. 210–211). As regards justifiability, Bennet's Bomber and Strategic Bomber seem to stand on equal footing. It is this repugnancy which motivates the Closeness Problem: what, if any, are the conditions under which an agent who acts with an intention to bring about X also intends to bring about Y? How close do X and Y need to be, and what constitutes this relation of "closeness"?

Although much ink has been spilled on the matter (see, e.g., Duff, 1980; Quinn, 1989; Moore, 1993, 2020; Simester, 1996; Fitzpatrick, 2006; Yaffe, 2011; Nelkin & Rickless, 2014, 2015; Sarch, 2017), the Closeness Problem is still far from resolved. In my paper, I want to assess the upshots of this debate for the criminal law. I will argue that a dissolution of the Closeness Problem requires a general account as to the representational content of an agent's intentions, and that the criminal law, too, is in dire need of such an account. I will then propose one such account and explicate what it would look like in a legal court.

Section:	Ethics
Language:	English
Chair:	Stephen Müller
Date:	14:40-15:10, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location:	SR 1.005

Levin Güver (University of Zurich, Switzerland)

Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness and Origins of Agency

Michael Hegarty

Are non-human animals agents? Some philosophers ("Intellectualists") say "no". True action, they say, is dependent on rationality in a demanding sense: "acting for reasons", requiring self-consciousness. Others ("Anti-Intellectualists2) say "yes".

There is reason to think animals are agents, because no sophisticated conceptual and metarepresentational abilities are required. Intellectualists about agency 'including John McDowell' are sometimes criticised because they seem to deny that the emergence of human agency from the natural world can be explained in a philosophically cogent way. If self-consciousness is necessary for agency, this makes agency too demanding for non-human animals and even human infants. We seem left with a choice: either reject Intellectualism or give up on explaining the natural origins of agency. In this paper I propose an account of a precursor to human rational agency that I argue can avoid this dilemma.

Drawing on recent philosophical work on nonconceptual precursors to self-consciousness, I argue that there is a logically possible precursor to human mentality. I explain how this "pre-reflective" mentality shares a structural-functional organisation with human mentality as conceived of by Intellectualists. And in virtue of this shared organisation, pre-reflective mentality can, I claim, support a pre-rational version of agency that provides a plausible intermediate to ground an explanation of the emergence of fully self-conscious human agency. Intellectualists, following work by Donald Davidson and the Pittsburgh School, require that any account of human mentality must meet constraints on its normativity and unity. Using work from contemporary philosophers including Susan Hurley, Eric Marcus and Elisabeth Camp, I show how my proposed pre-reflective mentality can meet pre-conceptual analogues of normativity and unity. And, hence, that it can plausibly ground an explanation of the emergence of human agency.

Section:	Philosophy of Mind
Language:	English
Chair:	Daniel Weger
Date:	10:40-11:10, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	HS E.002

❧

Michael Hegarty (University of Connecticut , USA)

Embodied skills and knowledge-how as the basis for concept possession

Alexander Hölken

Concepts are a fundamental part of any theory of cognition aiming to explain how animals and humans can retain information about their environment in a way that allows them to employ it for the purposes of offline reasoning, future planning, intention ascription, and other high-level cognitive processes. Traditional views of concepts hold that, when an organism possesses a concept, their brain or mind contains contentful representations of objects or abstract entities subsumed under that concept. For instance, a person's concept of DOG may be constituted by a structured set of mental representations with the contents "tail", "pet", "fluffy", et cetera. While many philosophers disagree on what exactly the format of these representations are, and which role the structural relation between them plays, it is fair to say that the received view within philosophical approaches to concept possession hinges on the possession of representational content (Prinz, 2002).

In my paper, I argue against this fundamental assumption. Instead, I present an account of concepts that is based on the possession of abilities, both to perceive and interact with properties of objects and to relate concepts to each other in a certain way (Newen & Bartels, 2007). Abilities, in turn, are realized by an agent possessing knowledge-how about sensorimotor correlations on the one hand and patterns of thought on the other. Knowledge-how, understood in this sense, turns out to be a prerequisite for the possession of knowledge-that, since it needs to be grounded in skills of access and interaction with the real world (Nou, 2015).

Consequently, concepts should not be understood as grounded in representational content, but in fundamental sensorimotor abilities that allow for the recognization of instantiations of that concept in one's environment. Thus, taking into account the different degrees to which concepts can incorporate knowledge-how and knowledge-that, we arrive at a pluralist understanding of concepts.

References
– Newen, A. & Bartels, A. (2007): Animal Minds and the Possession of Concepts. Philosophical Psychology, 20(3)
– Nou, A. (2015): Concept Pluralism, Direct Perception, and the

Fragility of Presence. In: T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds.): Open-MIND, 27(T)
– Prinz, J. J. (2002): Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and their Perceptual Basis. MIT Press.

Section:	Philosophy of Mind
Language:	English
Chair:	Bruno Cortesi
Date:	14:00-14:30, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	HS E.002

<div align="center">ॐ</div>

Alexander Hölken (Ruhr University Bochum, Germany)

Freedom Without Ability

Ilkin Huseynli

Most political philosophers assume that ability is necessary for freedom and in the absence of ability, either one cannot be said to be free, or the question of freedom does not arise at all. That is, if I am unable to φ, either I cannot be said to be free to φ, or it does not make sense to ask whether I am free or unfree to φ. If this view is right, then a hypothetical prevention has no impact on my freedom when I lack the relevant ability. In other words, when I am unable to φ; but will be prevented if I could φ, that hypothetical prevention does not reduce my overall freedom. I argue against the ability-based account of freedom by claiming that a hypothetical prevention also reduces my overall freedom because I cannot increase or decrease my overall freedom all by myself while everything else around me, including the deposition of other agents, remains exactly the same. I argue that when I am unable to φ; in the absence of preventive obstacles, I am unfree to φ; provided that I will be prevented if I become able and try to φ.

Virtually all contemporary theorists of freedom reject the direct relevance of one's desires to one's freedom. According to a desire-based account, freedom is the ability to do what one wants to do. Suppose that you are a prisoner and you want to go out but the guards prevent you. If you remove your desire to go out, you will not be prevented to

do what you want to do. So, by meditation, you remove most of your desires and now you want to do those things which are allowed in the prison. Thus, prison guards do not prevent you from doing what you want to do and by meditation you increased your overall freedom by removing some of your unfreedoms. In short, a desire-based conception of freedom implies that a prisoner who reduces his desires to the set of actions which are allowed to him does not suffer from any unfreedom. The reason why contemporary philosophers reject desire-based view is their belief that you cannot increase your overall freedom all by yourself while everything else around you remain exactly the same.

Now suppose that the UK government declared me persona non grata. So, I am unfree to enter the UK but I want to increase my freedom. After reading those philosophers who argue that one cannot be free to do something if one is not able to do that thing, I decided to remove my ability to enter the UK. I jumped over a cliff in order to become paralyzed and I made myself unable to enter the UK. On ability-based conception of freedom, while before I was prevented by the UK government and this prevention reduced my overall freedom, now this prevention does not matter. Thus, by becoming paralyzed I made myself freer. In other words, while everything else around me, including the disposition of the British government to prevent me, remained exactly the same, I increased my overall freedom by removing one of my unfreedoms - namely, entering the UK.

So, as the prisoner increased his overall freedom by reducing his desires, I increased my overall freedom by reducing my abilities. But if desire-based conception is rejected, ability-based conception should be rejected too. Both conceptions hold that I can increase my overall freedom by decreasing something about myself (my ability or my desire) while everything else around me remains exactly the same.

Section:	Political Philosophy
Language:	English
Chair:	Giada Coleschi
Date:	16:00-16:30, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location:	SR 1.007

<div align="center">☙❧</div>

Ilkin Huseynli (University of Milan, Italy)

Realism on Thin Ice: An Argument from Mathematical Practice

Jared Ifland

In Maddy (2011), Penelope Maddy introduces two methodologically equivalent but philosophically distinct positions which presumably respect set-theoretic practice; termed Thin Realism and Arealism, the former has a realist bent and the latter an anti-realist one. Since both positions agree on the level of method, Maddy concludes that for her idealized naturalistic inquirer, who practices an austere version of naturalism dubbed Second Philosophy, there is no substantive difference between the two positions. I argue that Thin Realism loses its tenability when extended beyond set-theoretic practice and toward broader mathematical practice. Additionally, I submit that the issues presented for Thin Realism are not issues for Arealism. Central to my argument is the observation that mathematicians approach problems in everyday practice from multiple foundational vantage points. Moreover, I consider various foundational goals proposed in Maddy (2017) and demonstrate that none of them force a whole-hearted endorsement of one foundation over another.

From here, the problem for Thin Realism is presented in the form of a dilemma. The first horn is that if the Thin Realist accepts ontological pluralism, then this is at odds with the putative unity of mathematical practice. Thus, she is charged with showing how engaging in mathematical practice from different foundational approaches does not lead to what Quine terms a change of subject. The second horn is that if she rejects ontological pluralism, then she must do so by appeal to some epistemological faculty other than the methods of working mathematicians. However, this takes the Thin Realist beyond her epistemological standards. In turn, this presents a naturalistic way to undermine Maddy's conclusion that Thin Realism and Arealism are two equally admissible ways of describing the underlying constraints of mathematical practice for the Second Philosopher.

Section:	Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Language:	English
Chair:	Leon Commandeur
Date:	10:40-11:10, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.006

Jared Ifland (Florida State University, United States)

How to measure effect sizes for rational decision-making

Ina Jäntgen

In studies testing the effectiveness of treatments, the treatments' effect sizes are measured using so-called outcome measures. Such outcome measures provide information for subsequent choices between treatments. However, in the case of binary variables, two classes of outcome measures, absolute and relative ones, differ in how they describe a treatment's effect size. Which outcome measures can then inform a rational choice between treatments? In this talk, I argue that absolute measures are at least as good as, if not better than, relative ones for informing rational decision-making across choice scenarios.

To start, I model two choice scenarios using decision theory, one between a tested treatment and the control group treatment and another between treatments tested in distinct trials. Using these decision models, I analyze the conditions under which absolute or relative measures provide decision-relevant information. As argued by Sprenger & Stegenga (2017), absolute measures but not relative ones always do so for choices between a treatment and a control group treatment. I show that this argument does not hold for choices between treatments tested in distinct trials. Here, we need information about the difference in the probabilities of the outcome of interest given treatments to decide. To analyze when absolute or relative measures provide this information, I distinguish between three epistemic situations, differing in how much we know about the probabilities of the outcome given control group treatments. I argue that absolute measures are equally good or better than relative ones for informing choices across these epistemic situations. Overall, for informing rational decision-making, absolute measures dominate relative ones across choice scenarios.

The dominance of absolute measures challenges the current practice in biomedical research of only using relative measures, while also undermining the claim that only absolute measures are suited to inform choices (Sprenger and Stegenga 2017). Recognizing these aspects advances the debate on reporting outcome measures. I conclude my talk

with three principles for reporting outcome measures, to be scrutinized in further work moving beyond the idealized perspective of decision models.

Section:	Philosophy of Science
Language:	English
Chair:	Maren Bräutigam
Date:	16:50-17:20, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location:	SR 1.004

Ina Jäntgen (University of Cambridge, United Kingdom)

Gendered Personal Pronouns as Presupposition Triggers

Antonina Jamrozik & Zuzanna Jusinska

Cooper (1983) proposed that gendered pronouns trigger presuppositions about the referent's gender. This idea was further popularised in linguistics by Heim and Kratzer (1998) and has later found its way into philosophy (Dembroff & Wodak 2018). Cooper (1983) believes that while the anaphoric pronouns trigger presuppositions in a typical way, the presuppositions triggered by deictic pronouns differ from those triggered by anaphoric pronouns. In the case of deictic pronouns the presuppositions about the referent's gender are indexical meaning that they have to be satisfied in the actual world. Yanovich (2010) argues that all gendered pronouns (deictic, anaphoric, or bound) trigger indexical presuppositions, meaning that gendered pronouns trigger presuppositions in a different way that the typical examples of presupposition triggers.

In our talk, we want to agree with Yanovich, and put forward the hypothesis that gendered personal pronouns trigger presuppositions about the referent's gender, in opposition to the claim that the use of a gendered pronoun entails information about the referent's gender. We claim that in both cases of gendered pronoun usage – anaphoric and deictic – its processing relies vastly on context cues, and that virtually the only difference between the two uses is what kind of context is at play.

The argument for this claim is twofold. First, we present what Strawson called the "squeamishness" effect of false presuppositions (Strawson 1950) and appeal to the audience's intuitions concerning the use of a wrong gendered pronoun in a context. Second, we claim that our approach, apart from its intuitive appeal and theoretical strength, can also serve as a starting point for an analysis of different manifestations of grammatical gender in natural language.

References:
– Cooper, R (1983). Quantification and Syntactic Theory. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing.
– Dembroff, R., & Wodak, D. (2018). He/she/they/ze. Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 5.
– Heim, I. & Kratzer, A (1998). Semantics in Generative Grammar. Malden: Blackwell.
– Schwarz, F. (2016b). Experimental work in presupposition and presupposition projection. Annual review of linguistics, 2, 273-292.
– Strawson, P. F. (1950). On referring. Mind, 59(235), 320-344.
– Yanovich, I. (2010). On the Nature and Formal Analysis of Indexical Presuppositions. New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 6284, 272-291.

Section:	Philosophy of Language
Language:	English
Chair:	Marlene Valek
Date:	14:00-14:30, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.007

Antonina Jamrozik (University of Warsaw, Poland)

Zuzanna Jusinska (University of Warsaw, Poland)

Social Construction as Grounding: Demarcating the Important/Covert Cases

Pelin Kasar

A lot of things are said to be socially constructed: money, borders, corporates, nations, gender, race, etc. As Hacking puts it, the metaphor of social construction has "become tired" (Hacking 1999, p.35). Especially in social ontology, according to the simple-ground theoretic analyses of social construction, all the cases that are grounded in the social are social constructions: even mathematical sets and public artifacts. There is no doubt that those are not social constructions, but what about borders, corporates, and nations? Many social ontologists accept them as paradigmatic examples of social construction and build their theories to include them. However, I am skeptical about their approach, I think that they miss the point of social constructionist claims: to show that some kind we ordinarily take to be natural is, in fact, social (Haslanger 2003). This is called the debunking project, and those cases such as gender and race can be called covert cases of social construction. We need an account through which we can distinguish covert cases of social construction from other cases grounded in the social. There are two steps that need to be taken: (1) understanding social construction in terms of grounding relation, and then (2) distinguishing important/covert cases of social construction from other cases. In this way, we can integrate the notion of social construction into a more general metaphysics without forgetting the aim of social constructionist claims.

Section:	Metaphysics/Ontology
Language:	English
Chair:	Alejandro Gracia di Rienzo
Date:	10:00-10:30, 08 September 2022 (Thursday)
Location:	SR 1.006

Pelin Kasar (Central European University , Austria)

Naive Realism and Temporal Expectations

Daniel Kim

his paper defends the idea that phenomenological approaches to time-consciousness can enrich the current analytic philosophy of perception, by showing how naive realism, a prominent contemporary Anglophone theory of perception, can be supplemented with the phenomenological notion of "horizon" in a novel way.

According to Hoerl's (2018) strong temporal externalism, the phenomenology of temporal experience is fully determined by the temporal properties and objects perceived "in absence of a temporal viewpoint".

However, I argue that Hoerl's externalist view, understood within a naive realist framework, cannot do full justice to the role of the subject in determining the temporal character of experience because of the emphasis on the constitutive and explanatory role assigned to perceived mind-independent events.

The issue concerns the difficulty of accounting for variations in the phenomenology of temporal experience without the variation in the objects. I argue that Hoerl's externalist view is not well-positioned to explain the discrepancy between "expected" and "felt2 duration of perceived events (e.g., the same events can seem to take "longer than expected" when you're bored and "shorter than expected" when you're having fun) (Tanaka & Yotsumoto 2017).

My alternative approach is to supplement temporal externalism with phenomenological discussions of the "horizonal" structure of experience (Husserl 1927/1991; Merleau-Ponty 1945/2013), to legitimise the subjective (perspectival) aspects of the phenomenology of temporal experience. The claim is that perceptual experience fundamentally involves (i) an "acquaintance" to mind-independent occurrences on (ii) a 2future-horizon2 in virtue of which one can be aware of anticipated experiences one could have.

The proposed view, I argue, is better suited (than Hoerl's) to explain phenomenal variations without the variation in the acquainted events, in terms of variations in the "future-horizon" (i.e., the subject's anticipation).

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Bruno Cortesi
Date: 15:20-15:50, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location: HS E.002

Daniel Kim (University of York, United Kingdom)

Predication, Ways of being and Properties

Minseok Kim

In this paper, I propose a new theory of properties in which properties are understand in terms of ways of being: a property (e.g. the property of being human) is an object that encodes a way of being (e.g. being human). So, (i) properties are objects, and (ii) properties encodes ways of being. About the first claim: because properties are objects, I claim, properties have what I call an objectual part in their structures. About the second claim: unlike other objects, properties have something more in their structures. Because properties encode ways of being, I claim, they have what I call a predication part in their structures. This predicational part of properties is where ways of being are encoded. So, strictly speaking, ways of being are not encoded in properties themselves but encoded in the predicational part of properties.

The semantic value of a predicate is a way of being that is encoded in the predicational part of a property. For example, the semantic value of the predicate "is F" is being F that is encoded in the predicational part of the property of being F. So, the semantic value of "is F" is being F which in a sense is a part of the property of being F. On the other hand, the semantic value of the singular term "the property of being F" is the property of being F as a whole or the property of being F as an object (i.e., as something that has the objectual unity). In the statements "The property of being F is a property/an abstract entity", we are talking about the property of being F as a whole or as an object. Note that these statements describe specifically the objectual part of the property of being F in the sense that they tell us what sort of object the property in question is.

Then, I will show that some puzzles about predication can be solved in my theory of properties, which shows that there are good reasons to accept my theory: (1) My theory can explain why the predicate "is human" and the singular term "the property of being human" cannot be substituted for each other. (2) My theory can avoid Bradley's regress. (3) My theory can explain why, for example, the essentialist statement "Socrates essentially is human" does not entail "Socrates is ontologically dependent upon the property of being human" while the essentialist statement "Socrates essentially exemplifies the property of being human" entails it.

Section:	Metaphysics/Ontology
Language:	English
Chair:	Alejandro Gracia di Rienzo
Date:	12:00-12:30, 08 September 2022 (Thursday)
Location:	SR 1.006

Minseok Kim (Syracuse University, USA)

Grounding and metaphysical explanation: Is it really that complicated?

Markel Kortabarria

The notion of grounding has been sailing the stormy sea of metaphysics for many years now and it seems that despite sceptical winds the ship is reaching port. The reason, proponents claim, is that grounding connections are distinctively explanatory. Unionists argue that grounding is itself a form of metaphysical explanation, whereas separatists hold that it is the relation of metaphysical determination that is uniquely apt to back up said cases of explanation. Yet, in a recent line of criticism Anna-Sofia Maurin (2019) has argued that the grounding ship faces a dilemma that prevents it from mooring:

Assuming that grounding connections are fully objective and that explanations are typically encoded as having both a representational and a worldly component: Either unionism is true, and we must account for the abnormal non-epistemic nature of grounding-explanations,

which seems unfeasible; or separatism is true, and we must explain what makes grounding so special that it enables it to account for metaphysical explanations in a way that no other determinative relation can, which seems difficult. In either case, it seems as if the boat is leaking.

I explore this tension and argue that while revealing, the arguments provided fail to close the explanatory path in any horn of the dilemma. First, because the objections of explanatory inaccessibility and epistemic constraints against unionism fail, since there are at least two philosophically tenable positions that the grounding theorist can articulate. Second, because, contrary to what is objected, separatism can unproblematically model grounding explanatoriness in analogy with causation and moreover, no principled reason has been given for thinking that non-grounding metaphysicians could always dispense with the grounding relation in accounting for cases of metaphysical explanation.

Section:	Metaphysics/Ontology
Language:	English
Chair:	Youssef Aguisoul
Date:	14:40-15:10, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location:	SR 1.006

❧❦

Markel Kortabarria (Universitat de Barcelona, Spain)

Plausible Deniability and Epistemic Authority

Gabriel Levc

The current literature on (plausible) deniability identifies avoiding criticism and accountability for what was said as the main motivations for strategically communicating in a way that allows for denial (see e.g. Peet 2015, Dinges & Zakkou 2021). In this paper, my aim is to identify a further possible motive for maintaining deniability, namely preserving epistemic authority with regards to the topic of the conversation, and to show the kinds of demands this further motive places on philosophical accounts of deniability.

In the first part of the paper, I demonstrate how plausible deniability can be instrumentalised to maintain epistemic authority by contrasting it with situations in which speakers admit to outright being

wrong. Drawing from Langton's (2018) work on authority presupposing speech acts, I show that in the case of taking back an assertion, a speaker might suffer from a deficit in epistemic authority, while in cases of denying having said something, no such thing happens. Furthermore, I use Maitra's (2012) discussion of authority accommodation to show that not only does the speech act of denial require a sort of authority in order to be appropriate, but that it can also be used to gain this kind of epistemic authority, as long as no interlocutor objects to it.

In the second section of the paper, I draw from my previous discussion to formulate two desiderata for philosophical accounts of (plausible) deniability that have not been recognized in the literature so far: (1) They must provide an adequate analysis of the speech act of denial that incorporates its demand for epistemic authority and explains how interlocuters might block it based on a speaker's lack of authority (2) They need to restrict the phenomenon of deniability to cases in which the speaker does not automatically suffer from a loss of epistemic authority should they decide to deny having meant a specific proposition. While (1) follows relatively straightforwardly from my observations in the previous section, (2) requires a specific methodological aim for which I provide a brief defence.

References:
– Dinges, A. & Zakkou, J. (2021): "On Deniability"
– Langton, R. (2018): "The Authority of Hate Speech", Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law Vol. 3, 123-151.
– Maitra, I. (2012): "Subordinating Speech", in: Maitra, McGowan: Speech and Harm, 94-120.
– Peet, A. (2015): "Testimony, Pragmatics, and Plausible Deniability", Episteme 12/1, 29-51.

Section:	Philosophy of Language
Language:	English
Chair:	Teresa Flera
Date:	10:00-10:30, 08 September 2022 (Thursday)
Location:	SR 1.007

<div align="center">✂✎</div>

Gabriel Levc (University of Vienna, Austria)

The Price of Deception: Thinking of Greenwashing in Terms of its Economic Preconditions

Jakob Lissy

Most current scientific and philosophical discussion on greenwashing is centered around questions such as whether greenwashing is effective, which methods companies use to greenwash themselves, and how greenwashing can be combated. There is little discussion, however, about economic preconditions of greenwashing which, as I will argue, could shine light on issues that other approaches (Lyon et al. 2011, Lee et al. 2018) do not cover.

I base my discussion on three basic preconditions, all of which need to be fulfilled to make greenwashing favorable for companies. I call the first cheap production viability, which demands that non-green production is cheaper than green production. The second is deception favorability which is fulfilled if creating the impression that one's production practices being green is cheaper than actually becoming green. Lastly there is greenwashing profitability, which requires that the fines for being discovered to greenwash multiplied by the chance to be discovered amounts to less than the surplus the non-green production yields. If all these conditions are met in a given product-market and one assumes that the survival of companies depends mainly on their monetary gain, greenwashing companies have a competitive advantage.

After explaining and discussing this framework I will argue that thinking about greenwashing in terms of its economic preconditions can suggest new ways to investigate issues concerning it. I will briefly discuss four cases in which this approach could prove fruitful:

1. It can help us to understand why greenwashing is so pervasive whilst questioning the colloquial conception that construes greenwashing as an evil act of greedy individuals.

2. It indicates that we should doubt the market's ability to adapt to changing consumer interests if consumers merely change their buying patterns.

3. It provides a rough framework for identifying markets susceptible to greenwashing.

4. It suggests means to make greenwashing unattractive for companies.

By shifting the analysis to focus on markets instead of individual

cases of greenwashing, my paper adds a novel perspective on the phenomenon and strategies to combat it.

Bibliography:

– Lee, Ho Cheung Brian, Jose M Cruz, and Ramesh Shankar. "Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Issues in Supply Chain Competition: Should Greenwashing Be Regulated?" Decision Sciences 49, no. 6 (2018): 1088-1115. https://doi.org/10.1111/deci.12307.
– Lyon, T. P., & Maxwell, J. W. (2011). Greenwash: Corporate environmental disclosure under threat of audit. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 20(1), 3-41.

Section:	Philosophy of Science
Language:	English
Chair:	Ina Jängten
Date:	11:20-11:50, 08 September 2022 (Thursday)
Location:	SR 1.004

❧

Jakob Lissy (University of Vienna, Austria)

Pluralistic Ignorance and Group Belief

Filippo Riscica Lizzio

We can ascribe beliefs to groups. Statements like, "The team believes that the market will grow next year", and "The group of friends believes that Berlin is a beautiful city" are meaningful, and useful in everyday situations. While this kind of ascriptions are common, it is not intuitively clear what is the relation between the individual members' beliefs and the group beliefs. The analysis of the concept of group belief, and the explication of the relations between individual members' beliefs and the group belief occupies a lively debate in social epistemology.

Lackey (2021) has argued that the main accounts of group belief that are presented in the contemporary debate cannot be correct, because, in some cases, they do not distinguish group lies (and group bullshits) from group beliefs. Lackey (2021, pp. 48–49) has also introduced

a new account of group belief, the Group Agent Account (henceforth GAA).

In my talk, I have two aims. Firstly, I shall argue that the GAA does not yield the correct ascriptions in the cases of pluralistic ignorance where each member of a group privately believes that p but acts, speaks and argues as if she believes that not-p. Following Gilbert (1989) and Bird (2010, 2020), I shall argue that in these cases a good account of group belief should not ascribe to the group the belief that p. In the GAA, it does not matter that the belief held by the operative members be publicly expressed within the group. Consequently, in cases of pluralistic ignorance where condition (2) is satisfied the GAA incorrectly ascribes to the group the belief that p.

Secondly, I shall present an original account of group belief that correctly distinguishes group lies (and bullshits) from group beliefs, and that ascribes the correct group belief in the cases of pluralistic ignorance.

I shall argue that since in my account the ascription of belief depends on the utterances of the members of the group rather than on their private mental state, it correctly deals with cases of pluralistic ignorance. Finally, I shall argue that the two conditions allow my account to correctly distinguish group lies and group bullshits from group beliefs.

References:
– Bird, A. (2010). Social Knowing. Philosophical Perspectives, 24, 23-56.
– Bird, A. (2020). Group Belief. In: Fricker, M., Graham, P. J., Henderson, D. & Pedersen, N. J. L. L. (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. Routledge.
– Gilbert, M. (1987). Modelling Collective Belief. Synthese, 73(1), 185-204.
– Gilbert, M. (1989). On Social Facts. Princeton University Press.
– Lackey, J. (2021). The Epistemology of Groups. Oxford University Press.
– Tuomela, R. (1992). Group Beliefs. Synthese, 91(3), 285-318.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Niklas Gärtner
Date:	15:20-15:50, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location:	SR 1.003

❧❦❧

Filippo Riscica Lizzio (University of Hamburg, Germany)

Recognition and parity: A consequence of deep disagreement between epistemic peers

Ignacio Federico Madronal

Two kinds of disagreement have been of great interest to social epistemology in the last decades: deep disagreements, which take place when the dispute between the parties is systematic and particularly difficult to resolve, and disagreements between epistemic peers, caused by the confrontation between agents who have the same evidence and cognitive virtues regarding the topic under discussion. The purpose of this article is to work on the intersection of them, evaluating the consequences of a deep disagreement between peers.

First of all, I argue that we can relate both treatments of disagreement from a theory based on the notion of epistemic perspective, which is defined as a set of policies or strategies used by an agent to build factual beliefs when facing certain piece of evidence (Borge 2020). From this point of view, the depth (or strength) of disagreements can often be explained by the divergence of the epistemic perspectives adopted by the parties who disagree, making them support incompatible beliefs even when they are epistemic peers.

Secondly, I defend that, given some characteristics of epistemic perspectives (fundamentality, immodesty, and immunity to the evidence), there exist circumstances in which both parties of a disagreement are epistemic peers, but they cannot recognize them as such because their perspectives are making them perceive each other as partially irrational. This explains why some disagreements are so deep that each part treats the other as their epistemic inferior, even when they both share the same evidence and have equivalent cognitive virtues.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Cristian Vulpe
Date:	10:40-11:10, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.003

𝔅🕈🕸

Ignacio Federico Madronal (Universidad de Buenos Aires (University of Buenos Aires), Argentina)

Understanding Voluntariness

Marlene Maislinger

hilosophers do not agree on the meaning of voluntariness. In this talk, I explore some possible ways of understanding voluntariness and present my own point of view about how the concept should be used. I ask why we want to know whether an action or decision is voluntarily made and look at some writer's ideas about when this is the case. After rejecting Robert Nozick's (1974) notion of voluntariness and delving into Serena Olsaretti's (1998 & 2018), I conclude that it is most sensible to understand voluntariness as depending on one's subjective assessment of the acceptability and availability of one's options and on one's ability to act in accordance with what one considers to be the best option.

Section:	Political Philosophy
Language:	English
Chair:	Giada Coleschi
Date:	16:50-17:20, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location:	SR 1.007

𝔅🕈🕸

Marlene Maislinger (Universität Salzburg, Austria)

Charles Mills' misinterpretations and insurmountable difficulty regarding John Rawls's ideal theory

Hrayr Manukyan

In this essay, I discuss and reject Charles Mills' five objections raised against Tommie Shelby concerning the applicability of John Rawls's fair equality of opportunity principle in matters of racial justice. Mills, one of the most influential critics of Rawls, argues that Rawls's theory is inherently inapplicable for race-related justice issues and that it is ideological and colonial in its nature. Mills criticizes Shelby's attempt to use the Rawlsian framework in the context of racial justice. Shelby replies to Mills' second objection by formulating a strong argument regarding the necessity of ideal theory. I argue that this argument poses insurmountable difficulty for Mills' project concerning the decolonization and deideologisation of Western political philosophy.

Shelby also partially addresses Mills' third objection. However, Shelby does not address Mills' first, fourth, and fifth objections. I reconstruct these objections and show that they too should be rejected. Particularly, I argue that it is irrelevant what Rawls himself thought about the principle of fair equality of opportunity in the context of racial justice; that Mills fails to understand the point of the veil of ignorance by claiming that we cannot use left-wing social-scientific materials during the process of four-stage vail lifting; and that Mills' approach is highly problematic from both moral and practical/political perspectives.

Section:	Political Philosophy
Language:	English
Chair:	Giada Coleschi
Date:	14:40-15:10, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location:	SR 1.007

Hrayr Manukyan (University of Amsterdam, Netherlands)

Cognitive Phenomenal Presence

Valentina Martinis

abian Dorsch (2018) distinguishes two kinds of features that are phenomenally present (i.e., that make a subjective difference to one's conscious experience) in perception: (1) object-directed phenomenal properties: features that seemingly belong to the object of the experience (e.g., red, blue, cold, hot, etc.); (2) experience-directed phenomenal properties: features that seemingly belong to the experience itself (e.g., blurriness, mineness, etc.). In this talk, I shall apply this same distinction to cognitive phenomenal states. I will thus distinguish between object-directed phenomenal features of thought and experience-directed phenomenal features of thought. Object-directed phenomenal features of thoughts are those features that seemingly belong to the object of the thought. Naturally, this presupposes a clarification of the ambiguous expression "object of thought". For our phenomenological task, I shall assume that our thoughts are transparent to their referents, and that the expression "objects of thought" refers to such referents as they are intended by us. Considering as an example the state of thinking of Pegasus, the object-directed phenomenal features of such thought will thus be: being winged, being white, being non-existent, belonging to Bellerophon, and so on. To the category of experience-directed phenomenal features of thought belong those features that pertain to the phenomenology of experiencing a given thought. Continuing with our Pegasus example, some of these features will be: being thought at this moment, being thought in English, belonging thought by me, feeling irreal, feeling mind-dependent, and so on. In the concluding part of my talk, I will suggest that the sceptics of cognitive phenomenology tend to ignore the second category of features or conflate it with the first category, thereby reducing it to the phenomenology of the associated sensory imagery. My proposed taxonomy is not an argument in favour of the existence of cognitive phenomenology, but it can be a helpful tool to clarify what cognitive phenomenology is and why it cannot be simply reduced to sensory phenomenology. The upshot of this project is to move away from the standard negative definition of cognitive phenomenology (i.e., as what cognitive phenomenology is not, namely non-sensory phenomenology) towards a positive definition.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Jakob Roloff
Date: 11:20-11:50, 08 September 2022 (Thursday)
Location: HS E.002

Valentina Martinis (CEU, Austria)

Extrarational Permissivism

Paige Massey

Part of what can make disagreement intractable is not that the people with whom we disagree are totally irrational and embracing a "post-truth" disregard for evidence, but, rather, they are sometimes reasoning from the same evidence and reaching different conclusions (Nguyen 2018). Consider a stipulated, static body of evidence that is isolated from your background information and has some relation to a proposition p. Following Li 2019, I include epistemic standards in background information. Agents adopt a rational doxastic response to p given the body of evidence: belief that p, disbelief that p, and withholding or suspending judgement that p. Permissivism is the view that some body of evidence permits more than one rational doxastic attitude towards p. Uniqueness (also called "impermissivism") is the view that any body of evidence permits at most one rational doxastic attitude towards p. This debate cuts across many issues in epistemology, including the demands of evidentialism (White 2013, Kelly 2013, McGrath 2019), the normativity of rationality (Greco and Hedden 2016, Schoenfield 2019, Ye 2021), voluntarism (Roeber 2019, 2020), disagreement (Christensen 2016, Levinstein 2017, Jung 2017, Daoust 2021), pragmatic encroachment (Feldman 2000, Rubin 2015, Podgorski 2016, Jackson 2021), and more. In this paper, I assume a strong form of traditional evidentialism where what is rational given the available evidence is fixed by epistemic factors that bear on whether p is true. I argue for uniqueness by challenging the inference to permissivism from cases of underdetermination. Jackson and Turnbull (forthcoming) argue that a single case of underdetermination is sufficient to establish the truth of permissivism because a

case of underdetermination, trivially, just is a case of permissivism. They then describe a case of scientific underdetermination from Turnbull 2017 as a putative case of permissivism. I argue that such cases ultimately permit a unique doxastic response of agnosticism towards whether p. My focus is on full belief, and I leave open the possibility that withholding full belief in p may be consistent with multiple credences toward p. Cases of underdetermination are plausibly the best candidates for permissivism, and if the best cases for permissivism fail, then the weaker cases are likely to fail, too. However, while I argue that underdetermination by evidence requires agnosticism, I make space for pragmatic considerations to shape our inquiry (cf. McGrath 2019, Friedman 2017), especially where inquiry requires coordination.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Christian Vulpe
Date:	12:00-12:30, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.003

Paige Massey (University of Colorado Boulder, USA)

Analyzing Time-Consciousness: A Pluralistic Proposal

Camden McKenna

The experience of time, or time-consciousness, especially as it relates to the subjectively felt present, remains one of the thorniest yet most fundamentally important aspects of the mind for philosophers to understand. In recent times, two contemporary accounts of time-consciousness have become especially popular. One of these accounts holds that what our temporal experience is like (i.e., the "phenomenal character" of experience) is rooted in an actual extension of experience over time, while the other account maintains our temporal experience is fundamentally constituted by intentional content, for instance, content as of an extended interval. The former view is commonly known as "extensionalism" and the latter "retentionalism". These two positions are typically treated as opposed. I

will argue this common wisdom is misguided. I will argue not only that these two ways of thinking are compatible, but that combining them in a complementary way results in numerous explanatory benefits that would otherwise be shut off to us.

In making this argument, I will adopt a pluralistic approach, pursuing an explanatory strategy that calls upon different resources in pursuit of different explanatory goals. I will explicitly avoid making strong ontological claims about the true nature of the mind, especially as concerns the metaphysical status of intentions. Instead, I will be concerned with which strategies provide the most sensible explanations for features of experience given the admittedly thorny problems that any single more reductive account of temporal phenomenology faces.

For extensionalists, experiences themselves are simply extended in actual time and this extension explains multiple facts about our experience, such as the duration of the experienced present. Retentionalists, in contrast, appeal to intentions directed at different phases of time, like fine-grained sections of the recent past and/or future, but the intentions are not necessarily themselves extended or distributed over those time-phases. Taken together, the intentional content is supposed to constitute an experienced present. Classically (e.g., in Husserl), retentional models also include a stipulation that the intentions can in principle be simultaneously occurrent and not spread out over actual clock time. However, it is not this contention, but rather the postulation of retentions (i.e., past-directed intentions) that fundamentally distinguishes retentional models from competing views. Retentionalism and extensionalism would be mutually exclusive if we insisted that the explanatorily relevant intentions all exist simultaneously in one moment, but this need not and should not be the case.

A hybrid extensional-retentional model could include features of both accounts. Such a model is pluralistic, appealing to different explanatory strategies for different ends. Specifically, it holds there are intentions directed at different phases of time, but also that those intentions are temporally extended or "distributed" over an interval. Both features "intentionality and the temporal extension of intentions" can be seen as contributing to the phenomenal character of temporal experience. This extensional-retentional analysis is better able to accommodate our temporal phenomenology than either retentionalism or extensionalism alone.

First, I will argue that the hybrid view can escape a potentially infinite explanatory regress associated with classical forms of retention-

alism that undermines those models' ability to offer a coherent account of the so-called "specious present", i.e., the interval of experienced time that we take to be now. Furthermore, I will argue a hybrid view evades the unpalatable implication of the classical retentionalist picture that the specious present might have no boundary in principle and might extend indefinitely. The hybrid view can achieve both these ends by explicitly casting actual temporal extension as explanatorily relevant for experience. Following this, I will argue that a hybrid model can also recruit solutions from each of its components to answer potential threats to the other. Specifically, I will show how a hybrid approach can handle what Barry Dainton has identified as the "extensional" and "retentional simultaneity problems", which stem from oversimplifications made by each account when considered as sole explanations for temporal phenomena. Finally, I will argue that a hybrid model strikes the right balance between parsimony and phenomenal accuracy while still accommodating temporal illusions through appeal to intentional explanations. Ultimately, I conclude that a pluralistic explanatory approach endorsing a hybrid model of time-consciousness can provide a more satisfactory understanding of the experienced present, experiential succession, and temporal variability than the standard accounts can offer on their own.

Section:	Philosophy of Mind
Language:	English
Chair:	Martin Niederl
Date:	16:00-16:30, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location:	HS E.002

<div align="center">❧</div>

Camden McKenna (University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom)

Integrity or partiality? On Bernard Williams and consequentialism

Ida Miczke

The aim of this paper is to discuss Bernard Williams' objection to utilitarianism which became famous as the integrity objection. By discussing some criticism towards this argument, I

try to show that it should be read not so much as an argument about integrity, but more as a defense of the right to be partial towards oneself.

Williams claimed that utilitarianism cannot account for the value of integrity of the moral agent because it disregards the projects and commitments that are central to our identity. His argument purported to show that by requiring us to comply with the commands of the utilitarian calculus (which may amount to sacrificing our central life projects for the sake of the greater good), utilitarianism deprives us of the meaning in life and our sense of self (Williams 1973, Williams 1981a). In this paper I discuss some criticism towards his view, concentrating however on the challenge for a more broadly understood consequentialism. I begin by recalling Sophie Grace Chappell's argument (2007) that Williams' objection presupposes internalism about reasons (see Williams 1981b). I try to argue that as long the consequentialist opponent is concerned with human fulfillment, there is a reading of the integrity objection that is challenging for her view, even if she holds to externalism about reasons. Nonetheless, by discussing Samuel Scheffler's (1994) example of a sophisticated consequentialist theory I explain that consequentialism can successfully accommodate Williams' complaint. Moreover, I argue that the reason for this lies in the fact that integrity is a value that can be accounted for entirely impartially. This, however, leads me to argue that Williams' objection is not about integrity actually. Inspired by Pettit's (2012: 54-56) claims about the identity-dependence in non-consequentialist theories and in Williams' view, I propose to read the integrity objection rather as an argument for the right to be radically partial towards oneself.

References:
– Chappell, Sophie Grace (published under the name Timothy). 2007. "Integrity and Demandingness". "Ethical Theory and Moral Practice" 10 (3), pp. 255-65.
– Scheffler, Samuel. 1994. "The Rejection of Consequentialism. A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions". Revised ed. Oxford University Press.
– Pettit, Philip. 2012. "The inescapability of consequentialism". In: "Luck, value and commitment: Themes from the ethics of Bernard Williams". Eds. Ulrike Heuer, Gerard Lang. Oxford University Press, pp. 41-70.
– Williams, Bernard. 1973. "A critique of Utilitarianism". In: "Utili-

tarianism: for and against". J. J. C. Smart, Bernard Williams. Cambridge University Press, pp. 77-150.

– Williams, Bernard. 1981a. "Persons, character and morality". In: "Moral Luck. Philosophical Papers 1973-1980". Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-19.

– Williams, Bernard. 1981b. "Internal and External Reasons". In: "Moral Luck. Philosophical Papers 1973-1980". Cambridge University Press, pp. 101-113.

Section:	Ethics
Language:	English
Chair:	Felix Danowski
Date:	14:40-15:10, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.005

Ida Miczke (University of Warsaw, Polska)

Mathematical Objectivity: Truth and Independence

Ismael Ordonez Miguens

The absolute security provided by mathematical proof has to face some limits, mainly: axioms and undecidable sentences (Gödel, Goodstein or the Continuum Hypothesis). Over the decades there have been a large number of attempts to justify such sentences employing concepts as coherence, simplicity or consequence. However, these attempts are inconclusive. Not only does the quest for justification remain open, the very possibility of this justification is an open problem too: are sentences as the Continuum Hypothesis objective matter?

The objective of the talk is to discuss how Wright's (1992) criteria for objectivity apply in the context of mathematical foundations (set theory). Specifically, the availability of a minimalist and classical truth predicate, one defining a maximally consistent set of sentences as extension, for set theory will be assessed. This point, semantic realism, is tied with metaphysical realism. Also, the behaviour of this predicate inside of a plural context (multiversism) will be analysed. Since

truth acts as a criterion for choice theories, is semantic realism a good criterion for objectivity inside of a plural ontology of mathematics?

Keywords: objectivity, truth, undecidability, multiversism, set theory

Section:	Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Language:	English
Chair:	Katia Parshina
Date:	14:40-15:10, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.006

Ismael Ordonez Miguens (University of Santiago de Compostela, Spain)

What and how do we represent in science and art?

Hamid Mirhosseini

An account of theoretical representation (representation in science and art) is supposed to answer two questions: what does make A a representation of B? And, given that A represents B, how does it? In my account, these two questions are dealt with jointly. In a theoretical representation, some features of the carrier of the representation are exemplified. Then the representation user(s) interpret those features. These interpreted features, finally, get imputed to the target system. The above-mentioned elements altogether decide what represents what, and how.

Section:	Philosophy of Science
Language:	English
Chair:	Oyku Ulusoy
Date:	16:00-16:30, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.004

Hamid Mirhosseini (University of Salzburg, Austria)

The Metaphysic of Constitutive Standards

Yohan Molina

Constitutive standards are properties representing norms for something to be realized in its nature, although such a thing may fail to meet the standard and thus not be good at being what it is. However, so far it has not been clear how to understand the metaphysical status of such norms. Jeremy Fix in "Two Sorts of Constitutivism" (2021), makes a case for the possibility of contingent essential properties to account for the metaphysical status of constitutive standards. According to Fix, contingent essential properties are properties that are essential to a genus because they (partially) explain its nature in a basic way, although can be lacked by particulars belonging to it. For example, having four chambers would be a contingent essential property of the genus HUMAN HEART which partially explains what a human heart is, and it is part of the requirements to be good at being a human heart (p.14). For that reason, that property can be considered a standard for particulars of such a genus, which can be possessed or not by them. A three-chambered heart is still a heart, although a faulty one because it does not possess a contingent essential property serving as a standard.

Fix's argument relies on the following strategy: essential properties are assigned fundamentally to genera and not to their particulars. For that reason, something belonging to a genus can have a "non-actualized" essence or nature. However, I will argue in this presentation that Fix does not make clear a criterion for particulars to belong to a genus, and this is an important problem for his approach. I will show that one rather reasonable criterion, which I will call "Possesionism", undermines the existence of contingent essential properties. According to Possesionism, when something lacks an essential property that constitutes the nature of the genus, it simply does not belong to that genus. Thus, Possesionism supports the idea that there is no room for properties essential to a genus that can be lacked by its particulars. In other words, it implies that there cannot be such a thing like contingent essential properties. I will argue that Posessionism is able to resist some possible objections and opposite views.

References:
– Fix, J. (2021). "Two Sorts of Constitutivism", Analytic Philosophy 62 (1): 1-20

Section: Metaphysics/Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Youssef Aguisoul
Date: 14:00-14:30, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.006

❧

Yohan Molina (Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, Chile)

Resolving social deep disagreements: argumentation and change of perspective

Hugo Ribeiro Mota

Social deep disagreements are persistent disagreements over socially relevant structural issues. A possible source is structural oppression, such as a clash between a white supremacist perspective and a black feminist perspective. The former is supported by the structuring commitment "white men are superior and must dominate" and the latter vehemently denies it. The problem is to deny the supremacist commitment in a way that convinces its holders to abandon it, initiating a process that should lead to a major change of perspective. Theories of deep disagreement vary with respect to how optimistic or pessimistic they are about the possibility of rational resolution (Aberdein 2020; Ranalli 2021). Adopting a moderate pessimistic view, I hold that in some cases indirect rational resolutions may happen through alternative methods of communication. Inspired by argumentative strategies that employ rational appeals to other reasons the interlocutor endorses or to relevant shared contextual worries (Williams 1975; Zarefsky 2010), I will argue that if there are successful methods of resolving social deep disagreements, they must primarily involve a change in perspective. The difference between an argumentative change and a perspective change is a cognitive one. There are two cognitive levels in which deep disagreements occur. The first is a clash in structuring commitments related to propositional disagreements, while the second is a clash in perspectives related to differences in salience bias (Siegel 2020). Both levels are interconnected so that changing one's perspective shifts what is salient to them, which in turn leads to

a revision of beliefs. According to this, I present the perspective-taking making method of communication. Its goal is to accommodate structural oppression cases where only one of the parties recognizes and is interested in resolving the deep disagreement. It allows the oppressed to make, guide, or teach the oppressors to take their perspectives. Its main mechanisms of change are functional equivalence (Maibom 2018) and noticing feelings (Peacocke 2021).

Section:	Philosophy of Language
Language:	English
Chair:	Marlene Valek
Date:	15:20-15:50, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.007

<div align="center">✂✁</div>

Hugo Ribeiro Mota (University of Oslo, Norway)

Trope-Ontological Interpretation of Quantum Field Theory - A Case Study of Inductive Metaphysics

Nina Nicolin

Could tropes occur independently of their "things" or are they co-instantiated with "nomological necessity"? Can they at least temporarily detach themselves from a "bundle"? Keith Campbell argues for an empirical possibility of detachment: "The way concrete particularity dissolves in the subatomic world ... suggests that disassociated tropes are not just possibilities but are actually to be encountered at our world." (Campbell 1981, p. 128). Schaffer (2003) also argues that properties can indeed be thought independently of their "carriers" and that, for example, the idea of "free mass" - that is, a property independent of a thing - is, if not visually imaginable, at least logically thinkable. Furthermore in quantum field theory (QFT), Kuhlmann (2012) suggested to interpret particles as bundles of tropes. These metaphysicians lack, so fare, an empirical foundation for a trope ontological approach.

In the framework of inductive metaphysics (IM) empirical data and findings derived from empirical data are part of an essential basis for theory formation (Engelhard et al. 2021).

I argue that metaphysical beliefs in general should not be grounded on conceptual and a priori grounds alone. Empirical sources should play an important role in metaphysics and metaphysical theories should be justified a posteriori, based on inductive (or abductive) inferences from empirical data, embedded in a science-like methodology.

Trope ontology is a metaphysical theory, of a more general nature than a scientific theory. It is a metatheory, and thus falls within the subject matter of inductive metaphysic. If one wants to justify trope ontology of QFT in the sense of the IM programme (and not merely "purely metaphysically"), it must be shown that a "bundle understanding" of particles can be justified by empirical data. Therefore a metaphysical discussion of the "Chesire Cat Effect" and the performed experiments, which shows that one can indeed separate a particle's properties in a matter-wave interferometer (Denkmayr et. al. 2014), is relevant for trope theoretical interpretation of quantum particles.

Section:	Philosophy of Science
Language:	English
Chair:	Wojciech Grabon
Date:	11:20-11:50, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.004

Nina Nicolin (Heinrich-Heine-University,, Germany)

Animal Reasoning via Conative Salience

Martin Niederl

There has been a recent surge in the literature arguing for non-human animal agency (cf. Arruda and Povinelli 2016; Glock 2017, 2019; Wilcox 2020). These authors converge in two respects: they all agree (i) that some non-human animals are agents, capable of acting for reasons, and (ii) that this is so despite their not being able to understand reasons as reasons. Starting from commitments these authors already share, I argue that some non-human animals actually can conceptualize reasons as reasons via the notion of conative salience.

My paper proceeds in two steps. First, I briefly motivate some minimal conditions for regarding non-human animals as agents. In particular, I show that all one needs to be committed to is internalism about rationality (cf. Williams 1981), an ability account of concepts (cf. Allen 1999; Glock 2010), and factualism about reasons (cf. Alvarez 2009, 2010) - commitments the aforementioned authors share. More importantly, in a second step, I then argue for a minimal understanding of what it means to conceptualize reasons as reasons via the notion of conative salience. Roughly, understanding x as a reason for φ-ing is to understand it as that in virtue of which a specific course of action or object appeared desirable in the agent's eyes (i.e. in the guise of the good). I thus propose a minimal understanding of practical reasons that construes them as sources of conative salience. After motivating and defending this notion, I close by surveying evidence that suggests that some non-human animals elicit such an understanding of reasons (Krupenye and Call 2019; Lewis and Krupenye 2021).

The upshot of my argument is twofold. First and foremost, if what I am arguing is correct, then any of the aforementioned accounts can actually hold that animals are capable of conceptualizing reasons as reasons. Second, I propose that the notion of conative salience can explain our regarding certain facts as practical reasons, hence somewhat vindicating reasons internalism. Moreover, this notion should also shed some light on the idea of practical reasoning for non-necessary means by way of the guise of the good. In particular, it would point towards understanding practical reasoning primarily by way of its "goodness-transmitting" feature (cf. Anscombe 1957).

Bibliography:
– Allen, Colin. 1999. "Animal Concepts Revisited: The Use of Self-Monitoring as an Empirical Approach." Erkenntnis 51 (1): 33-40.
– Alvarez, Maria. 2009. "How many kinds of reasons?" Philosophical Explorations 12 (2): 181-193.
—. 2010. Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
– Anscombe, G. E. M. 1957. Intention. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
– Arruda, Caroline T., and Daniel J. Povinelli. 2016. "Chimps as secret agents." Synthese 193 (7): 2129-2158.
– Glock, Hans-Johann. 2010. "Can animals judge?" Dialectica 64 (1): 11-33.

—. 2017. "Animal rationality and belief." In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds, 89-99. New York, NY: Routledge.

—. 2019. "Agency, Intelligence and Reasons in Animals." Philosophy 94 (4): 645-671.

– Krupenye, Christopher, and Josep Call. 2019. "Theory of mind in animals: Current and future directions." Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science 10 (6): e1503.

– Lewis, Laura S., and Christopher Krupenye. 2021. "Theory of mind in nonhuman primates." In Primate Cognitive Studies, edited by B. L. Schwartz and M. J. Beran. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

– Wilcox, Marc G. 2020. "Animals and the agency account of moral status." Philosophical Studies 177 (7): 1879-1899.

– Williams, Bernard. 1981. "Internal and External Reasons." In Moral Luck, 101-113. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Section:	Philosophy of Mind
Language:	English
Chair:	Jakob Roloff
Date:	10:00-10:30, 08 September 2022 (Thursday)
Location:	HS E.002

<div align="center">☙❧</div>

Martin Niederl (University of Vienna, Austria)

The Role of Minds and Mites in Korsgaard's Account of Duties to Animals

Lia Nordmann

In Fellow Creatures (2018) Christine Korsgaard develops a Kantian account of duties to non-human animals. I point out a weakness in her conception of moral patienthood and present a possible solution.

Korsgaard's conception of moral patienthood relies heavily on a sophisticated notion of sentience. She considers animals as moral patients - i.e. fellow creatures we have duties to - if they possess a level of sentience, henceforth sentience*, that (i) goes beyond mere physiological sensation and involves both (ii) action tendencies and (iii) a minimal

sense of self. While one might think these cognitively demanding requirements would set the bar for moral patienthood rather high, Korsgaard assumes that most animals, including various invertebrates and presumably even dust mites, possess sentience*. I claim this conception of moral patienthood is both empirically implausible and theoretically undesirable.

First, I argue that treating invertebrates, all the way down to microscopically small mites, as moral patients on the grounds of their sentience* lacks empirical support. No empirical measure of sentience meets Korsgaard's requirements for sentience* and yields the broad class of moral patients she wants. Surveying different operationalisations of sentience in biology and neuroscience, I show there is a mismatch between Korsgaard's conception of sentience* and the creatures she attributes it to. Indicators of sentience most akin to Korsgaard's description of sentience* are found in far fewer species than Korsgaard assumes. Indicators of sentience that are indeed shared by most animals and even dust mites, in turn, provide a much more primitive sentience than sentience*. This suggests that Korsgaard's sentience*, understood as a cognitively demanding yet widespread capacity, lacks a real-world analogue.

Second, I show that Korsgaard's willingness to include even dust mites in the realm of moral patients leads to a further theoretical problem. Duties towards creatures invisible to the naked eye conflict with the ethical principle Ought Implies Can (OIC). The principle absolves moral agents from duties they cannot fulfil, and it seems duties not to harm dust mites are, because unfulfillable, such that OIC would annul them. Korsgaard acknowledges this tension but jettisons OIC, insisting on duties to dust mites. I suggest that her reasons for doing so are defeasible. She rejects OIC because of its dubious religious underpinnings in Kantian philosophy. But OIC might well stand on secular footing, or so I argue. It is thus not necessary to abandon OIC and it is not desirable either, for an account of duties to animals without this principle might lead to a proliferation of unrealisable duties and consequently cease to be action-guiding.

In light of these two problems, I suggest an amendment to Korsgaard's conception of moral patienthood: in line with empirical evidence for sophisticated sentience*, Korsgaard should accept a narrower category of moral patients and keep OIC. Doing so would rule out duties towards dust mites as well as to some, though importantly not all, other invertebrates. It would nonetheless allow her to defend a

remarkably demanding account of duties to animals.

Section:	Ethics
Language:	English
Chair:	Stephen Müller
Date:	14:00-14:30, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location:	SR 1.005

Lia Nordmann (Berlin School of Mind and Brain, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, Germany)

How Do Quantum Systems Persist?

Maria Norgaard

Persistence is a central issue of metaphysics, and despite the development of several formal accounts in recent years, only a handful of papers have been dedicated to investigating the persistence of quantum systems. I argue that while the extensive literature on persistence has proved effective for classical systems, it does not successfully extend its application to the quantum domain.

The difficulty arises due to quantum position indefiniteness. As a consequence of superposition, entanglement, and incompatible observables, a quantum systems can fail to have definite exact location in spacetime – a feature that plays an indispensable role in formal accounts of persistence. According to the traditional definition: an object persists if and only if its spatiotemporal path is non-achronal (where path is the union of regions at which the object is exactly located). This means that a persisting object is exactly located at no less than two instants of time. A quantum system that exists for a duration of time, without having any exact location at all, will have an empty path – the system cannot be taken to persist. Evidently, the traditional account of persistence breaks down in the quantum domain.

Pashby (2016) recognises this difficulty and provides an alternative notion of exact location: a quantum system is exactly located at a region if this is the minimal region at which it is entirely located. This modification allows him to continue to utilise the traditional definition of persistence. However, I argue that the account faces a serious co- and

multilocation challenge to which there is no immediate resolution, and furthermore fails to account for the persistence of certain systems. This ultimately makes the account an unattractive candidate for quantum persistence. The question remains: is it possible to modify the traditional framework to accommodate cases of position indefiniteness or should quantum persistence be defined in completely different terms?

Section:	Philosophy of Science
Language:	English
Chair:	Wojciech Grabon
Date:	12:00-12:30, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.004

❧

Maria Norgaard (University of Geneva, France)

Linguistic Correctness as a Response to the Normativity Argument

Sara Papic

One of the main hinge points in Kripke's notorious reading of Wittgenstein and in the paradox that follows from it is that naturalistic theories of meaning, and in particular dispositionalism, cannot account for the normativity of language (Kripke 1982, p. 37). A standard response to this argument has been to argue that language is not normative, and that the illusion of normativity is attributable to the existence of semantic correctness conditions, which only generate normative consequences in conjunction with speakers' desires. I suggest that defenders of naturalistic theories should opt for an alternative strategy: pointing to non-intentionally defined linguistic correctness conditions as the source of language's normative character.

My work is organized as follows: first, I draw on recent work by Reiland to show that deniers of the distinction between semantic and linguistic correctness are vulnerable to Kripke's argument due to their reliance on the idea that speakers imbue words with meaning through their intentions. Next, I suggest that linguistic correctness can be defined without relying on propositional attitudes, which means that it

can be incorporated into a theory of meaning without rendering it vulnerable to Kripke-like arguments. Lastly, I argue that unlike semantic correctness, it is plausible that linguistic correctness has categorical normative consequences. The overall purpose of this work is to delineate a strategy for resisting Kripke's sceptical argument that can both do justice to the intuition that language is normative and remain compatible with a naturalistic notion of meaning.

Keywords: the normativity of meaning, Kripkenstein, meaning scepticism, correctness.

1. Semantic Correctness and Linguistic Correctness

The debate surrounding correctness and its normative implications has seen both supporters and deniers of the idea that there might be two different types of correctness. Typically, those who disagree that the notion is ambiguous insist that only semantic correctness exists - i.e. an expression is semantically correct if its application is true, and an expression is semantically incorrect if its application is false. This type of correctness is thought by many not to be inherently normative; for example, Hattiangadi (2007) argues that it creates no categorical obligations. To answer Kripke's sceptic, then, supporters of the notion that only semantic correctness exists have sometimes chosen to argue that our intuitions regarding language's normativity stem from a misinterpretation of semantic correctness conditions as a sign of genuine normativity.

Some philosophers have suggested that there are two different types of correctness: semantic and linguistic. Defenders of this distinction point out that there are intuitions supporting the idea that we can use language correctly even if we say something false. For example, whenever I lie there is a sense in which I am using language correctly, even though I am saying something false, as I am speaking in accordance with the words - established meaning. I can also be said to use an expression incorrectly even if I am saying something true - typical examples include speakers who misspeak, e.g. someone who uses "arcane" instead of "ancient" (substituting the two can contingently generate true statements which are nevertheless incorrect). These examples indicate that there are two different senses in which we might speak (in)correctly: one that is directly linked to true and false application and one that is not.

Reiland (forthcoming) argues that the resistance to the idea that linguistic correctness is separate from semantic correctness comes from the implicit assumption that people can privately imbue words with

meaning through their intentions. The reasoning of deniers of the distinction can be summed up as follows: there can be no linguistic error because people always mean what they intend to mean, and if they stray from publicly established norms for the usage of an expression this should always be interpreted as a type of linguistic innovation. However, if one is to grapple with Kripke's sceptical argument, they cannot assume that individual intentions have a role in the determination of meaning: all content-laden states (such as belief, thought, and in this case intention) can be targeted by the sceptical argument in an analogous way. This suggests that the distinction should be maintained until someone provides further reasons to deny its existence.

2. Use-Conditional Semantics and Intentions

An important thing to note is that if linguistic correctness could not be defined in non-intentional terms, its incorporation into a theory of meaning would render it vulnerable to Kripke's sceptical argument. Reiland (forthcoming) proposes a generic definition of linguistic correctness which may be adapted to different theories: using an expression in accordance with its meaning is using it while being in its "use-conditions". Use-conditions could take on this form: "saying S is linguistically correct when certain conditions are satisfied". Reiland leaves use-conditions to be further defined; however, it is plausible that they may be explained in purely non-intentional terms - the conditions to be satisfied could simply depend on facts about relevant context, circumstances, and/or previous use in the particular linguistic community one is speaking within.

One way use-conditions could be fleshed-out is through reliance on use-conditional semantics. Semantics has historically been understood as the domain of conventional meaning, sometimes also called "literal meaning", which was understood to be meaning as provided by truth-conditional analysis. Any other meaningfulness found in language was posited as belonging to the domain of pragmatics. This basic criterion for distinguishing semantics from pragmatics has sometimes been represented as "pragmatics = meaning" truth-conditions (Gazdar 1979, p. 2). However, it has been argued that some aspects of meaning that have traditionally been thought to be within the domain of pragmatics should belong to semantics: in particular, some philosophers noted that there are conventional aspects of meaning that have little to do with truth-conditions. For example, "goodbye" is an expression that has a well-established conventional meaning, but whatever is expressed by 2goodbye" is neither true nor false. It seems intuitive, then, that

conventionally established meaning encompasses something more than purely truth-conditionally understood meaning.

Since the appearance of Kaplan's 1999 underground paper on the meaning of "ouch" and "oops", several philosophers have tried to bring forward the project of a use-conditional semantics, something that could help us make sense of and analyse this wider sphere of conventional meaning. Kaplan's proposal is to provide a formal semantics that encompasses the conventional aspects of meaning which are, nevertheless, unanalysable in truth-conditional terms. The idea stems from the simple insight that taking truth-conditionality and conventionality as the criteria for semantic relevance does not yield the same results, as we have seen - conventionality casts a wider net. Kaplan's framework is designed to deal with expletives, indexicals, and other components of language which are unsuited to a truth-conditional analysis. As he notices, these types of expressions seem more suited to a use-conditional analysis: the truth-conditions of 2I am blonde" change depending on who utters it, while its use-conditions - namely that the sentence is correctly used if the speaker is blonde - are fixed and seem to provide us with the meaning of the sentence in a more accurate sense. Not only that, but the use-conditions for these words intuitively provide us with information about the correct and incorrect ways of using them - and clearly, this is not semantic correctness, as there are no true or false utterances of "goodbye". It should be underlined, then, that use-conditions are a good candidate for what determines linguistic correctness.

Truth-conditions and use-conditions can coexist. Following Kaplan's basic idea, Gutzmann (2015) tries to develop a 2hybrid semantics" that includes both truth-conditions and use-conditions. The goal of Gutzmann's project is to build a framework that would enable us to apply the familiar tools of formal semantics to non-descriptive, but still conventionally determined, features of language. In his framework, while truth-conditions of propositions are based on sets of possible worlds in which the proposition is true (as has been commonly assumed since Stalnaker's 1976 definition of propositions), use-conditions are given by the sets of contexts in which an expression is "felicitously" used (Gutzmann 2015, p. 18). It is safe to say that felicitous usage can model what we have, up until now, referred to as linguistic correctness. Linguistic correctness, then, can be modelled through a framework that relies on old and familiar techniques. The determination of context within this theory would play a significant role, but it is clear that it

is possible for context to be determined without referring to the intentions of speakers - it could encode publicly available information about the speaker, time, place, and other relevant non-intentional facts.

3. Linguistic Correctness and Normativity

Having established the distinction between semantic and linguistic correctness and the fact that linguistic correctness may be defined without using intentional terms, we may move onto its usefulness. I agree with Hattiangadi (2007) that semantic correctness does not provide us with anything beyond instrumental obligations such as "if you want to tell the truth, you ought to use "green" correctly". I also agree that instrumental obligations are not proof of language's normative character, as anything can be instrumentalized relative to our desires. For example, if I want to stay dry, I should bring an umbrella, but that does not mean that bringing an umbrella has normative consequences.

On the other hand, linguistic correctness seems to have more profound normative consequences that are constitutive of meaning - I cannot even participate in the practice of language if I don't speak in accordance with the expressions - use-conditions. This suggests that the "ought" derived from linguistic correctness is categorical and not instrumental, and gives us reason to believe that it can be used to account for the normative character of language. I conclude that incorporating non-intentionally defined linguistic correctness into our naturalistic theory of meaning is the preferred strategy for providing a proper account of the normativity of meaning without falling prey to the sceptical argument.

Bibliography:
Gazdar, G. (1979) Pragmatics: Implicature, Presupposition, and Logical Form. New York: Academic Press.
Gutzmann, D. (2015). Use-Conditional Meaning: Studies in Multidimensional Semantics. Oxford University press.
Hattiangadi, A. (2007). Oughts and thoughts. Oxford University Press.
Kripke, S. (1982). Wittgenstein on rules and private language. Harvard University Press.
Reiland, I. (Forthcoming). "Linguistic Mistakes". Erkentnis. Available at https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00449-y.

Section:	Philosophy of Language
Language:	English
Chair:	Teresa Flera
Date:	12:00-12:30, 08 September 2022 (Thursday)
Location:	SR 1.007

Sara Papic (University of Milan, Italy)

Philosophical Assumptions Behind the Rejection of Computer-Based Proofs

Katia Parshina

Since the first publication of a major theorem's proof produced by a computer (Appel & Haken 1977), many doubts have been expressed about the status of a computer-assisted proof. The first criticism came from T. Tymoczko (1979): the author presented different arguments against using computer-assisted proofs in mathematics. Tymoczko's paper was followed by criticism from other authors, who either were looking for a way to differentiate between computer-based and human-based proofs within the mathematical practice (Thurston 1994, Barrow 1995, Hanna & Jahnke 1996) or denied the fact that computer-based proofs can be called "proofs" at all (Lam et al. 1989).

The arguments against using the computer-assisted proof method vary: the proof is not verifiable by human beings because it is too long; the actions performed by a computer do not constitute mathematical proof, but merely a number of calculations; the method does not contribute to the existing mathematical practice, etc. All these arguments point to the fact that computer-based proofs are something new, introduced into mathematical practice from the "outside", and it is not that simple to embrace that innovation with no changes within the mathematics itself.

I analyze the existing objections against computer-assisted proofs and try to find common grounds behind them. I distinguish three groups of arguments: arguments from unsurveyability, arguments rejecting mathematical empiricism, and arguments from the uniqueness

of human-based proofs. There are two philosophical positions behind these objections: the first one is recognizing mathematics as a fully non-empirical science, and the second one is the rejection of physicalism. Since the criticism of computer-based proofs comes from predetermined philosophical positions about human nature and science, we can state that the debate about the status of computer-assisted proofs is a part of a larger debate within philosophy of mind and philosophy of science.

References:
1. Tymoczko, Thomas (1979). "The four-color problem and its philosophical significance." The Journal of Philosophy, 76(2), 57-83.
2. Barrow, John D. (1995). Pi in the sky. Counting, thinking, and being. Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l, 185(1).
3. Hanna, Gila and H. Niels Jahnke (1996). "Proof and proving." International handbook of mathematics education, Springer, Dordrecht, 877-908.
4. Lam, Clement WH, Larry Thiel, and Stanley Swiercz (1989). "The non-existence of finite projective planes of order 10." Canadian journal of mathematics, 41(6), 1117-1123.
5. Thurston, William P. (1994). "On proof and progress in mathematics." American Mathematical Society, 30(2), 161-177.
6. Appel, Kenneth I. and Wolfgang Haken (1977). "The solution of the four-color-map problem." Scientific American, 237(4), 108-121.

Section:	Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Language:	English
Chair:	Leon Commandeur
Date:	11:20-11:50, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.006

❧❧❧

Katia Parshina (University of Amsterdam, Netherlands)

Is transfer of epistemic warrant the mark of inferential transitions?

Ilia Patronnikov

The paper focuses on an attempt to capture the notion of inference by an appeal to the idea that, unlike other kinds of transitions, inferential transitions transfer epistemic warrant. An account along these lines is defended by Susanna Siegel. In a nutshell, I argue that her account fails to adequately distinguish inference from other kinds of transition between mental states. I point out that the distinction between inferential and non-inferential transitions cuts across the distinction between transitions that transfer warrant and transitions that fail to do so. It is because, assuming a plausible picture of justification, transfer of epistemic warrant doesn't supervene only on the properties of the states featuring in a transition - instead, it supervenes on the properties of a larger system of states, of which the former states are part. If so, it is to be expected that some non-inferential transitions might transfer epistemic warrant, whereas some inferential transitions might not do it. For example, associative transitions can in principle transfer warrant under some circumstances, so on Siegel's account, such associative transitions would count as inferential. This conclusion is problematic because one of the things that the account aims to do is to capture the difference between inferential and associative transitions. Therefore, the account needs to be modified.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Leon Assaad
Date:	14:40-15:10, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.003

Ilia Patronnikov (University of Barcelona, Spain)

Epistemic Normativity for Non-Classical Truth

Gareth Rhys Pearce

This talk connects three related concepts: Carnapian Logical Pluralism, Epistemic Normativity and Information. The Carnapian logical pluralist holds that logical correctness is a language relative notion. A logic is correct for a language iff it endorses all the valid inferences in that language (Carnap 1937, and elsewhere). However, different languages have different semantic properties. This means that the nature of truth, and hence validity, differs from language to language. Consequently, there are many logics that are correct for some language. Logical pluralism is true. Notably, for this talk, the Carnapian is a logical pluralist because they are an alethic pluralist. There are many correct logics because there are many different types of truth.

Epistemic value is the purely theoretical value that comes with knowledge or other praiseworthy doxastic states. The most popular contemporary theory of epistemic value is Veritism , the view that truth is the source of epistemic value. The Carnapian faces a dilemma when faced with Veritism. Because they are alethic pluralists, there are many different possible versions of truth, across different languages. If the Carnapian accepts Veritism, they must either accept that (1) all truth is epistemically valuable or (2) only some truth is.

If they accept (1), then they have to accept that truth in so-called nonsense languages, like those that model nonsense logics like Tonk (Prior 1960).

If they accept (2), then they must explain why the particular types of truth that are epistemically valuable are, and why those that aren't, aren't. To do that, they need to invoke the epistemic value of something other than truth, but then they concede that truth isn't the source of epistemic value.

Thus, the Carnapian cannot be a Veritist. This means that they have to give a rival account of epistemic normativity. This talk suggests just such a rival view: the Information View. On the Information View, information, not truth, is the source of epistemic value. Information, here, is meant in the technical sense. n bits of information are a factor 2-n reduction on the number of the epistemically possible worlds.

The talk shows that if one accepts the Information View, one can explain the epistemic value of "good" kinds of truth, as well as the lack of epistemic value of "bad" kinds of truth. This explains the epistemic

value of (some types of) Non-Classical truth.

Section:	Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Language:	English
Chair:	Katia Parshina
Date:	15:20-15:50, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.006

Gareth Rhys Pearce (University of Vienna, Austria)

Hate speech: between regulation and counterspeech

Linda Priano

The aim of this paper is to identify the proper countermeasure to curb hate speech. The literature proposes two opposing solutions to do this. Specifically, some scholars propose coercive measures, such as regulation, while others propose to respond with so-called "more speech", such as counterspeech, a non-coercive tool that consists of responding directly to hate speech by attempting to delegitimize it. However, both of these countermeasures, when attempting to curb hate speech, individually face several problems and prove to be an ineffective response. On one hand, counterspeech addresses problems in the immediate term, such as radicalization of hate and reinforcement of erroneous beliefs through backfire effect, failure to recognize authority, and social pressure. On the other, regulation is effective in the present but not sufficient in the long term, because hate returns in new forms, with new haters and new target groups. Therefore, neither coercive measures nor non-coercive are sufficient individually. For this reason, I propose to unify regulation and counterspeech. This combined model may be a more effective and satisfactory solution. Regulation is the best solution to curb hate speech in the immediate term. While counterspeech represents the best solution to do so in the long run, preventing future demands and promoting a climate open to pluralism and tolerance. Therefore, unifying these two measures represents a promising strategy to curb hate speech definitively, avoiding running into all the undesirable effects and issues that individual strategies encounter. To substantiate my argument, firstly,

I emphasize the strengths of regulation in the immediate term, and I prove that we should allow and justify restrictions to free speech when the speech is hate speech. Secondly, I point out the importance of the role of counterspeech in order to defuse the climate of hate and to reduce the demands of hate speeches.

Section:	Ethics
Language:	English
Chair:	Felix Danowski
Date:	15:20-15:50, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.005

Linda Priano (University of Milan, Italy)

Justifying Claims for Justice: Identity and Epistemic Power

Nicole Maria Prosser

Whereas distributive claims have for a long time predominated theorizing about social justice, recently demands for a politics of recognition have gained more ground. There remains an unsolved puzzle for both, distributive proponents as well as for advocates of a politics of recognition though, namely: How to justify claims of justice? This paper investigates meta-levels of social justice, where the justification of justice claims takes place: first the political, second the epistemic level. It argues that the justification of justice claims happens at a higher-order level that is unjust itself. With Rainer Forst (2007), we see that the political level is distorted by political power. Miranda Fricker's account of epistemic injustice (2007) finally enables us to realize that political power is closely connected to epistemic power (and thus tightly related to what Fricker calls a person's "identity power"). We come to see that at the epistemic level, recognition becomes crucial, namely: as recognition of others' epistemic authority. In this paper, I suggest understanding the epistemic level as conceptually and normatively prior to other spheres of social justice and postulate a primacy of epistemic recognition.

Section: Political Philosophy
Language: English
Chair: Giada Coleschi
Date: 14:00-14:30, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.007

Nicole Maria Prosser (Leiden University, The Netherlands)

The possibility of a one-many body-person relation

Aisha Qadoos

The Cohabitation Claim (CC) is the claim that two or more subjects of experience can share the same human body. Olson (2003) rejects CC on the grounds that it is incompatible with our being material beings. I show that Olson assumes the point in question, and, therefore, his argument does not give us reason to reject CC. I argue that it is at least possible that two or more subjects of experience could cohabit in one material body; in other words, that a one-many body-person relation is possible. I first argue that what it is to be a person is to have unified and continuous mental states, but this is not a strict requirement in order to allow for the kinds of disunities and discontinuities that occur in all single-occupancy beings (those in whom there is a one-one body-person relation). I argue that it is possible for there to be two subjects of experience in one material body if there are relations of unity and continuity between mental states that form a set, and this set is discontinuous and disunified with another set of unified and continuous mental states.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Martin Niederl
Date: 14:00-14:30, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location: HS E.002

Aisha Qadoos (University of Birmingham, United Kingdom)

Motivating AI Legal Personhood an Agency Account

Karl Reimer

It is an important and pressing question whether personhood ought to be adopted as a legal status for artificial intelligence systems. Consider for instance the case of a self-driving vehicle that kills an innocent pedestrian in an accident. It remains a question whether the engineers who developed the artificial intelligence system for such a vehicle should be held legally responsible for the death of this pedestrian, or whether the artificial intelligence system itself should be legally responsible. Indeed, in February 2017 the European Parliament launched a commission to investigate the implications of granting legal personhood status to artificial intelligence systems (2017). However, some recent scholarly work including Zevenbergen et. al. (2017) and Wagner (2018) has recommended against the ascription of legal personhood status to artificial intelligence systems in response to this European Parliament commission. Primarily, this scholarly work has criticised the vague notion of artificial intelligence and emphasised the instrumental and intrinsic risks such a status might bring to human society.

In this paper, I suggest such scholarship by Zevenbergen et. al. and Wagner would be more meaningful if further nuance was utilised in the conception of artificial intelligence. I argue that conceptualizing artificial intelligence via a continuum of agency rather than in binary terms allows the implications of the adoption of legal personhood status for artificial agents to be more appropriately framed. This paper is laid out as follows. Following the introduction in Section 1, I introduce the essential aspects of intentional agency as a conceptual framework for how to think about artificial intelligence agents in Section 2. In Section 3 I consider applied cases of legal personhood for AI system such as self-driving vehicles and in healthcare systems via a continuum of agency. I respond to counterarguments in Section 4 and conclude in Section 5. "Majority of sections 3-5 excluded from abstract"

The agency-based model of personhood is defined "not by what it is intrinsically but by what it does extrinsically: by the roles it plays, the functions it discharges" (List and Pettit, 171). In this sense, an agent is deemed a person according to the bundle of functions they discharge - the performances of the agent. Personhood is therefore acquired as a status upon completion of a minimum set of criteria: "the mark of personhood is the ability to play a certain role, to perform in a certain

way" (171). As such, there is no objective "person." Rather, persons can be understood as a collection of functions. I describe these functions in turn below, beginning with 1) rationality and moving toward 2) advanced interactivity and 3) responsibility.

1. Rationality: The minimal necessary and condition of an agent simpliciter can be understood as rationality, which involves the following three aspects. Here, I use Laukyte's example of a thermostat to explain what characteristics a rational agent requires (Laukyte 2017, 2).

1. Representative State: An agent can sense its environment.

(a) For example, a thermostat maintains a comprehension of the current state of the room. It understands, for instance that the room temperature is 15 degree Celsius.

2. Motivational State: An agent can understand how its environment ought to be.

(a) For example, a thermostat maintains an understanding of how the room ought to be. For example, the thermostat might be set to 25 degree Celsius.

3. Interactivity: An agent act in the gap between how its environment is and how it ought to be.

(a) For example, a thermostat can make the determination to increase the room temperature, assuming it understands the room temperature is 15 degree Celsius and it ought to be 25 degree Celsius.

(b) Said differently, the agent follows a set of criteria to arrive at an outcome.

Given the importance of rationality to the basic notion of intentional agency, a further example is helpful here. Consider the case of a simple robot whose function is to place upright wooden cylinders that have fallen onto their cylindrical side (List and Pettit 2011, 19-20). The robot can be understood as maintaining a minimal condition of rationality first because it can sense the state of its environment. This is the representative state. The robot recognises that the cylinder is not placed in an upright position. Further, it understands that within this environment the correct position for the wooden cylinder is an upright position. This comprehension is understood as its motivational state. Further, the agent can said to be interactive if it then acts on its understanding that the cylinder ought to be placed in an upright position but is not currently in that position. This action can be minimal. For instance, the agent may simply desire or have intention to act on placing the wooden cylinder upright. Its ability to place the

cylander upright is a more stringent criteria that is not necessary for agent rationality in its simplest form.

2. Advanced interactivity is a further important aspect of rationality to consider in relation to agency. This refers to an agent's ability to interact with other agents within its social environment. This means agents should "understand themselves both as part of a group" and "act in respect of that group" (Laukyte 2017, 3). To understand this distinction, consider the case of an autonomous robot that is sent to Mars for the purpose of obtaining samples of the soil composition. It can be understood as an agent of a basic sort because it 1) has goals (i.e. to collect soil samples) and 2) implements those goals (it collects the soil samples). However, this condition of advanced interactivity is not required if there are no other agents in the Mars environment for the robot to interact with. In this case the Mars robot would be an agent but not a social agent. (Note that the Mars robot could technically still be a social agent if it had the ability to interact with agents in its environment. For instance, a single isolated human person on a desert island can still maintain features of advanced interactivity despite the fact she does not have others to communicate with.)

For artificial intelligence agents in particular, advanced interactivity is important for two reasons (Laukye 2017, 4). First, any action initiated by an agent necessarily affects other agents. No agent works in isolation. Consider the hypothetical case of an autonomous vehicle controlled by an artificial intelligence agent. On the one hand, such an agent poses no moral or social danger if it functions in isolation. On the other hand, it is unlikely that an autonomous vehicle controlled via artificial agency might avoid interactions that have important moral and social implications. For instance, the simple act whereby an autonomous vehicle brakes in advance of an intersection with vehicles carrying human agents would be an instance of such a scenario. This is particularly the case in the hypothetical social environment where human and artificial intelligence agents come into regular contact with one another. Advanced interactivity is thus important because it allows for agents of different types (e.g. human agents, artificial intelligence agents, etc.) to communicate with one another within the social environment (Laukyte 2017, 4). To reiterate, advanced interactivity can be understood as an additional aspect of rationality (Laukyte 2017, 3). It can be distinguished from minimal interactivity (see 2.1) because an agent's ability to socially interact with other agents is not necessarily a pre-requisite for minimal agency. I discuss its importance to the con-

sideration of legal personhood in further detail at 3.1.2. I now turn to responsibility as an additional characteristic of agency.

3. An additional important characteristic of agency for personhood status is responsibility (Laukyte 2017, 5). This can be understood as the ability for an agent to

a) understand the normative significance of a situation,

b) be able to make normative judgments on that situation and

c) maintain the capacity to wield control over these normative choices (understood as the "control requirement") (Laukyte 2017, 5). Normative significance simply refers to an agent's comprehension of a situation in which it can do something morally good or morally bad.

Consider Laukyte's example of an autonomous drone to more closely relate this agent characteristic of responsibility to artificial intelligence agents, (Laukye 2017, 5). Conceptualise a hypothetical situation where this drone must decide for itself whether to fire a missile that will either a) kill a child soldier or b) allow a group of innocent civilians to die (Laukyte 2017, 6). First, we can say the drone recognises the normative significance of the situation if it understands a moral choice must be made in this moment. Second, it can be said that drone practices normative judgments if it is able to draw morally significant conclusions from the assessed situation (e.g. the drone can determine whether to kill the child soldier in order to save the group of innocent civilians.) Laukyte here argues that an artificial intelligence agent ought to -at least roughly- follow the actions of humans in its moral judgments (Laukyte 2017, 7). Third, it ought to be able to choose to fire the missile. This is particularly important for an artificial intelligence agent because the drone itself arguably ought to maintain agency in such a scenario. If it is a human agent who controls the drone's decision to fire the missile, then the responsibility belongs to the human agent and not the drone. For her argument, Laukyte assumes that the drone does maintain agency in such a scenario. Note that current artificial intelligence systems who must make choices similar to the drone described here already exist ("XQ-58A Valkyrie demonstrator completes inaugural flight", 2019).

Following an explanation of an agency-based model of personhood, I move to illustrate it according to a continuum. I observe that a weak notion of agency refers to an agent that is "more specialized and less flexible" (List 2019, 5). For example, an agent with basic rationality lands on the weak end of the continuum. This is generally with current capabilities of artificial intelligence systems. By contrast, a human

agent and other sentient life forms are placed on the strong end of the continuum. As AI systems advance in their technological makeup, it is possible their degree of agency will move closer toward the strong side of the continuum, thus granting and conditions such as responsibility moral personhood.

In my conclusion I note there are several tests that have historically been suggested for determining whether an agent might deserve the status of legal personhood that support the arguments put forward by Zevenbergen et. al. and Wagner. A traditional one is the Turing Test, which "tests for an intangible quality x by seeing whether the entity in question can do y" (Laukyte 2017, 8) (See also Solum 1992, 1235-36). Proposed by Alan Turing in 1950, this is famous for determining whether an artificial intelligence system can be considered "intelligent" (Turing, 1950).The test is aimed at replacing the question "Can machines think?" with the more nuanced "Can the machine convincingly imitate the human person?" (Turing 1950, 433). More recently, Dennitt proposed the "intentional stance test", in which he argues that an artificial intelligence system can be understood as an intentional agent if the agent's behaviour can be reasonably understood if one views the agent as an intentional agent (Dennett (2009, 339 from List 2019, 7).

However, tests such as those by Turing and Dennitt fail because they are overly reductionistic of what it is to be a person (see List 2019 and Laukyte 2017). In contrast to Turing and Dennitt, I conclude that the continuum of agency from weak to strong as I have illustrated is a superior explanation of how legal personhood might be understood. This is due to the reason that agency cannot be understood in terms of simple imitation. In doing so, I refute Zevenbergen et. al. and Wagner's suggestion that legal personhood for AI systems should not be adopted. Although moral questions remain in the case of a self-driving vehicle that kills an innocent pedestrian, this paper contributes nuance to how the legal question should be considered.

Section:	Ethics
Language:	English
Chair:	Stephen Müller
Date:	15:20-15:50, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location:	SR 1.005

<center>�</center>

Karl Reimer (University of Zurich, Switzerland)

Actions Deviating from Selection History. A Teleofunctionalist Solution to the Problem of Deviant Causal Chains of Actions

Jakob Roloff

According to Donald Davidson's causal theory of actions, actions must be rationalized and caused by a belief-desire pair. One problem of such a causal theory are deviant causal chains. In some scenarios all of the causal theory's conditions are met, but the behavior intuitively seems to be no action. In these cases, the behavior is not caused in the "right" way, but via a deviant causal chain. For example, a climber might want to kill his partner and believe he can do this by loosening his hold on the rope. This makes him so nervous that he starts to sweat and accidently loosens his hold without having decided to do it. oth conditions of Davidson's causal theory are fulfilled; the loosening is rationalized and caused via the detour of nervousness by his belief-desire pair, but we would intuitively deny that the climber acted. Theories of action must exclude such cases from actions and must determine what deviant causal chains are deviating from. To meet both challenges, I propose to supplement the causal theory with an additional teleofunctionalist condition that shifts the focus to the selection history of beliefs and desires. I analyze deviating causal chains as causal chains deviating from the way actions were typically caused in the selection history. My proposed additional condition thus requires that actions must be caused by belief-desire pairs in a selection-historically normal way. As I will argue, this condition drops counterintuitive cases of deviant causal chains out of the class of actions because in cases like the climber, the behavior is plausibly not caused in a selection-historically normal way. Additionally, there are cases in which causal detours are, nevertheless, intuitively the "right" way. For example, a weightlifter who only manages to lift the barbell via the detour of nervousness still acted. I argue that my proposal can also handle such cases because there can be different selection-historically normal ways in different contexts.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Martin Niederl
Date: 16:50-17:20, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location: HS E.002

❧

Jakob Roloff (Justus-Liebig-University Giessen , Germany)

Actional Theory of Adam Smith Sympathy

Cecile Rosat

What is to be understood when someone says: "Put yourself in her shoes!" Without a doubt, it is empathy or sympathy. But may this kind of phenomenon be an action? Intuitively, it seems that sympathizing could be something done by an agent. To argue in favor of such an ontological move, one line of argument consists in showing that it requires an effort (Massin, 2017). Whether it is projective empathy or Smithian sympathy, this effort is either implied or explicitly acknowledged (Bailey, 2018; Kaupinnen, 2017; Fleishacker, 2012; Coplan, 2011). Although researchers stress the importance of effort, this aspect has received little attention. Overall, existing studies do not define the concept fully nor address the possibility of actional sympathy. This paper nuances Adam Smith's (1982) understanding of sympathy, currently known as projective empathy (Darwall, 1998), and proposes an actional analysis of sympathy. It shows that firstly an effort requires an action. Then, it argues that a specific sort of sympathy implies an effort. Lastly, it provides a substantial account of sympathetic effort, defined in terms of forces (Massin, 2017). To sum up, if there is an effort, there is an action. Since sympathizing involves effort, then sympathy - in a Neosmithian account - can claim the status of action.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Silvana Pani
Date: 10:00-10:30, 08 September 2022 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.005

❦

Cecile Rosat (Neuchatel, Suisse)

Reconciling group mind hypothesis with inherently phenomenal mentality

Jan Rostek

I propose that supporters of the thesis that phenomenal consciousness is the mark of the mental (henceforth: PCM) may embrace the existence of group minds by claiming that there is a difference in reference between individual and group uses of mental vocabulary. Among the proponents of genuine group mentality there is a widespread assumption that intentionality is the mark of the mental. This is no surprise since the other main contender is phenomenal consciousness and groups entertaining intentional states are way more plausible than phenomenally conscious groups. Supporters of PCM usually dismiss the possibility of group minds because hardly any of them would like to claim that groups may be phenomenally conscious. However, it is disputable whether the nature of the mental states we ascribe to ourselves is identical to the nature of the mentality we ascribe to groups. Among the possible positions on the reference of mental vocabulary there are the literalist view and the technical view. The literalist view applied to groups claims that when one says that a group G has a belief B, then we should take "has B" as meaning exactly the same as when one says that a human H has B. Literalism seems to be accepted by major realists about group minds and it is the adoption of the literalist view that makes it look as if PCM stands in tension with group mentality. Supporters of PCM do not have to accept literalism and may instead embrace the technical view. When applied to groups it says that when one claims that a group G has a belief B it might be literally true but not because G has B in the same sense that a human H may have B. According to this view, "has a belief B" when applied to groups refers to a different property than when applied to individuals. A supporter of PCM might say that "G has B" is true iff G exhibits certain behavioral patterns, is best interpreted as having B or fits some scientific model, whereas "H has B" is true iff H has some phenomenal property, and that this discrepancy is the

result of "has B" being in fact two predicates which only look the same but refer to different properties. Such discrepancy is found in mental vocabulary applied to humans so it should not be surprising to find it between individual and group levels. If PCM supporters embrace the technical view and find a good motivation for it, they will be able to plausibly explain the practice of applying mental predicates to groups.

<div style="margin-left: 2em;">

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Martin Niederl
Date: 17:30-18:00, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location: HS E.002

</div>

<div align="center">❧</div>

Jan Rostek (Jagiellonian University, Poland)

Inferentialist Framing of Metaontological Expressivism

Szymon Sapalski

In recent years the interest in metaontology has grown significantly but it seems that not all theoretical options were given the deserved recognition. I want to present and develop a little known account of metaontological expressivism which was first explicitly endorsed by Kraut (2016). According to this view, the function of ontological claims is not to describe reality but to express the commitment to the utility of some linguistic forms. For instance, according to metaontological expressivism, the function of a sentence "There are possible worlds" is not to represent objective reality but to express the commitment that the notion of possible words is useful. However Kraut gave only a general description of his account, so I will present a more developed version of metasemantically understood metaontological expressivism.

In my version of expressivism, I combine two ideas already present in the literature on metaethics. One of them is Williams's (2013) explanation of meaning in terms of use (EMU), the other is Simpson's (2020) subject matter explanationism. EMU is a tool formulated in the inferentialist framework that aims to explain the meaning of the term by

its functional, epistemological and inferential aspects. Subject matter explanationism is a strategy for distinguishing representational theories from expressivist ones. According to this view, the theory counts as representational if in explaining facts about the meaning of a concept it mentions the subject matter.

I will also try to show that careful articulation of metaontological expressivism makes it immune to the potential problem of circularity dubbed by Kraut as the "No Exit" problem. Kraut's worry is that it is impossible to formulate an expressivist metaontological account without invoking non-expressive notion of existence. In my view the problem does not arise, because the correct way to treat metaontological expressivism is as an ontologically quietist view.

Section:	Metaphysics/Ontology
Language:	English
Chair:	Youssef Aguisoul
Date:	16:00-16:30, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location:	SR 1.006

Szymon Sapalski (Faculty of Philosophy Jagiellonian University, Poland)

Impredicativity and the Paradoxes of Deontic Logic

Diogo Campos Sasdelli

Deontic Logic aims at describing, through the instruments of Symbolic Logic, the rules underlying sound reasoning in normative contexts. Modern Deontic Logic was built analogously to the various logics of descriptive language, i.e., to Propositional, Predicate and, above all, to Modal Logic. This structure, however, is prone to recognizing certain deduction forms, which, from an intuitive point of view, are evidently incorrect, as being nonetheless logically valid. These are the so-called paradoxes of Deontic Logic. E.g., Ross' paradox: from an atomic sentence such as "deliver the letter!", one derives a disjunctive normative sentence like "deliver the letter or burn it!".

The goal of constructing a system of Deontic Logic free of paradoxes has led to the development of many logical systems. This venture's degree of success is questionable. While many paradoxes can be easily avoided, the development of new, ever more complex systems has also led to the discovery of new paradoxes. At the same time, normative Sciences, such as Practical Philosophy and Law, have been dealing with normative reasoning for centuries. Particularly, Legal Methodology has developed a canon of widely accepted argument forms. Moreover, as it is well known, the paradoxes of Deontic Logic pose no particular problem to jurists or moral philosophers. Thus, it seems reasonable to attempt to construct Deontic Logic as a formalization of Legal Methodology.

However, Legal Methodology is based on arguments - e.g., analogy, arguments a fortiori or e contrario -, which are, from a logical point of view, fallacies. Turning them into logically sound arguments requires the addition of further premises. In this contribution, I argue that this premise-addition also leads to paradoxes. This is due to the fact that Legal Methodology is based on impredicative concepts (e.g., similarity, context) which are not fully representable in classic symbolic logic.

Section:	Logic/Philosophy of Mathematics
Language:	English
Chair:	Maren Bräutigam
Date:	14:40-15:10, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location:	SR 1.004

☙❧

Diogo Campos Sasdelli (Universität Vechta, Germany)

De Gruyter Session: Get Your First Book or Article Published

Christoph Schirmer

In a short introduction, followed by a Question and Answer session, Christoph Schirmer, de Gruyter commissioning editor, provides some tips on how to get your (first) book published - and address the question of whether it's really worth writing a book, or whether it's better to publish journals articles.

Section: De Gruyter Session
Language: English, Location: HS E.002
Chair:
Date: ,
Location:

❦

Christoph Schirmer (De Gruyter, Germany)

Modeling epistemic violence: How testimonial quieting and smothering undermine collective inquiry

Leon Schöppl

In her 2011 article "Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing.", Kristie Dotson identifies two forms of epistemic violence, namely testimonial quieting and testimonial smothering. While clearly directly harmful to those subjected to them, this talk argues that in addition, they threaten epistemic harms for the whole epistemic community. It employs an agent-based model to simulate (the interplay of) both forms of violence, and their effects on collective inquiry, concluding that the presence of epistemic violence can substantially hinder the convergence of an epistemic community to the truth about questions examined.

The model features social groups of agents with different epistemic standpoints towards a proposition. These agents are repeatedly sorted into communication games, each of which has three rounds:

1. Assessing the group identity of other participants and the resulting likelihood of facing testimonial quieting.

2. Giving testimony on the central proposition, either by uttering their true beliefs, or by succumbing to testimonial smothering (depending on 1.).

3. Updating their beliefs based on input by other agents, possibly committing testimonial quieting against others.

Depending on the settings chosen for a given simulation, epistemic violence slows down collective inquiry, or even stops it entirely. As minority agents are disproportionately often quietened and hence forced to succumb to smothering, the violence heavily distorts (their testimony in) communication.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Nikolai Shurakov
Date: 10:00-10:30, 08 September 2022 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.003

❧❦

Leon Schöppl (MCMP, LMU Munich, Germany)

The epistemic-aleatoric uncertainty distinction for formal epistemology and suspension of judgment

Daniela Schuster

In formal epistemology we are concerned with providing frameworks that describe our belief states and rules for how we ought to rationally possess and change those belief states. Many of these formal frameworks are graded. They describe to what degree a subject believes a certain proposition rather then describing solely whether a subject believes a proposition or not. In doing so, these frameworks represent the subject's uncertainties about the truth of propositions. It was recognized early in the history of philosophy and probability theory that uncertainties can be of at least two kinds: chance-based and epistemological. Still, modern formal epistemology (in particular Bayesianism) neglects the difference, treating both uncertainties within the same framework. This is in contrast to a recent development in engineering and machine learning research that has drawn increasing attention to the distinction that is called the distinction between aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty. In this paper, I argue that it is fruitful to apply this distinction to formal epistemological frameworks, too. Although the distinction can already help to provide a better view on issues in formal epistemology concerning belief, the need for taking the distinction seriously becomes even more pressing ever since epistemological research has focused to some extent on the notion of suspension of judgment. All formal frameworks should be able to describe the whole doxastic household of a rational subject, including belief, disbelief and suspension. However, it has been noted that traditional formal frameworks such as Bayesian epistemology are not capable of describing suspension properly. I will argue that

many problems within the challenge to properly represent suspension arise from not distinguishing aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty. I will briefly show how a Bayesian framework can be adopted to accommodate the distinction. For this, I will introduce a two-dimensional framework that separates the two forms of uncertainty and I will show how rationality demands from Bayesianism can be transferred to the proposed framework.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Niklas Gärtner
Date:	16:50-17:20, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location:	SR 1.003

Daniela Schuster (Universität Konstanz, Germany)

Expertise and Concept Revision throught the Method of Cases

Krzysztof Sekowski

The Method of Cases is criticized with reference to empirical results that show influence of philosophically irrelevant factors to philosophical intuitions. In the talk I will defend the Method of Cases by introducing the novel form of the so-called expertise defence. I will adopt Max Deutsch's main idea that not intuitions, but arguments play an evidential role in this method. I will argue that these arguments have to be justified by some kinds of intuitions. However, I will show that the empirical critique towards the reliability of intuitions can be refuted if we interpret the Method of Cases as formulating arguments in favor of revising some concept. In such a case, the Method of Cases can be justified by intuitions of intensions, that is intuitions about meaning of some concept. As I will argue experts' intuitions, that is intuitions of speakers who are immersed in philosophical discourse and who express their expectations about a target concept, can form an reliable source of evidence for revisionary arguments.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Niklas Gärtner
Date:	14:00-14:30, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location:	SR 1.003

Krzysztof Sekowski (University of Warsaw, Poland)

Epistemic Stances, Argumentation and Simulation.

Dalila Serebrinsky

The debate between scientific realists and anti-realists is now a classic debate in the Philosophy of Science. Van Fraassen (2002) has suggested that the positions that take part in the debate not only take different doxastic attitudes regarding some propositions, but they adopt different epistemic stances, that is, different sets of commitments, values and epistemic strategies. The formulation of this debate in terms of epistemic stances and the voluntarist epistemology it motivates make it plausible to think of it as a deep disagreement. This kind of disagreements are ones that cannot be settled by reason alone because they lack the conditions that are necessary for arguments to work. In fact, we observe that arguments are not effective in changing neither realists - nor anti-realists - point of view. I argue, however, that the attempts to use arguments can have an epistemic value in these contexts. After analyzing one of the most famous arguments in the history of the debate, the No Miracles Argument, I conclude that, even if it is true that it cannot convince any anti-realist of changing her mind, it can trigger some of her realist intuitions. The statements that make up and argument, then, do not work as proper arguments in this context, but can help us make our opponent participate in a simulation that reveals her dispositions to accept some propositions and engage in some kinds of epistemic practices. In this deep disagreement, what we mean as arguments are, in fact, a certain type of thought experiment and, while they are not able to make us accept a proposition as the result of an inference, they can generate some common intuitions that can get us closer to settle the debate.

Section:	Philosophy of Science
Language:	English
Chair:	Wojciech Grabon
Date:	10:40-11:10, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.004

❦

Dalila Serebrinsky (University of Buenos Aires, Argentina)

Thinking Without Discriminating

Ayoob Shahmoradi

According to Kripke, Donnellan and their allies, for any subject s and entity e, it is possible for s to think of e even if s is not able to uniquely individuate e. The most influential way of resisting this view relies on the following two-pronged strategy: (i) it devises a way of explaining away the Kripke-Donnellan style intuitions that s is able to refer to e without being able to individuate e. (ii) It develops a program for explaining why reference requires unique individuation of the referent. Most of the arguments against this program are question-begging in that they merely repeat, or crucially assume, the intuitions that are already being explained away by the first prong. I argue that (ii) fails even if we accept (i). I discuss the main arguments for why reference requires unique individuation and show that these arguments are of two general types. The first type implicitly assumes that reference requires unique individuation and thus is unsuccessful. The second type does not rely on this assumption but it only supports a much weaker claim. Finally, I go on to propose a general account of reference.

Section:	Philosophy of Language
Language:	English
Chair:	Teresa Flera
Date:	10:40-11:10, 08 September 2022 (Thursday)
Location:	SR 1.007

❦

Ayoob Shahmoradi (University of California San Diego, USA)

The Use of Works on Scientific Explanation for Explainable Artificial Intelligence

Vera Shumilina

European Union regulations hastened the need for the elaboration of Explainable Artificial Intelligence especially due to the "right to explanation" (Goodman & Flaxman 2017) in automated high-stakes algorithmic decisions. The realization of XAI shows that firstly the ordinary usage of the term "explanation" was taken into account by computer scientists, as far as focus was on the clarification of the opaque ML mechanisms by visualization, "translation" of machine reasoning into flowcharts of human-like inferences (Doran, Schulz, & Besold 2017) and so on (Gunning & Aha 2019).

But the problem is that "researchers in artificial intelligence often use epistemological notions in a fast and loose manner that wouldn't pass muster with philosophers" (Paez 2009, 131), which is also true in relation to scientific explanation. This gap is filled by scientists as well as philosophers in broad (for general philosophy of science and epistemology: Paez 2009, Hoffman, Klein & Mueller 2018, O'Hara 2020, Valentino & Freitas 2022) and narrow (for social sciences: Miller 2019, economics: Kaul 2022) perspectives.

Among things neglected researchers indicate the factor of abductive reasoning at initial stage of inquiry as a trigger (surprising fact) for search for explanation and problem statement; the processual view of explaining which should be followed by justifications and usage of counterfactuals and contrast cases; the necessity of selective phase from many explanatory hypotheses; the preference of qualitative (especially causal) appraisal of hypotheses, not quantitative. Some authors claim on social nature of explanations (Miller 2019) and pragmatic criteria, namely close relation of explanation and understanding that is revealed in considering dependence relations (Paez 2019), co-adaptation of user and AI especially in case of clarifying boundary conditions (Hoffman, Klein & Mueller 2018, 199).

References:
– Doran, D., Schulz, S., & Besold, T. R. (2017). What does explain-

able AI really mean? A new conceptualization of perspectives. arXiv preprint arXiv:1710.00794.

– Goodman, B., & Flaxman, S. (2017). European Union regulations on algorithmic decision-making and a "right to explanation". AI magazine, 38(3), 50-57.

– Gunning D., Aha D.W. (2019). DARPA's explainable artificial intelligence program. AI Mag, 40(2), 44.

– Hoffman, R. R., Klein, G., & Mueller, S. T. (2018). Explaining explanation for "Explainable AI". In Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting (Vol. 62, No. 1, pp. 197-201). Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications.

– Kaul, N. (2022). 3Es for AI: Economics, Explanation, Epistemology. Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence, 5.

– Miller, T. (2019). Explanation in artificial intelligence: Insights from the social sciences. Artificial intelligence, 267, 1-38.

– O'Hara, K. (2020). Explainable AI and the philosophy and practice of explanation. Computer Law & Security Review, 39, 105474.

– Paez, A. (2009). Artificial explanations: the epistemological interpretation of explanation in AI. Synthese, 170(1), 131-146.

– Paez, A. (2019). The pragmatic turn in explainable artificial intelligence (XAI). Minds and Machines, 29(3), 441-459.

– Valentino, M., & Freitas, A. (2022). Scientific Explanation and Natural Language: A Unified Epistemological-Linguistic Perspective for Explainable AI. arXiv preprint arXiv:2205.01809.

Section:	Philosophy of Science
Language:	English
Chair:	Wojciech Grabon
Date:	10:00-10:30, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.004

Vera Shumilina (HSE University, Russia)

Invariantist Account of Epistemic Gaslighting

Nikolai Shurakov

ebates over context-sensitivity of knowledge resulted in the formation of two camps - contextualists and invariantists. Contextualists do not see any contradiction between "I know that p" in low stakes and "I don't know that p" in high stakes settings. Invariantists try to find an explanation that would have truth conditions for the knowledge claim fixed. In particular, moderate invariantists are united over the idea that high stakes ignorance is inaccurate. The adaptive invariantism of Nagel(2010) introduces the notion of "epistemic anxiety". Nagel argues that a subject experiencing epistemic anxiety in a high-stakes situation needs more evidence to form an outright belief that can result in knowledge. In this way, epistemic anxiety prevents the subject from knowing that p even if (s)he has some evidence and even if (s)he would say the opposite in a situation with lower stakes.

I will provide an explanation of gaslighting that employs such an invariantist position. Podosky(2021) considers gaslighting - a form of psychological manipulation, the effect of which induces doubt in a target's understanding of reality". This broad definition is tolerant of various forms of gaslighting identified by other researchers: manipulative, collective, structural, self-gaslighting etc. Stark (2019), Pohlhaus (2020) address epistemic gaslighting. I will also limit my considerations to epistemic gaslighting that will be understood as "to be disregarded as a knower". Using Nagel's terminology, I argue that in cases of epistemic gaslighting, a victim may experience epistemic anxiety that is caused by the lack of power that the abuser possesses. If so, the victim struggles even in forming an outright belief that (s)he may use in the future to report about the situation. This explains why some victims think that they perhaps reacted too emotionally or it happened not as their evidence suggests. Thus, I conclude that Nagel's terminology adequately captures epistemic gaslighting and suggests how it can be investigated further.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Niklas Gärtner
Date:	17:30-18:00, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location:	SR 1.003

Nikolai Shurakov (University of Tartu, Estonia)

On Scanlon's Individualist Restriction

Martin Sjöberg

ccording to Scanlon's contractualism "an act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement" (Scanlon, 1998, p. 153). In deciding which principles could (not) be reasonably rejected, we are only to take into account the reasons of single individuals. This has become known as the Individualist Restriction. The purpose of adopting the Individualist Restriction is to avoid letting the few carry great burdens in order for the many to receive small benefits. This restriction causes difficulties when we are faced with situations where we can save either a larger or a smaller group of people from equal harms; in these cases, contractualism fails to steer us towards saving the larger group outright. Parfit has suggested that Scanlon should drop the Individualist Restriction, a suggestion that Scanlon has recently discussed. In this talk I will flesh out this suggested solution, and discuss how we are to understand the Individualist Restriction. I make a distinction between a strong and a weak version of it. I will argue that the proposed solution only amounts to dropping the restriction if we take the strong interpretation to be the correct one. I will also argue that the strong interpretation actually is the correct interpretation.

Section:	Ethics
Language:	English
Chair:	Silvana Pani
Date:	12:00-12:30, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.005

༉

Martin Sjöberg (Lund University, Sweden)

Comparing pragmatic and introspection-based explanations of Moore's Paradox

Maciej Tarnowski

Moore's Paradox consists in providing an explanation of the "absurdity" (Moore 1944) of statements of the form "p, but I don't believe that p" or "p, but I believe that not p", which although seem to be contradictory are logically consistent. Among epistemologists the absurdity of such statements is usually approach with two strategies: (a) a pragmatic strategy, according to which Moorean statements are necessarily false when believed or asserted (e.g. Sorensen 1988, Williams 1996), (b) introspection-based strategies, according to which Moorean statements are plainly unbelievable or unassertible (e.g. Hintikka 1962). The pragmatic strategy is usually thought to be less demanding when it comes to the strength of the system of doxastic logic needed to demonstrate the falsehood of believed Moorean proposition, since the latter strategy needs to appeal to the highly controversial BB principle (doxastic counterpart of modal axiom 4) or at least some stronger introspective principle (Rieger 2015).

In my talk I will challenge this consensus and argue that the proper and general explanation of Moore's Paradox needs to utilize BB principle, so that any pragmatic strategy needs the same logical resources as introspection-based strategy. I will start by considering so-called iterated versions of Moore's Paradox (of the form "p, but I believe that I believe that not-p", Sorensen 2000) and argue, that their absurdity needs to be accounted for by any explanation of Moore's Paradox. Furthermore I will demonstrate that in order to prove the falsity of believed iterated Moorean proposition one needs the same logical resources as for proving that such proposition cannot be believed, and that the most natural (although not the weakest) way of doing so would be to accept modal logic KD4 as the underlying logic of belief.

References:
– Moore, G.E. (1944). Russell's theory of description. In: P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 177-225.
– Sorensen, R. (1988). Blindspots. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
– Sorensen, R. (2000). Moore's problem with iterated belief. The Philosophical Quarterly, 50(198), 28-43.
– Williams, J. N. (1996). Moorean absurdities and the nature of asser-

tion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74, 135-149.
– Rieger, A. (2015). Moore's Paradox, Introspection and Doxastic Logic. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 4(4), 215-227.
– Hintikka, J. (1962). Knowledge and belief: An introduction to the logic of the two notions. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Cristian Vulpe
Date:	11:20-11:50, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.003

Maciej Tarnowski (University of Warsaw, Poland)

Knowledge First Psychology

Valentin Teillet

shall argue that belief/desire psychology (BDP) is wrong and should be replaced by knowledge first psychology (KFP). BDP is widely accepted in cognitive science (Egan, 2012)(Fodor, 2008)(Block, 1995)(Chomsky, 1959)(Pylyshyn, 1980). It explains behaviour in terms of two mental states. Belief explains how mind is adapted to world, while desire explains how world is adapted to mind. My hypothesis is that this psychological methodology rests on false epistemological assumptions about the nature and role of belief. The best way to explain how mind is adapted to world is not through belief, but through knowledge.

BDP accepts the epistemological framework defended by the JTB analysis of knowledge. This programme defends three main theses. First, the (i) primitiveness and (ii) simplicity of belief, i.e. belief is (i) the starting point of epistemology and (ii) the simplest epistemic mental state to acquire. For instance, one cannot know without believing, but one can believe without knowing. So belief must define knowledge and not vice versa. If belief defines knowledge, then knowledge is a form of belief. So knowledge is not a mental state since it is reduced to the mental state of belief. Belief is primitive because it explains knowledge and it is simple because it is acquired before knowledge. Secondly,

cognitive internalism. According to JTB, knowledge is defined by an internal condition or narrow content (belief) and an external condition or broad content (truth). According to cognitive internalism a mental state cannot depend on the environment. Therefore knowledge cannot be a mental state (Stitch, 1978)(Burge, 1979)(Fodor, 1981)(Kim, 1993), unlike belief, which does not depend on the environment since it can be true or false. So belief again seems to be the only way to psychologically describe the way mind is adapted to world. Finally, causal effectiveness. If belief allows us to explain our actions it is because it depends on cognitive processes internal to our brain that cause our actions. Since knowledge depends on the environment, it does not depend on these cognitive processes internal to our brain and therefore it does not allow us to explain what causes our actions. The whole point of my paper will be to show that these three epistemological presuppositions are false. The argument is as follows. BDP relies on the JTB analysis of knowledge, yet the JTB analysis of knowledge is false, so BDP is false. I will show that JTB is false by introducing an alternative epistemological program, that of knowledge first epistemology (Williamson, 2000). I will then explain how this new epistemology can give rise to a new psychological methodology, that of knowledge first psychology (KFP).

Contrary to what JTB defends, knowledge first epistemology argues that knowledge is just as primitive as belief and is simpler than belief. Belief is primitive because it cannot be defined. But firsters argue that knowledge cannot be defined either. Indeed, if belief can be true or false, knowledge is necessarily true. So JTB's assumption that belief can define knowledge is false. Secondly, knowledge is less complex than belief since it is binary: either I know or I do not know. On the other hand, belief can be of several kinds: true, lucky, probable, false, etc. So it is easier to attribute knowledge than belief (Nagel, 2011)(Phillips, et. al., 2021). Secondly, cognitive internalism also applies to knowledge. Indeed, not only does belief also partly depend on the environment (if I believe that p and p becomes false without my being aware of it, then I continue to believe that p, but I have gone from a true belief to a false belief), but knowledge also corresponds to precise cognitive heuristics (Nagel, 2013, 2017) as well as to identifiable neurocognitive mechanisms (Bricker, 2021). So knowledge admits of at least a minimal form of cognitive internalism. Third, if cognitive internalism also applies to knowledge, then knowledge has causal efficacy and can therefore explain our behaviour. For instance, if I ring my neighbours' doorbell, I would not behave in the same way if I knew they were home or if I simply

believed they were home. In the first case I might be offended if they don't open the door, whereas in the second case I would simply tell myself that my belief was wrong (Williamson, 2000, p. 86). Knowledge therefore has at least as much explanatory power as belief.

The whole point of the last part will be to show how knowledge has a stronger explanatory power than belief and therefore why KFP should be preferred to BDP. KFP faces two main objections (Magnus & Cohen, 2003). Firstly, belief cannot be dispensed with in psychological explanation. Second, more complex beliefs such as "belief-that-will-survive-scrutiny" does as well as knowledge. I will argue that both of these objections miss the mark. First, KFP does not imply an elimination of belief in psychology. It only implies that the norm of belief is knowledge (my belief that p is correct if I know that p), so any explanation from belief involves an explanation in terms of knowledge. Second, belief may have strong explanatory power at the local level (to explain a particular behaviour), but the explanatory power of knowledge is at the global level. In other words, KFP relies on a knowledge/ignorance (absence of knowledge) explanation, i.e. it can explain all behaviour based on this distinction. Nevertheless, ignorance can correspond to different types of beliefs at the local level (true, lucky, reliable, probable, false, etc.). KFP therefore has a greater explanatory power than BDP because our knowledge attributions are easier, more numerous and allow us to explain a greater number of behaviours. Furthermore, KFP makes a finer psychological explanation possible in terms of beliefs at the local level while BDP prevented any explanation in terms of knowledge. For all these reasons, KFP is preferable to BDP.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Leon Assaad
Date:	16:00-16:30, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.003

<div style="text-align:center">⁂</div>

Valentin Teillet (EHESS, France)

Justified Non-moral Blame

Lorenzo Testa

In the contemporary debate, the vast majority of recent accounts of blame focuses on moral blame, understood as a reaction towards an agent who has violated a justifiable moral standard. Most philosophers, however, recognize that morality is not the only normative domain. Moreover, it seems that our interpersonal practices already include reactions to agents who have violated nonmoral standards. The aim of this paper is to enquire whether those reactions count as blame, and whether non-moral blame is all-things-considered justifiable. Does the concept of blame admit that we non-morally blame agents? And, even if non-moral blame is conceptually possible, can we justifiably non-morally blame agents?

The first two sections of this paper defend the concept of non-moral blameworthiness. Following P.F. Strawson, many accounts of moral blame understand blame as a negative responsibility-imputing affective attitude. Resentment, indignation, and guilt are commonly seen as tightly connected to blame. This paper claims that this interpretation of moral blame does not rule out the possibility that non-moral blame being connected to other reactive attitudes such as shame or regret. What is more, negative responsibility-imputing affective attitudes seem appropriate in cases in which agents fail to meet some relevant operational standards. These standards do not need to be moral standards, as in cases of so-called "skill blame". A musician may feel like kicking herself for failing to hit the right note, and the fittingness of this affective attitude does not seem to rely on the agent having violated a moral standard.

The last section of this paper shows that non-moral blame can be all-things-considered justifiable, thus addressing normative concerns linked to blame. Blame does not have to be interpreted as a sanction nor as a form of punishment. An argument for this claim is provided along with a clear example of permissible non-moral blame.

Section:	Ethics
Language:	English
Chair:	Silvana Pani
Date:	11:20-11:50, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.005

Lorenzo Testa (University of Pavia, Italy)

Selfhood as an Emergent Property

Dmitry Tourko

Philosophers have been speaking for some time about the conflict between the first- and third-person viewpoints (Madell 1991), or the scientific and manifest images of man (Sellars 1963). Building upon the work of Baker (2000), Zahavi (2005) and Bayne (2010), I suggest an emergentist solution to this conflict. Emergentism, a non-reductionist approach in philosophy of mind, can also be used to deal with some problems in personal identity. Consider selves, defined as (1) mental things or properties identical to us (2) which are not identical to our bodies or brains. There can be two principal metaphysical stances about selves: (1) anti-realism / eliminativism - there are no such things as selves and we are identical to respective bodies, brains, or human animals; (2) realism - we are selves, selves are real, selves are not identical to animals etc. (Note that a self-realist stance does not commit us to a broader substance dualism). Before an argument for either is made, let us again turn to selves. Perhaps it is rather uncontroversial that an entity S has selfhood iff S possesses a first-person perspective. S's having a first-person perspective means there is some state which is for S (e.g. feeling pain, being cold, or seeing red are all states which might be for S; it can also be argued a token of these states, if it is for S, is only for S). Note that being in a state is different from experiencing this state perspectivally: a rock can be cold, but the state of being cold is not for the rock (i.e. the rock lacks for-me-ness, or, put differently, the rock is not in an intentional state of being cold). If the first-person perspective is indeed essential for selfhood, then self-antirealism must be rejected insofar as complete physical descriptions of bodies, brains and animals apparently cannot account for their having the first-person perspective. Thus, we ought to opt for self-realism. How, then, do we reconcile the ontical gap between non-identical animals and their selves? A possible solution is self-emergentism. On this view, selfhood, or having a first-person perspective, is an emergent property S of animals which are not identical to S.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Bruno Cortesi
Date: 16:00-16:30, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location: HS E.002

Dmitry Tourko (HSE University, Russia)

Inheritance Temporalism: Sketching a Novel Temporalist Approach

Emanuele Tullio

Some recent temporalist approaches to temporal metaphysics identify instants of time with abstract entities rather than with physical spacetime hypersurfaces. For instance, Bacon (1) identifies times with functions mapping abstract indices to hypersurfaces, and Dorr (3) (unpublished) identifies times with functions mapping individuals to their temporal counterparts. The resulting views aim to maintain that a time is metaphysically distinguished in an A-theoretic sense without singling out a region of spacetime as special. They are ultimately meant to develop a temporalist picture of reality that, at least at the fundamental level, is consistent with egalitarianism about spacetime hypersurfaces. I wish to develop the bones of a view in the spirit of these approaches.

Such view is built within the framework of a specific theory of persistence: perdurantism. In particular it is built within the account of property-instantiation that (standard) perdurantism presupposes. In a nutshell, according to such account the instantiation of properties by perduring wholes is ultimately due to the possession of temporal parts. Temporal parts do the instantiation work in the first place and perduring wholes instantiate the properties had by their temporal parts derivatively - they inherit properties from their temporal parts. My view focuses on the instantiation of one specific class of properties: phenomenal properties. On the one hand, it holds that fundamental facts about what phenomenal properties are instantiated by temporal parts are permanent: temporal parts always instantiate all their

properties. On the other hand, it holds that derivative facts about what phenomenal properties are instantiated by perduring wholes are temporary and not eternal: perduring wholes sometime instantiate the phenomenal properties had by one of their parts and sometimes those had by another. In such a way, the view develops a picture which holds (i) that at the fundamental level of reality facts are as permanent as they are on a B-theoretic approach to time, and (ii) that at the non-fundamental level of reality some facts are as temporary as they are on an A-theoretic approach. As its core insight is that what properties perduring wholes inherit is a temporary matter, the view can be labelled as Inheritance Temporalism (IT).

In the context of IT, times, rather than being identified with physical entities like spacetime hypersurfaces, can be identified with functions that map the phenomenal properties had by one of their temporal parts to each perduring worm. As these functions determine what derivative facts about derivative instantiation of phenomenal properties by perduring wholes hold, they can be labelled as inheritance functions (IF). In such a way, the passage of time ultimately consists in a transition in what set of IFs holds: as time passes there is a transition in what phenomenal properties perduring wholes derivatively instantiate (and hence in what experiences they have). In turn, the transition between the holding of a set of IFs and another can be grasped by appealing to tense operators (which, in such context, would (i) be primitive and irreducible and (ii) belong to a non-fundamental level of reality - much as like in Bacons view (1)). So, the resulting picture would be a picture where there are non-fundamental tensed facts about what set of IFs is/were/will be the case.

I shall argue that, as IT identifies times with sets of IFs, it can be coupled with Special Relativity Theory without incurring in the usual A-theoretic drawback of enriching spacetime with some additional fundamental facts about its structure. It is not necessary to hold that some point or region of spacetime is distinguished from the others as it instantiates some A-theoretic property like presentness (as it happens in the context of standard A-theories like the Moving Spotlight Theory (2) (4)). Friends of IT can agree with B-theorists about what is the fundamental furniture of spacetime and about the fact that all hypersurfaces are metaphysically on a par. Still, they can maintain that time passes in an A-theoretic sense: it passes since there is a transition in what abstract set of IFs is/were/will be the case.

Then, I shall focus at length on a concern that may affect IT (I

shall set aside other issues that may pertain the fundamental ideology of the view). Such concern is about IFs. Say you have many facts about what phenomenal properties are derivatively instantiated (inherited) by perduring worms. Then a natural question is about whether different perduring worms inherit properties from temporal parts that exist at the same time. That is, is inheritance of properties synchronized among different worms or not? Of course, we want it to be synchronized: we want the experiences of the worms to be centred on the same time. This is especially valuable in the case of interacting worms: while the worm-Brutus has experiences of stabbing Caesar we want the worm-Caesar to have experiences of being stabbed by Brutus. Still, in a relativistic context it is hard to maintain that inheritance of phenomenal properties by worms - and hence experiences "could be synchronized in such fashion" a problem related to this concerns Dorr's view (1) (3). Roughly, Special Relativity entails that there is no frame-independent way of singling instants out of spacetime. It is hard to impose synchronicity over IFs without assuming that one way of singling instants out (and so one specific frame of reference) is privileged with respect to the others. But this brings back to well know problems afflicting standard A-theories of time and the problem of privileging a given way of singling out instants from spacetime. So, IT seems bound to go without synchronicity: while the worm-Brutus inherits experiences of stabbing Caesar, the worm-Caesar may inherit experiences of hanging out with Cleopatra rather than experiences of being stabbed by Brutus. This may look like a conclusive case against the view. Still, I shall provide some reasons for thinking that, at a closer inspection, the lack of synchronicity entailed by IT is not untenable. In particular, I shall show that, as fundamental facts about the instantiation of properties by temporal parts are permanent, the worm-Brutus can still be said to be stabbing an entity which has experiences of being stabbed by Brutus: the Caesar's temporal part which is in fact stabbed by one of Brutus' temporal parts.

Finally, I shall conclude that IT is in many ways attractive and worthy of further exploration.

References:
(1) Bacon, A., 2018, "Tense and Relativity". Nous, 52 (3): 667-696.
(2) Deasy, D., 2022, "The Modal Moving Spotlight". Mind, forthcoming.
(3) Dorr, C., Counterparts. Manuscript.

(4) Skow, B., 2009, "Relativity and the Moving Spotlight". The Journal of Philosophy, 106: 666-78.

Section:	Metaphysics/Ontology
Language:	English
Chair:	Youssef Aguisoul
Date:	15:20-15:50, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location:	SR 1.006

❧

Emanuele Tullio (CEU, Italy)

Behaviourism vs. Mentalism: Two Approaches to Decision Theory and the Normative Implications of Modelling Practice

Oyku Ulusoy

In her thought-provoking framework of transformative experiences, Laurie Paul (2014, 2015) challenges standard decision theory for its adequacy (1) to model choice settings and (2) to suggest viable rationality norms, when subjective values of the outcomes are undetermined. Paul's critique is based on the epistemic limitations of human agents to know the subjective effects of new experiences on their understanding and assessments. Specifically, she argues that fundamentally new experiences provide new knowledge, which transforms individuals' understanding, sense of self, interests and values in incomprehensible ways. When a decision-maker needs to compare the alternative futures, under which she will have significantly different lived experiences; from her epistemically impoverished first-personal point of view, she cannot assign subjective values. Nor can she decide how she values the alternative selves that she may become, to choose which self she wants to be rationally. Paul's critique aimed at the normative interpretations of standard decision theory and is in two folds. She first questions the theory's object of interest, i.e., subjective values, as a measure to rank and compare the alternatives, in the case of transformative experiences. She also opposes the normative bearing of the rational choice frameworks on real-world decision-makers in the cases of "transformative choices".

Two issues arise regarding in what ways Paul's critique applies to decision theory. First one is about value-formation and its use within the domain of decision theory, i.e., what subjective values represent. Secondly, it is important to establish what the normative implications of decision theory can be. More specifically, what normative truths can be derived from the theoretical frameworks, and whether these truths inform the real-world decision-makers on how they ought to make rational choices. I argue that Paul's critique about subjective values only apply to decision theory if the concept of subjective values concerns the psychological reals and cognitive limitations of decision-makers. I also argue that norms for rational action cannot necessarily be derived from the normative implications of decision models. The formal solutions to represent transformative choices in a decision theoretic framework may not provide action-guidance for rational decision-making to real-world agents.

I use Titelbaum (2013, 2021) to design the inquiry. In his exploratory work on how to practice normative modelling, Titelbaum argues that even the models that are used for normative goals, they are often constructed descriptively: they characterize and explain regularities in choice. That is, when the modeller's goal is to fit real-world phenomena in the model, the outcome is a descriptive framework. Titelbaum, on the other hand, proposes to construct models as distinct objects of study from the targets of the models, and to focus on how to interpret their relations with their targets -before introducing novel phenomena to study with the model. There are two sorts of interpretations necessary for normative modelling: First, to determine how to apply the model, i.e., how to use the formal tools to represent the features of the world. Secondly, to determine what normative truths can be obtained from the outcomes of the model. Titelbaum argues that this approach is useful for interpreting the implications of the models and for acquiring normative truths.

By following Titelbaum's approach, I provide a comparison of the conceptualisation of subjective values and preferences under two approaches to decision theory: mentalism and behaviourism (Okasha, 2016; Dietrich & List, 2016). Behaviourism and mentalism are views of decision theory that differ in their interpretation of preferences and beliefs and in their postulated evidential basis. For behaviourists, the relations and functions describing preferences and beliefs should be interpreted as abstract theoretical concepts, which are useful to describe behaviour patterns and to organize empirical regularities. Here,

preferences are the primary source of data and domain of application. Utilities and credences are inferential outcomes of the framework and secondary for the efforts of representation and explanation. Accordingly, subjective values are a derived outcome of the framework, not the domain of study. As such, epistemic limitations do not present an obstacle for the behaviourists to represent rational preferences, so long as preference-formation conforms to the rationality rules.

For the mentalists, the objects of decision-theoretic functions are representations of real psychological or mental phenomena. Utility is a real and independent psychological factor, not derived from other objects such as preferences. Whereas preferences and choices are the outcomes of agents' assessments of their utilities and credences. Accordingly, the problems that Paul puts forward present an obstacle for the mentalist approach, as subjective understanding of decision-makers concerns the domain for representation.

Regarding the normative implications, behaviourist framework does not indicate that decision-makers ought to imagine and evaluate their decisions by applying the axiomatic structure of the framework in their thinking. The choice functions represent rational choice "as if" decision-makers order their preferences in accordance with a utility function. If the "as if" condition holds, decisions can be deemed rational. Accordingly, this approach can inform real-world decision-makers regarding transformative phenomena, should they assess whether their preferences are consistent with the axioms, without the need to assign a cognitively accessible value to their alternatives.

Since in their framework, the value function "should" correspond to psychological reals and explain preferences, mentalists will be compelled to reconfigure their representation models to accommodate undetermined subjective values. The normative implications of the mentalist approach then depend on the outcomes of the modified models. We can view (Steele & Stefansson, forthcoming) as an example of such attempt. Their framework provides how awareness growth can account for limits in understanding due to epistemic boundaries. They explain that when awareness growth is taken into consideration, transformative decisions can take place rationally. However, the framework does not provide guidance to decision-makers themselves due to its descriptive nature as understood by Titelbaum. That is, it is unclear how decision-makers should account for awareness growth when they assess the subjective values of their alternatives.

Bibliography:

– Dietrich, F., & List, C. (2016). Mentalism versus behaviourism in economics: a philosophy-of-science perspective; Economics and Philosophy, 32(2), 249-281.

– Okasha, S. (2016). On the interpretation of decision theory. Economics and Philosophy, 32(3), 409-433.

– Paul, L. A. (2014). Transformative Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

– Paul, L. A. (2015). Transformative Choice: Discussions and Replies. Res Philosophica, 92(2): 473-545.

– Steele, Katie & Stefansson, H. Orri (forthcoming). Transformative experience, awareness growth and the limits of rational planning. Philosophy of Science.

– Titelbaum, M. (2013). Quitting certainties: A bayesian framework modeling degrees of belief (1st ed.) "1st ed.". Oxford: Oxford University Press.

– Titelbaum, Michael G. (2021) Normative Modeling. Preprint URL: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/18670.

Section:	Philosophy of Science
Language:	English
Chair:	Ina Jängten
Date:	12:00-12:30, 08 September 2022 (Thursday)
Location:	SR 1.004

❧✺❧

Oyku Ulusoy (University of Bristol, United Kingdom)

E-Mail: oykuulusoy@gmail.com

Decoding ostension: the metacommunicative file

Edoardo Vaccargiu

Developmental psychology has devoted much attention to children's early involvement in ostensive communication, i.e., a form of communication relying on the expression and recognition of communicative intentions (Scott-Phillips 2014). According to Csibra (2010), communicative intentions are expressed via specific behavioral cues that are easily decoded by infants. Many studies suggest that infants' sensitivity to such "ostensive cues" reveals an

early ability to track others' communicative intentions, thus generating specific interpretative bias in children, such as referential expectations, generalization of newly-acquired information, and expectations of trustworthiness.

From a theoretical perspective, these findings raise the question of how to conceptualize the representational apparatus which underlies communicative intentions' recognition. Here, I propose to describe this process through the notion of metacommunicative file.

My proposal draws upon a recent hypothesis in developmental research, according to which children's disposition to be biased by others' mental states is underpinned by flexible structures admitting placeholders for underspecified propositional contents (Kovacs 2016). Analogously, I describe metacommunicative files as metarepresentational structures made up of two variables, one for the agent acting with communicative intent, the other for the content conveyed through an ostensive act of communication. Crucially, the computation of these variables can be procedurally and temporally distinguished, thus allowing for the content variable to be provisionally tagged by a placeholder and then filled afterwards.

By discussing some scenarios that exemplify the dynamic functioning of this new theoretical construct, I propose to describe the decoding of ostensive cues as the setting up of a metacommunicative file that is bonded to the communicator, and whose informative content is left underspecified or is computed later by further cognitive effort.

Section:	Philosophy of Mind
Language:	English
Chair:	Daniel Weger
Date:	10:00-10:30, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	HS E.002

<div align="center">❧</div>

Edoardo Vaccargiu (University of Genoa, Italy)

Silencing as Resistance

Marlene Valek

Silencing is usually discussed as something that unjustly happens to an already disadvantaged group. I explore the possibility of using silencing as a means of resistance and countering discriminatory speech. I argue that Quill Kuklaas account of uptake gives us an interesting framework for (partially) retracting the speech of others.

The role of uptake in performing an illocutionary act has been much discussed. In social philosophy of language, uptake has mostly been treated as a felicity condition for illocution (Langton&Hornsby 1998). More radically, sometimes uptake is taken to constitute the illocution (Kukla 2014).

To be (illocutionary) silenced means to be made unable to perform a certain illocutionary act. Failing to secure uptake is one way illocutions can be infelicitous. If the intended warning "You won't make the jump!" is taken to be a dare by its recipient, the speaker failed to warn them. But what did they do? Either they failed to do anything (Langton&Hornsby), or even issued a dare (Kukla).

Kukla holds that the performative force of a speech act depends on its output, i.e., the normative statuses, the social change, it brings about. For example, a speech act is a promise if and only if it brings about an obligation to keep it (and other related normative statuses), independently of the speaker's intention to make a promise.

What at first might sound like an unpalatable consequence, I argue, can also provide a fruitful framework for counter-speech. If a hearer can change what a person does with words through her subsequent behaviour and subscription to normative statuses, she might be able to stop discriminatory speech simply by failing to react accordingly. A typical example would be treating an insult as a joke. If the hearers laugh instead of taking offence, the speaker's insults are silenced. Importantly, this approach should not be interpreted as an appeal to endure abuse, but as calling attention to the power a hearer has over a speaker's actions.

My argument adds to the already existing discussion about blocking felicity conditions (Langton 2018) and retracting one's own speech (Kukla&Steinberg 2021). I argue that with Kukla's framework it is possible to go even further and make plausible the possibility to retract other people's illocutions as a hearer or a small-scale group effort by

adjusting one's reaction.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

– Hornsby, Jennifer and Rae Langton (1998): "Free Speech And Illocution" in Legal Theory, 4 (1998), 21-37.

– Kukla, Quill -writing as Rebecca- (2014) "Performative Force, Convention, and Discursive Injustice" in: Hypatia, vol. 29, no. 2 (spring 2014), pp. 440-457.

– Kukla, Quill and Dan Steinberg (2021): "'I Really Didn't Say Everything I Said': The Pragmatics of Retraction" in Townsend, Leo; Stovall, Preston; Schmid, Hans Bernhard (eds.): The Social Institution of Discursive Norms. Milton: Taylor & Francis Group, pp. 223-247.

– Langton, Rae (2018): "Blocking as Counter-Speech" in Fogal, Daniel; Harris, Daniel W.; Moss, Matt (eds.): New Work on Speech Acts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Section:	Philosophy of Language
Language:	English
Chair:	Hugo Ribeiro Mota
Date:	10:40-11:10, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.007

Marlene Valek (University of Vienna, Austria)

Norm externalisation and the evolution of cooperation

Martina Valkovic

In a recent article, Kyle Stanford gives an account of what he terms "externalisation", understood as our tendency to objectify or externalise moral demands and obligations. According to Stanford, externalisation is a distinctive feature of our moral psychology which is adaptive since it enables and preserves cooperation. I claim that the main issue with this account is that it assumes a primarily psychological, instead of social, perspective. I argue for an alternative perspective that gives primacy to social practices and the social reality they create. I show how, seen in this light, norm

externalisation becomes a side-effect instead of an adaptation deserving of a special explanation

Section:	Political Philosophy
Language:	English
Chair:	Giada Coleschi
Date:	15:20-15:50, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location:	SR 1.007

Martina Valkovic (Leibniz University Hannover; Radboud University Nijmegen, Netherlands)

Productive Higher-Level Causation Without Mechanisms

Martin Voggenauer

In this paper I argue for a productive theory of higher-level causation without reference to mechanisms to meet the common objection of circularity against mechanistic theories. Mechanistic theories of causation, like pursued by Glennan, are often considered as a promising productive alternative or supplement to conserved quantity theories of causation which also covers higher-level causal relationships. However, despite their recent success, mechanistic theories of causation face the threat of circularity as the concept of mechanism is itself a causal concept. To avoid this problem, I reconsider the general structure of conserved quantity theories, which mechanistic theories are often considered extensions of and which are not at risk of circularity. I deduce from this general structure that we should consider productive causation also on higher levels as mere sequences of changes of higher-level structures which are connected by processes that consist in the preservation of higher-level structures. However, we still have to guarantee that, in fact, the result of the higher-level changes is preserved in the processes and not just any higher-level structure. Therefore, I further argue that the structure changing events and the structure preserving processes, in turn, are connected through lower-level causal relationships instead of the mechanisms which comprise the events and processes.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Maren Bräutigam
Date: 15:20-15:50, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.004

✺

Martin Voggenauer (University of Cologne, Germany)

Moral Worth and the Two Kinds of Reasons Challenge

Michael Vollmer

One of the most influential accounts of moral worthis the so-called coincidencethesiswhich has been defended by Julia Markovitsin several publications: an action confers moral worth iff the motivating reasons for which the agent performed the action coincide in content, as well as in strength with her normative reasonsin favour of acting this way. Several objections have been levelled against Markovits' theory, one of which is the focus of this talk: Joashua Gert has prominently argued that we have to distinguish two kinds of functions and associated weights of reasons. A reason has some degree of justificatoryweight, as well as requiringweight which can come apart. Now, in a widely neglected paper, Gert uses this distinction to level an objection against the coincidence thesis. First, one has to disambiguate the notion of ?strength? of normative reasons. He takes it to refer to the requiringweight of such reasons. Second, provided that altruistic reasons in supererogatory situations are merely justificatory, we cannot identify the strength of normative reasons Markovits?talks about with the requiring weight. In my talk, I, first, aim to rebuttal Gert?s objection. On the one hand,he does not discuss the option to identify the 'strength' of a normative reason with its justificatory weight. On the other hand,as has been recurrently noted in the literature, Gert?s analysis of altruistic reasonsis highly questionable, i.e. they do have considerable amount of demanding weight. Hence, there is no problem for Markovits' theory to accommodate supererogation. Second, I investigate whether one can develop a Gert-inspired objection

to the coincidence thesis by using yet an-other differentiation between two kinds of reasons, i.e. Julian Snedegar's distinction of reasons forand reasonsagainst. Here, I maintain, one should take a different path in order to accommodate Snedegar's ideas: one should equally distinguish between motivating reasons and de-motivating reasonswhich come with their own kind of strength.

Section:	Ethics
Language:	English
Chair:	Silvana Pani
Date:	10:40-11:10, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.005

Michael Vollmer (University of Innsbruck, Austria)

A Dispositional Theory of Practical Basing

Cristian Vulpe

et the practical basing relation be the relation that holds between an action and the reason for which someone does the action. In this paper, I offer a theory of practical basing which I call 'Double Dispositionalism' (DD). According to DD, S's phi-ing is based on R if and only if S's phi-ing involves: (i) S's exercise of a disposition D1 to ? when R, and (ii) S's disposition D2 to believe that R supports phi-ing. With respect to the second condition, DD requires that S embodies D2, which S might exercise by adopting certain beliefs, although as I will argue, such exercises are not required for S's phi-ing to be based on R. Furthermore, I expand DD into a theory of proper practical basing. In this sense, I argue that S's phi-ing is properly based on R if and only if S's phi-ing is based on R and D2 is reliable, i.e., it generally leads to true beliefs. Finally, I show that in contrast to other competing theories, viz., the doxastic theory, and the dispositional theory, DD avoids (i) the problem of over-intellectualization, (ii) the problem of deviant explanatory chains, and (iii) a recent challenge involving higher-order defeat.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Leon Assaad
Date: 14:00-14:30, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.003

❧

Cristian Vulpe (University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, USA)

Internalist Representationalism and the Predictive Mind

Daniel Weger

In Perception (2021), Adam Pautz discusses the main views in the philosophy of perception and examines whether they provide an adequate answer to the external-internal puzzle. According to him, internalist representationalism can accommodate both the external directed-ness and the internal dependence of perceptual experience, but it lacks a comprehensive ac-count of experiential representation. Although externalist representationalism cannot account for internal dependence, proponents of representationalism usually still adhere to it because it provides a somewhat natural account of experiential representation in terms of tracking or detecting features in the perceiving subject's environment.

In this talk, I want to argue that the neuroscientific framework of Prediction Error Minimization (PEM) put forth in Jakob Hohwy's The Predictive Mind might provide internalist repre-sentationalism with an idea of how to give a plausible account of experiential representation. To this end, I will first show that PEM is compatible with internalist representationalism because it is both internalist and representational-ist in spirit. Second, I will argue that PEM is committed to a structuralist notion of representation. My claim is that we can conceive the generative model at the core of PEM as structurally representing the perceiving subject's environment because it recapitulates the hidden causal structure of the world. Third, I will point out that we can draw on ideas familiar from inferential or functional roles semantics to better understand how individual hypotheses acquire their specific content. Finally, I will elaborate on how the resulting version of internalist

representationalism accommodates both the external directedness and the internal dependence on perceptual experience and that it goes well together with empirical findings on perceptual experience.

Section:	Philosophy of Mind
Language:	English
Chair:	Jakob Roloff
Date:	12:00-12:30, 08 September 2022 (Thursday)
Location:	HS E.002

❧

Daniel Weger (Goethe University Frankfurt/Main, Germany)

Concept-Use and Hermeneutical Justice

Margot Witte

       argue that hermeneutical justice demands not only that an agent possess the relevant concept(s), but also that she can competently use them. This requires revisions to mainline descriptions of hermeneutical justice.

Trauma is one way that harms to someone's ability to use concepts can result in hermeneutical injustice. I consider the hypothetical case of Olivia, a rape victim. The high emotional and social costs of identifying her experience as rape prevent Olivia from competently using her concept, <rape>, to make sense of her trauma.

The case points towards two conclusions. First, concept-possession and concept-use can come apart: After Olivia is raped, she possesses the concept but cannot competently use it. Second, unjustly violating someone's ability to use a concept constitutes a hermeneutical injustice - even if one maintains possession of the concept.

Both conclusions challenge mainline theories of hermeneutical justice, and I sketch two ways to revise the theories accordingly. One option requires revising our definition of concept-possession to include competent concept-use. A second involves revising our understanding of hermeneutical justice to require both concept-possession and concept-use. I argue that this second option is more promising.

My intervention has implications for our efforts to promote epistemic justice. We must ensure that educational efforts pair relevant

concepts with the tools to actually use them competently. Additionally, we must pay careful attention to the usefulness of the concepts we develop when we do ameliorative analysis and conceptual engineering. We also see that hermeneutical justice requires lowering the social, emotional, and cognitive costs associated with using concepts that people already possess.

The stakes are high. Recognizing the importance of concept-use has consequences for our theories of hermeneutical justice, and failing to do so risks overlooking opportunities to promote justice.

Section:	Philosophy of Language
Language:	English
Chair:	Hugo Ribeiro Mota
Date:	12:00-12:30, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.007

Margot Witte (University of Michigan - Ann Arbor, United States)

On the role of idealizations in legal interpretation

Marcin Wozny

The aim of my presentation will be to answer the question what role idealizations play in the process of legal interpretation. The philosophy of science literature highlights the crucial role that idealisations play in our cognitive practices, particularly in the sciences - both natural and social (Nowak 1980, Cartwright 1983, Weisberg 2007, Potochnik 2017, Uskali 2020), as well as in ethics, or political theories (O'Neill 1987, Ismael 2016). However, there is still little attention given to considering the role of idealization in legal studies, particularly in the crucial process of legal interpretation. One of the few philosophers of science who systematically addressed the issue of idealization in legal interpretation was Leszek Nowak, who, on the basis of his idealizational theory of science, pointed out that the process of legal interpretation is based on a number of idealization assumptions according to which the legislator is perceived as an ideal subject, i.e. one who, firstly, as a rational subject, possesses non-contradictory and systematic knowledge, asymmetrical and transitive preferences, and chooses

means adequate to ends, and, secondly, as a perfect subject, possesses perfect linguistic competence, legal knowledge and up-to-date empirical knowledge, and wishes to realise states of affairs considered as decent against the background of a given legal axiology (Nowak 1973, 2021). Consequently, the interpretation of a legal text follows a direction that allows the realisation of these assumptions (Nowak 1973, 2021). In my presentation, using Nowak's theory as an example, I will consider what perspectives and limitations are involved in describing the practice of legal interpretation as a practice based on idealizations. At the same time, while acknowledging the validity of many of Nowak's insights, I will point to problems with the assumptions underlying his vision of legal interpretation (a theory of language that can be described as internalist, and a vision of legal practice that is not entirely adequate). Consequently, I will propose a modification of Nowak's model towards more externalist views of language (Putnam 1975, Kripke 1980, Milikan 1984), as well as more modern perspectives on legal practice (Dworkin 1987, Greenberg 2004), so that Nowak's original theory becomes more resistant to objections.

Bibliography:
– Cartwright, N. (1983). How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
– Dworkin, R. (1987). Law's Empire. Harvard University Press.
– Greenberg, M. (2004). How Facts Make Law. Legal Theory, Vol. 10, pp. 157-198.
– Ismael, J. (2016). A philosopher of science looks at idealization in political theory. Social Philosophy and Policy, 33(1-2), 11-31.
– Jones, Martin R. (2005). Idealization and Abstraction: A Framework. In Idealization XII: Correcting the Model, edited by Martin R. Jones and Nancy Cartwright, 173- 217. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
– Kripke, Saul. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.
– Mäki U. (2020). "Puzzled by Idealizations and Understanding Their Functions." Philosophy of the Social Sciences 2020, Vol. 50(3) 215-237.
– Milikan, R. (1984). Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism, MIT Press.
– Nowak, L. (1980). The Structure of Idealization: Towards a Systematic Interpretation of the Marxian Idea of Science. Dordrecht: Reidel.
– Nowak, L. (1973). Interpretacja prawnicza. Studium z metodologii prawoznawstwa. Warszawa: Pawstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe.

– Nowak, L. (2021). Chapter 9 Juristic Interpretation. In Poznac; School of Legal Theory, Leiden: Brill.

– O'Neill, O. (1987). Abstraction, Idealization and Ideology in Ethics. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements 22:55-69.

– Potochnik, A. (2017). Idealization and the Aims of Science. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

– Putnam, H. (1975). The meaning of "meaning". Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.

– Weisberg, M. (2007). Three Kinds of Idealization. Journal of Philosophy 104 (12): 639-59.

Section:	Philosophy of Science
Language:	English
Chair:	Oyku Ulusoy
Date:	14:40-15:10, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.004

<div align="center">✵</div>

Marcin Wozny (University of Warsaw, Poland)

Mary meets Mike: In defense of the Knowledge Argument

Abhishek Yadav

ackson (1982) proposes the knowledge argument to reject reductive physicalism by showing that all knowledge is not physical. The knowledge argument has two main premises: one epistemic that Mary would learn something new when she comes out of the room; and the second metaphysical that what she will learn is not physical. Dennett (1991, 2007) objects to the first premise and tries to show that Mary would not "learn" anything new. Churchland (1985,1990) Lewis (1983, 1988) and Nemirow (1980, 1990, 2007) object to the second premise and argue that Mary would learn something new but this new information would be physical. Churchland argues that Mary would learn the new mode of accessing the same knowledge that she already had inside the room. Lewis and Nemirow present the ability hypothesis as a criticism to the knowledge argument. According to this view, Mary would learn an ability (know-how)

to remember, recognise or imagine the already possessed propositional knowledge (know-that). Mary would simply gain an ability on coming out of the room, not new knowledge. In this paper, I present a criticism of the ability thesis by using the indirect proof method. I propose a thought experiment to show that if we accept the ability thesis to hold true, it is not able to account for the fact that the ability to remember, recognise and imagine something is categorically different in the case of phenomenal knowledge. Know-how in the case of phenomenal knowledge cannot be explained by a thesis that only accommodates only physical knowledge. Gaining an ability would amount to gaining new knowledge in case of phenomenally accessible content. Thus, given our experience of the scope and possibility of knowledge which is non-physical, we conclude against a strict physicalist stance and in favour of phenomenalism. Mary learnt something new and phenomenal indeed!

Section:	Philosophy of Mind
Language:	English
Chair:	Daniel Weger
Date:	11:20-11:50, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	HS E.002

Abhishek Yadav (Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, Mumbai India, India)

Do we need a cure for gender-biased AI?

Palina Yaroshyk

In this talk, I will apply a post-phenomenological approach based on I-technology-world relation in order to inspect gender biases in technologies and how they influence ordinary users. The particular focus of his presentation is being fixed on gender biases on the level of cognitive skills. For that purpose, it analyzes AI personal assistants that are developed with an aim to mimic human interaction.

The philosophical approach to this politically pressing topic seeks not only to unveil hidden gender biases manifested in the cognitive skills of personal assistants, but, furthermore, argues for morally responsible

technologies. It will show that such an excuse of AI developers as claiming their creations to the work purely on statistics and algorithms leads to discrimination and enforces biased vision further into humans with which it interacts. Due to the feedback mechanism, the gender-biased inclinations are fed back to the system and are caught in a loop. The outcome - deepening the biases.

The concept of implicit stereotypes as "culture in mind", which was put forward by Perry Hinton, can be extended to technologies, to suggest that it can actually be used as a weapon to combat culturally conditioned stereotypes through, for example, long term associative training with an aim to have an impact on explicit and implicit processes of cognition.

Section:	Philosophy of Mind
Language:	English
Chair:	Martin Niederl
Date:	15:20-15:50, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location:	HS E.002

❧

Palina Yaroshyk (University of Warsaw, Poland)

Are Reasons of Partiality Deontic?

Xi Zhang

This paper aims to unpack two conceptual interlocks as argued along the vein of valuing, partiality, and duty so as to further respond to the inquiry that whether reasons of partiality are and, if so, how they could be deontic. To be specific, the first conceptual interlock denotes that when we value something, such as personal projects, interpersonal relationships, and group memberships, especially in a noninstrumental fashion, we may thus have reasons to take into consideration their interests, appeals, and demands so as to be provided with reasons of partiality to count in favor of them in a prioritized, special, and even exclusive manner, whereas the second conceptual interlock denotes that those reasons of partiality as derived, if any, would be, at least under certain circumstances, deontic ones, namely duties of partiality that we owe to them by virtue our moral

responsibilities in a contractualism manner. Having said, by valuing something noninstrumentally, it is argued that we are provided with deontic reasons of partiality as such.

Along this vein, this paper would unfold by unpack those two conceptual interlocks as indicated above as follows. Section II would explicate what valuing something noninstrumentally denotes. By comparing different manners in which the action of valuing is performed, either instrumentally or noninstrumentally as well as other actions similar to but nonetheless different from valuing, we may have a better grasp of the nuanced differences therein, and more generally, both propositional contents and normative implications of valuing from the perspective of practical reasoning. Besides, the relationship between valuing and valuable would be briefly discussed as well in that the counterpart of intrinsic value and extrinsic value, as elaborated by Raz for instance, would be also of much relevance here.

Section III would switch to reasons of partiality and explicate what on earth they denote. By elaborating the propositional contents of reasons of partiality, we may have a better grasp of what we are supposed to do insofar as we are embedded with such reasons. Further to this, a more challengeable inquiry would be the interlock between valuing something noninstrumentally and reasons of partiality as derived, namely why valuing something noninstrumentally may provide us with reasons of partiality. Section IV would finally come to the inquiry that under what circumstance, if any, would it be a justifiable case that reasons of partiality in the circumstance of interpersonal relationships be duties of partiality or otherwise.

Section:	Ethics
Language:	English
Chair:	Silvana Pani
Date:	16:00-16:30, 09. September 2022 (Friday)
Location:	SR 1.005

❧

Xi Zhang (New York University School of Law, United States)

On Relativizing the Sensitivity Condition to Belief-Formation Methods

Bin Zhao

According to the sensitivity account of knowledge, S knows that p only if S's belief in p is sensitive in the sense that S would not believe that p if p were false. It is widely accepted that the sensitivity condition should be relativized to belief-formation methods to avoid putative counterexamples. A remaining issue for the account is how belief-formation methods should be individuated. In this paper, I argue that while a coarse-grained individuation is still susceptible to counterexamples, a fine-grained individuation makes the target belief trivially insensitive. Therefore, there is not a principled way of individuating belief-formation methods that helps the sensitivity account to accommodate different cases.

Section:	Epistemology
Language:	English
Chair:	Niklas Gärtner
Date:	14:40-15:10, 07 September 2022 (Wednesday)
Location:	SR 1.003

Bin Zhao (University of California at Irvine, U.S.)

A neo-aristotelian approach to the ontology of events

Alfonso Romero Zuniga

Events are essential in describing the world. Their relevance in talk about causation, theory of mind, explanation and actions is indisputable. In past years, philosophers such as Davidson and Kim have focused on both the philosophical semantics and ontology of events. Influenced by a quinean point of view, much of these works are centred on issues about their ontological commitment, i.e. regarding whether they exist at all. However, this perspective has not adequately addressed the issue of how events exist or happen, in a non-reductive fashion.

This is the main concern of this paper: From a neo-aristotelian approach inspired by the work of philosophers like Lowe, Fine and

Sattig, I argue that events are to be understood as four-dimensional structured wholes. I aim to defend the idea of events as being composed of matter and form: Sets of instantaneous stages structured by an arrangement of kind sensitive slots. In this sense, this inquiry is to be better acknowledged as a mereological one.

First, I present the idea of telicity as central in distinguishing two families of event kinds: telic and atelic ones. Here, I rely upon classical linguistic knowledge about the temporal and causal internal structure of verbs and nouns, their so-called aspectual character, following authors like Vendler or Mourelatos. Telic events, such as playing a sonata and drawing a circle, have a natural or built-in end that has to be reached in order for us to truly state those phrases; while atelic ones, such walking or singing, do not. Using this distinction, I explore how these general kinds are intertwined with more specific ones, normally related to verbs, verbal phrases and other nouns. In this regard, I defend the standpoint that such denominations are primarily names in a rigid sense, however, we have to take their semantic and pragmatic content into account when searching for their essence, in a Lowe-like sense.

Secondly, I further discuss the idea of so-called dynamical stages: sets of instantaneous stages representing a minimal amount of change. These dynamical stages are to be understood as atelic events, forming the building blocks of every structured one. This distinction will allow a better understanding of incomplete events and general unstructured ones. In addition, I propose that this kind of events is to be understood analogically to stuff.

Furthermore, I use the idea of telicity in order to characterize the criteria of identity for events, shedding new light into a classical problem, which has remained without a workable solution let alone a definitive one. I propose both a first and a second order formulation of this telicity-based criterium, thus avoiding crucial criticism from rival alternatives.

Finally, I discuss some possible areas in which this new ontological insight regarding events could help to get a deeper understanding of related issues, such as in process biology and linguistics of verbal aspect.

In conclusion, this project, by closely examining events from a neo-aristotelian perspective, sheds new light on the rarely acknowledged issue of their structured compositional nature.

Section: Metaphysics/Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Alejandro Gracia di Rienzo
Date: 11:20-11:50, 08 September 2022 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.006

Alfonso Romero Zuniga (University of Tübingen, Germany)